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This dissertation analyzes environmental policy trends in frontier oil 
developments in two major Canadian oil dependent provinces: Alberta’s tar sands and 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s offshore oil fields. It attempts to account for how the 
environmental policy systems in these cases permit or do not prevent the 
environmental impacts of oil development. 
The theoretical frameworks of the resource curse and political ecology literatures 
guide this analysis within the broader context of work on petro-capitalism. I use 
qualitative methodologies, primarily semi-structured interviews and a review of 
scholarly, government, and publicly oriented literature, alongside basic economic data 
analysis to understand the impact of oil on these provinces.  
I argue that petro-political dynamics in these cases result in weak environmental 
policy regimes that, in turn, lead to undesirable environmental outcomes. The provinces 
I study are marked by the symbiotic relationship between governments and oil 
companies. Given shared economic interests in oil development, the provincial (and 
also federal) government ensures the continuation of the industry via financial 
subsidies, by actively defending and promoting the industry at home and abroad, and 
 by abrogating its regulatory responsibility and authority. The oil industry 
simultaneously reinforces the governmental approach through coordinated lobbying 
efforts. 
The shared interests of government and industry amount to strong consent for 
oil developments and translate into biased environmental policy regimes: the petro-
politics at work forward rapid, extensive oil development while not meaningfully 
restraining the resulting environmental impacts. Notable ways in which regulatory 
structures are weak or underdeveloped involve critical gaps in regulations and research 
as well as ineffective public consultation, monitoring and enforcement. 
However, there are viable policy alternatives available and growing oppositional 
movements are pressing for these changes. Building from those perspectives, the 
dissertation closes by presenting two paths forward. The first adjusts current policies to 
avoid the worst outcomes of the resource curse and to reduce environmental impacts. 
The second challenges the petro-political system more profoundly, suggesting 
alternatives that are environmentally sustainable and politically and economically just.  
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CHAPTER 1: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING PETRO-PROVINCES 
 
The tension between oil and the environment is a central problem of our time. 
Obtaining this fundamental global commodity results in multiple negative 
environmental impacts and risks along the entire oil production chain, from exploration 
to consumption. This is particularly evident in the recent shift in global oil production. 
Intense expansions in unconventional oil production over the last ten years signal a 
transition from relatively accessible conventional reserves to frontier oil that is farther 
North, farther offshore, and in ever more fragile environments. These projects have 
created some of the worst ecological impacts of oil development in scale, intensity and 
duration. This new form of oil development is a harbinger of the future of production of 
this critical commodity and, if peak oil theories prove correct, it could represent the 
final act in the great scramble for oil that has defined our modern period.  
In this dissertation I attempt to understand environmental policy trends in oil 
dependent governments, specifically two major Canadian frontier oil development 
sites: Alberta’s (AB’s) tar sands and Newfoundland and Labrador’s (NL’s) offshore oil 
fields. Specifically, I aim to account for how the serious environmental impacts of oil 
development are permitted or not prevented via weakened or ineffective environmental 
policy and institutions. Stated most succinctly, I argue that to protect oil developments 
(and under pressure from industry), oil dependent petro-states create weak 
environmental policy regimes that, in turn, result in undesirable environmental 
outcomes. The environmental policy regimes in petro-states exhibit an obvious sacrifice 
of environmental integrity for petro-dollars. 
“Petro-polities” are marked by the symbiotic relationship between governments 
and oil companies, with governments highly dependent on revenues from private oil 
developments and oil companies earning impressive profits from extraction on public 
lands. Given these interests, the provincial (and also federal) government ensures the 
  2 
continuation of the industry via funding or subsidies (such as tax breaks), by actively 
defending and promoting the industry at home and abroad, by being reluctant to dig 
deeper into the environmental questions raised, and by not intervening to protect the 
environment where regulatory authority exists (and instead emphasizing regulatory 
“streamlining”). The oil industry reinforces these governmental approaches via 
coordinated lobbying efforts, political financing, and media and community 
“engagement” of public relations campaigns. 
This context of the petro-state results in environmental regulation processes and 
institutions that forward rapid, extensive oil development and do not meaningfully 
restrain the resulting environmental impacts. The shared interests by government and 
industry in oil development amounts to strong consent for oil developments and it 
translates into an environmental policy regime that is biased toward oil development. 
The regulatory system is configured or retooled to support, permit, or not obstruct oil 
development and this system is legitimated and defended by the state. Notable ways in 
which regulatory structures are weak or underdeveloped include critical gaps in 
regulations and research as well as ineffective public consultation, monitoring and 
enforcement. 
This chapter lays the foundation for the above argument by first discussing the 
dissertation’s overarching theoretical framework of petro-capitalism. From here, I 
elaborate on the two theoretical approaches guiding this work, the resource curse and 
political ecology. The chapter then introduces the cases, and, finally, describes the 
methodology.  
  
  3 
I. Broad Theoretical Context: Petro-Capitalism  
 
At the centre of the analysis of capitalism’s relation to nature is its inherent and 
unavoidable dependence on fossil fuels, and particularly on oil (Altvater 2006, 39). 
 
We live in “the fossil fuel age,”1 or, to borrow Watts’ term (2004a, 2004b), the “petro-
capitalist” period. The tensions of petro-capitalism are fundamental tensions of our 
time. On the one hand, fossil fuels are key commodities in the dominant global 
economic system but more importantly, these fuels—oil in particular—are 
acknowledged as having created capitalism as we now know it. This dominant economic 
system is extremely dependent on oil, in ever increasing supply, for its maintenance 
and expansion. Yet at the same time, the system is challenged by the increasingly 
obvious and pressing environmental impacts of oil developments, the potential 
“peaking” of global oil supply, and the inequities marking the global oil industry, 
primarily seen in the great power that private and nationally-owned oil companies hold 
over the resource as well as the compromised lives of people living in or near extraction 
sites (Huber 2009, 113).  
Fossil fuels created global capitalism, our dominant global economic system. In 
particular, oil—easily and cheaply found and in seemingly endless supply—was a 
necessary condition of capitalist production and circulation (Huber 2009, 105). The 
significant role fossil energy has played in the development of capitalism is notable in 
the “perfect correlation between the given measures of growth of industrial capital 
stocks and the consumption of energy from fossil fuels” in the U.S. and UK (Altvater 
1998, 40, quoting Martinez-Alier). Fossil fuel provided the energy for a “quantum leap 
in the speed and reach of human activities” as well as the “enormous growth in labour 
productivity and social surplus production” (23). Huber similarly notes the close 
relationship between the transition from solar-powered sources of energy (“muscles, 
                                                
1 McNeill is quoted in Huber (2009, 107). 
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wind and water”) to fossil energy (beginning with coal and soon emphasizing oil and 
gas), and the transition to and expansion of capitalism and “capitalist social relations.” 
This included greatly expanded productivity, the extension of wage-labor relations, 
mass transportation and consumption on a global scale, resource extraction also on a 
global scale, and corresponding environmental crises (2009, 106, 110-11).  
Why this link between fossil energy and capitalist development? Altvater 
explains that fossil energy fulfills “almost perfectly” the “requirements of the capitalist 
process of accumulation” and, among fossil energy sources, “oil is the one which has 
above all been key to capitalist development over the last hundred years.” This is 
because fossil fuels, and oil specifically, allow for the geographic expansion of 
capitalism globally. Oil is our most energy-intensive transportation power—it offers the 
highest “energy return” of all available power sources. It is also a form of power that is 
cheaper and easier to transport than the previous locally bound forms of energy (such 
as water-power). Without fossil energy, capitalism could not move beyond the 
“boundaries of biotic energy (wind, water, bio-mass, muscle-power, etc.)” (2006, 42, 46; 
see also Clark and York 2005, 405). Second, fossil energy can be used constantly, 
unrestrained by seasons or the biological needs of previous energy sources (Altvater 
2006; see also Altvater 1998, 41, footnote 17). Oil is key among resources that have 
“extreme importance for the accumulation of capital as a whole” given its flexibility of 
use and high energy return (Labban 2008, 6) that allow for the expansion and 
acceleration of capitalism over space and time. 
Oil allowed for the development and expansion of capitalism and now it 
maintains the system. Capitalism requires “constant access to, and an increasingly large 
supply of, natural materials (e.g., petroleum)” (Clark and York 2005, 407). But as 
capitalism has expanded thanks to energy provided by oil, the pace of oil extraction and 
consumption has increased and this has led to the dual problems of peaking oil supplies 
and environmental degradation associated with the extraction of oil. Altvater 
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summarized this contradiction well as follows:  
 
the key role of fossil energy in this congruence [‘capitalism, rationalism, 
industrialism and fossil energy’] makes it an obstacle to further development. First, 
it will eventually run out; and second, its combustion produces so much harmful 
emissions that living conditions on earth are deteriorating (2006, 45). 
Capitalism tends to deplete the “productive power” on which it depends, primarily 
labor and land (including energy) (Burkett and Foster 2006, 129). In particular, the 
capitalist mode of production “broke the budget constraint of living on solar income 
and began to live on geological capital” (Daly is quoted in Burkett and Foster 2006, 110) 
that could not be restored as quickly as it was used up. And in so doing, it emits 
massive amounts of carbon into the atmosphere (Clark and York 2005, 406).  
As for the first problem noted above, shrinking supply and rising oil prices, Buck 
predicts it will “threaten the kind of radical time-space de-compression” it permitted 
and result in the “collapse of the vast systems weaving together industry, agriculture, 
and our cities and modern societies” (2006, 60-61, 67). Similarly, as Nikiforuk warns, 
“the end of cheap oil would challenge every aspect of our economy as well as 100 years 
of lazy, oil-induced thinking” (2010). This idea is growing familiar in public debate. See, 
for example, Rubin’s (2009) book on the subject. 
With regard to the second problem of environmental impacts, Huber describes 
the risk as follows:  
 
the unbelievable productivity of fossilized production ensures a concentrated 
production of industrial waste and pollution, a vast increase in material and energy 
throughput, and the degradation of the most seemingly natural processes—climate, 
soil fertility, and hydrological cycles. In particular, the emission waste produced 
from burning fossil fuels have surely shifted important global-scale atmospheric 
processes in the direction of climate change sites (2009, 113). 
Worse, the solution to dwindling oil supplies is resolved in a way that exacerbates the 
environmental impacts of oil. Clark and York note this tension. They describe 
capitalism as “disrupting the carbon cycle by adding CO2 to the atmosphere at an 
accelerating rate,” while simultaneously “continually plundering of the earth for new 
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reserves of fossil fuel” (2005, 409). Indeed, in response to the fears of oil supply and 
rising oil prices, new oil reserves are sought on the oil “frontiers,” in unconventional 
fuels (such tar sands and shale oil) or farther north, farther offshore and in ever more 
fragile landscapes.  
These new sites present opportunities for oil development but also new and ever 
deepening environmental impacts as oil is extracted in riskier and more fragile 
environments, often farther from public awareness and scrutiny. The ecological impacts 
associated with this shift to frontier oil have increased in scale, intensity and duration. 
Hence Nikiforuk’s (2010) description of this phase of the industry “chasing ‘junk crude’ 
in the tar sands or the ugly, difficult and tough stuff at the bottom of the barrel” now 
that the large and easily accessible reserves have been tapped. 
Of course, as frontier oil is increasingly explored, even greater emphasis is also 
placed on the remaining major conventional oil reserves, which take on great “geo-
strategic significance” (Watts 2004b, 52). This is particularly true for the U.S. where oil 
demand continues to increase but where domestic production has long been in decline 
and alternatives to oil are woefully slow to come on line. Given this, the U.S. is 
dependent on foreign supplies, primarily from the Middle East (Harvey 2003, 23) but 
competition for this oil is growing given the new oil demands of countries such as 
China. (I elaborate on these points in chapter 4.) 
Closely related to the environmental impacts of oil development are the issues of 
social inequity in petro-capitalism. Rather than being understood as a key element of 
the “global commons” or “global public good,” oil supplies are restricted to those who 
can pay for it (Altvater 2006, 58, footnote 42) or to those who can fight for their “oil 
security” (Harvey 2003). Meanwhile people living at or near the sites of extraction are 
negatively impacted by the environmental damage and are often denied access to oil. 
Altvater puts this plainly: “It is not very likely that fossil resources will be distributed 
through a democratic, solidaristic rationing of oil reserves” (2006, 50). And we are 
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certainly nowhere near that point now. 
What real alternatives are there to this system? This reconstructive aspect of the 
petro-capitalist literature is weakest but there are common suggestions proposed. These 
include shifting our primary energy sources from oil to renewable energy (solar, wind, 
water, geothermal, and so forth). And with this change in energy system would come—
Altvater argues this change would require—a change in economic and social 
arrangements as well, ones that are more solidaristic and cooperative (2006, 54). There is 
agreement in this literature on the need for what Huber refers to as the 
“democratization of energy”; “a broad anti-capitalist politics of energy” (Huber 2009, 
113). This would include a fairer distribution of the right to emit carbon, perhaps 
through emissions rationing (Clark and York 2005, 415). 
 The concept of petro-capitalism is a useful place to start this analysis as it 
elucidates in broad strokes the central tensions and paradoxes of our time: the economic 
system is dependent on a commodity in potentially finite supply that poses 
considerable threats to the broader environment and society in which this system is 
embedded; new oil supplies are sought to address the supply problem and to maintain 
the economic system as we know it, but these new supplies exacerbate environmental 
impacts; alternatives exist, but they are not easy fixes. The concept of petro-capitalism is 
helpful to orient our thinking about the role of oil in the current dominant economic 
system and the ensuing environmental and social impacts. However, to flesh out the 
more specific environmental, economic, and political dynamics at work, I sought a more 
developed theory of the paradoxes of the political economy of oil states and the 
unintended consequences of oil abundance and dependence. Hence my turn to resource 
curse literature.  
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II. Theoretical Frame 1: The Resource Curse  
Resource curse theories respond to the optimism of early modernization theorists who 
suggested that dependence on natural resources would bring economic development. 
Rosenstein-Rodan (1943, 1961), Hirschman (1958), and Baldwin (1966), for example, 
forwarded the idea that developing countries would industrialize based on the 
exportation of natural resource windfalls. Viner (1952) and Lewis (1955) similarly 
claimed dependence on abundant natural resources would help states develop by 
gaining foreign capital through exports. Likewise, staples theorists asserted that natural 
resource booms would develop the economies of poorer areas and lead to local 
investments and economic diversification. But perhaps the now most famous of this 
modernization theory group was Rostow (1961) who claimed natural resource 
abundance would allow developing nations to “take off,” following Britain’s path to 
development. Other more recent examples of work in this vein, as suggested by Rosser 
(2006), include Balassa (1980), Drake (1972), and Krueger (1980). At the same time, there 
developed a cultural myth of oil having the power to bring all good things and being 
the saviour of underdeveloped or poor societies. Coronil (1997) described this well in 
his discussions of how oil wealth seizes the imagination and creates a culture of 
miracles. This sentiment was expressed more recently in reference to Iran by Polish 
journalist Kapuscinski who stated:   
 
Oil creates the illusion of a completely changed life, life without work, life for free … 
The concept of oil expresses perfectly the eternal human dream of wealth achieved 
through lucky accident … In this sense oil is a fairy tale and like every fairy tale a bit 
of a lie (quoted in Watts 2004b, 51). 
 
Since the late 1980s, this myth of the fairy tale of oil and the optimism of 
modernization theories have been challenged by what would become known as the 
resource curse literature.2 This body of research identifies a basic logic: states’ 
                                                
2 Of course, modernization theories were challenged before this period by early 
dependency theorists like Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) who thought developing nations 
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dependence on natural resources, in particular oil, leads to undesirable economic and 
political outcomes. Note also the common threshold of “high dependence”: when oil 
represents one third of exports, GDP or government revenues (Atkinson and Hamilton 
2003; Goldberg et al. 2005; Ross 2001a; Sachs and Warner 1995, 1999, 2001; Stevens 2003; 
Weinthal and Jones Luong 2006). 
At the outset of this literature, economists showed that dependence on natural 
resources often results in slowed economic growth. Then, beginning in the late 1990s, 
the research agenda expanded to include political effects. Through these kinds of 
analysis, the resource curse theory is useful in understanding precisely how oil 
abundance does not create a simplistic state of wealth and prosperity. Rather, it turns 
out to be a “double-edged sword” (Bergevin 2006, 2).  
 
Economic Impacts of Oil Dependence 
Oil booms, such as we are seeing today, promote bursts of temporary headline 
economic growth, followed by hangovers so deep that growth in the very long term 
is often lower than it would have been without the resource (Shaxson 2007, 1123). 
 
The early literature originating from economics demonstrated that as dependence on 
natural resources increases, economic growth (commonly measured in terms of GDP) 
stagnates or declines. The negative long-term economic impacts of natural resource 
dependence generally, and oil dependence in particular, include declining per-capita 
GDP over time, the export of development benefits (as the industry is often dominated 
by foreign investment by multinational corporations that do not reinvest profits into the 
region of extraction), and risks to other key economic sectors. As for the latter, referred 
to as the “Dutch Disease,” the oil sector tends to inhibit other sectors by increasing 
general production costs and drawing labor away from manufacturing and agricultural 
                                                                                                                                                       
were disadvantaged in international commodity markets by dependence on natural resources. 
For other examples of early criticisms of modernization theory, see Baldwin (1966), Hirschman 
(1958), Levin (1960), and Nurske (1958). 
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industries. Also at issue is the tendency for large revenues from the export of natural 
resources to cause state currencies to appreciate, thereby making the export of other 
goods more costly and therefore less competitive. In short, instead of invigorating other 
industries and creating positive spillover effects into other sectors, a strong oil sector 
has a tendency to choke off other industries. General economic volatility is also a key 
problem: oil-dependent states are exposed to the booms and busts of unpredictable oil 
prices, therefore their revenues are volatile and their capacity to provide public and 
social services is vulnerable and erratic. Below I give a sense of the key contributions to 
this sub-literature of the resource curse that is focused on economic impacts of resource 
dependence. 
Early in the debate, Nankani (1979) demonstrated the slow growth of hard-rock 
mineral exporters in the developing world, findings echoed in Wheeler’s (1984) work on 
Africa as well as in Gelb’s (1988) World Bank study on oil and hard rock exporters. 
Auty’s (1993) study of iron-ore exporters confirmed these findings and summarized 
many economic and political problems (more on the political problems below) 
associated with natural resource exporters: they tend to be marked by capital intensity 
rather than labor intensity; a lack of local linkages to other parts of the economy; the 
exportation of development benefits out of the country; risks to other sectors; 
governments’ misuse of the windfall which creates problems in slump periods; and 
inflation and scarcity in boom times.  
Resource curse evidence has continued to accumulate. In a foundational article in 
this debate, Sachs and Warner (1995) demonstrated the correlation between economies 
with high natural resources export to GDP ratios and slower economic growth in 
developing countries. Their subsequent research showed declining per-capita GDP in 
seven Latin American countries experiencing resource booms and concluded that 
“resource booms seem to have done little to generate long-term growth, and may in fact 
have hindered growth on average” (1999, 63). Their 2001 article also found that since 
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the Second World War, “high resource intensity tends to correlate with slow growth” 
(828) and they described the resource curse as a ”reasonably solid fact” (Sachs and 
Warner 2001, 837). Also notable in the recent economic resource curse literature are 
Gylfason et al. (1999) who demonstrated how natural resource abundance attracts labor 
to the natural resource sector, rather than towards more growth-enhancing 
entrepreneurship. Likewise, Neumayer (2004) confirmed previous resource curse 
findings (“natural resource-intensive countries really do suffer from a ‘resource 
curse’”), but got to this conclusion by showing how resource abundant economies grow 
slower over time in terms of genuine income rather than GDP. And very recently, as 
nuances continue to develop in the research, van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2010) find 
that countries with relatively stable growth rates experience economic growth from 
resources rents and exports, but countries with more “volatile” growth rates experience 
slower economic growth from resources due to the volatility of natural resource prices. 
Their research confirms the resource curse theory: “Growth performance thus depends 
also negatively on the share of natural resources in exports” (1444), they note. 
 
Political Impacts of Oil Dependence 
In a more recent turn in the resource curse literature, studies now focus on the negative 
political impacts of natural resource dependence. First, an entire sub-literature has 
developed linking the dependence on natural resources to the commencement, 
intensity, or duration of civil war (Ballantine and Sherman 2003; Basedau and Lay 2009; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2002, 2004, 2005; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fearon 2004; Le Billon 
2001; Reynol-Querol 2002; and Ross 2004). Klare’s more popularized comments on U.S. 
intervention for oil are also relevant here (2001, 2004). These conflicts develop over the 
sharing of oil rents and costs of oil development. 
Second, and more relevant for my cases, another sub-literature is developing on 
the broader political impacts of resource dependence. Here correlations are shown 
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between natural resource abundance and political conservatism, authoritarianism, and 
weakened state capacity, for example, Goldberg et al. (2005), Jenson and Wantchekon 
(2004), Karl (1997), Leite and Weidmann (1999), and Ross (2001a).  
Key data substantiating the claim that resource dependence weakens democracy 
were provided by Ross (2001a) in his analysis of the impact of oil on democracy in 113 
states from 1971 to 1997. He found a correlation between oil dependence and 
authoritarianism and concluded that oil has a tendency to “hurt democracy” (356). 
Similarly, Jenson and Wantchekon (2004) analyzed the political impact of resource 
dependence in African states, finding that countries more dependent on natural 
resources were also “more likely to be authoritarian” and more likely to have “worse 
governance” (817). More recently, Stevens and Dietsche show that “Natural resource 
wealth tends to consolidate and conserve ‘bad’ political regimes and undermines the 
social and cultural changes that have facilitated democratic transitions and 
consolidations elsewhere” (2008, 57). 
With regard to the tendency of resource dependence to weaken state capacity, 
the major contribution here is Karl’s The Paradox of Plenty. Here she develops the idea of 
the “petro-state” which tends to become a rentier state that replaces “statecraft” with oil 
rent collection, “thereby weakening state capacity” (1997, 16), see also Chaudry (1997). 
Governing for a broader notion of public good is replaced with strategic spending to 
maintain power and protect the oil industry. This vein in the literature highlights how 
the state begins to govern in a biased way, favoring the oil industry. 
One important shift at work here is how the state’s dependence on various 
sources of taxes, particularly personal income taxes, changes to a dependence on 
resource rents. This can lead to an erosion of a strong, broad-based tax system and 
thereby alter governments’ lines of accountability. For Shaxson, oil money creates 
“misplaced lines of accountability” (2007, 1129): rather than being focused on 
accountability to citizens, the state is focused on the oil industry. At the same time, 
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Stevens and Dietsche argue that the replacement of taxes with natural resource rents 
will “undermine” citizens’ “demand for and the supply of channels for political 
representation” (2008, 57). 
Due to this, when oil revenues are disrupted or lower than anticipated, as during 
the recent decline in oil prices, the state cannot draw on the now eroded tax revenue 
and instead often cuts social services or spending. Karl also showed that economic 
growth based on resource dependence has long term institutional “inertia” effects that 
keep the state focused on oil rather than working for diverse (and more resilient) 
development. As the power of those developing oil and benefiting from natural 
resource development is enhanced and reinforced through oil rents, these benefiting 
groups work hard to keep the state focused on oil development, as opposed to 
developing more economically and environmental sustainable industries. An “inertia” 
results that keeps the state focused on oil to the detriment of more sustainable, 
productive industries. Resource rents are shown as empowering and maintaining the 
power of certain social groups that impede growth and diversification.  
Wasting of the resource rent is another common political problem emphasized in 
this literature. Instead of saving the windfalls from natural resources, state actors often 
act irrationally in response to the “feeding frenzy” pressures from citizens, 
corporations, and other “rent seekers” (Weinthal and Jones Luong 2006, 39). Corruption 
and overspending on projects of only short-term value are frequent. Leite and 
Weidmann (1999) also studied “natural resource induced” corruption which, they 
argued, explains slow economic growth in resource abundant states, particularly in 
developing nations. Two kinds of politically motivated waste and corruption prevent 
societies from capturing the full economic benefit of oil resources. First, when 
politicians or bureaucrats “rob” resource rents (Stevens and Dietsche 2008, 57), 
particularly to gain or maintain power (primarily through remaining in political office). 
This is often seen in patronage spending or in investments of large-scale projects of 
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national symbolic value but limited long-term growth or development. The second kind 
of domestic corruption involves capitalists “grabbing” resources rents rather than 
creating wealth more productively (Mehlum et al. 2006b), a tendency notable in 
powerful industry lobby groups pressuring governments for access to more resource 
revenue (Costantini and Monni 2008, 870). But corruption, as Shaxson (2007, 1125) 
rightly points out, is not restricted to domestic actors: the international financial system 
plays an important role as well. To date the resource curse literature has not dealt in 
depth with this aspect of natural resource corruption, for example, how the 
international community provides banking services and tax havens to those siphoning 
off oil money (ie. Switzerland) (2007, 1130). 
Said most succinctly, the resource curse literature demonstrates the unexpected 
negative economic impacts of resource dependence as well as the negative political 
outcomes such as deteriorating democracy, weakened state capacity, and political 
corruption. And more recently, within the political turn in this literature, there is a more 
specific and rapidly growing discussion on the relationship between resource 
dependence, development outcomes, and institutions.  
 
Is the Resource Curse Institutional?  
 
We don't like to call it the oil curse, we prefer 'governance curse' (André Madec of 
Exxon quoted in The Paradox of Plenty; The Curse of Oil 2005). 
 
This newest institutional turn in the resource curse literature comes after exceptions to 
the resource curse become increasingly obvious. States increasingly cited as avoiding 
the resource curse include Australia, Botswana, Canada, Chile, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Norway, and the U.S.—literature on the exceptions is summarized in Stevens and 
Dietsche (2008, 58).3 The growing discussion of the exceptions led to the 
                                                
3 See also Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), Brunnschweiler (2008), and Stijns (2005). 
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acknowledgement that there is no deterministic relationship between resource 
dependence and political-economic growth or decline. So how had some countries 
managed to avoid the curse? The common answer, drawing on the more general 
literature on the relationships between economic institutions and economic 
performance (outlined in Stevens and Dietsche 2008, 59), is now institutions (or 
“governance”), or, more specifically, policy. The role of institutions is increasingly 
acknowledged as tempering the negative impact of natural resources dependence on 
economic and political outcomes. Of course, the resource curse literature had long 
noted the negative impact that resource dependence can have on institutions (such as 
eroding state capacity or institutions necessary to the management of natural resource 
rents). But in this new development in the literature, institutions are not outcomes but 
mediating variables.  
The growing consensus is that the resource curse is not due to resource 
dependence alone but to the effect of institutions that direct those resources. For 
instance, Mehlum et al., contrary to previous literature explaining the resource curse in 
terms of the Dutch disease and rent-seeking, first hypothesize that “a poor quality of 
institutions is the cause of the resource curse and […] good institutions can eliminate 
the resource curse entirely” (2006b, 12) and then find that “institutions are decisive for 
the resource curse” (1)—“the quality of institutions determines whether countries avoid 
the resource curse or not” (16). As a test of this, Mehlum et al. divided their group of 
forty-two countries in half, into “bad” and “good” institution categories, to find that the 
resource curse disappears in states with good institutions but it is deepened in states with 
bad institutions (2006b, 2). Institutional quality seems to drive resource curse outcomes. 
There is a great deal of agreement on these findings, for example, Ahrend (2005), 
Damania and Bulte (2003), Murshed (2004), and Robinson et al. (2006). The most recent 
example of contributions in this vein comes from Jones Luong and Weinthal who, in 
studying five oil-based former Soviet Union states, argue that these states “are ‘cursed’ 
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not by their wealth but rather by the structure of ownership” used to mange the wealth. 
Ownership structures are critical as they influence the develop of institutions that create 
the fiscal regime on which economic success or failure depends (2010, 9).  
This institutional turn in the resource curse literature, however, raises numerous 
issues yet to be resolved. First, what is driving differences in institutions and their 
ability to cope with resource curse impacts is unclear. There are now as many as four 
major explanations in this literature for institutional variance: institutions vary 
depending on whether (1) states that are developmental (focused on broader economic 
development) versus predatory (where elites tend to hoard resource wealth); (2) 
resources are point source or diffuse; (3) societies that are more equal and socially 
“cohesive” versus those of greater inequality and wealth concentration; and (4) 
depending on historical legacies, for example, patterns of development set by colonial 
powers. Researchers also struggle with the variable impact of institutions. Stevens and 
Dietsche write that “different institutions can lead to similarly good outcomes” while 
“similar sets of institutions do not need to produce the same outcomes” (2008, 61-62)—
the impact of the particular kind of institution at work can vary from case to case.  
Perhaps more fundamentally, defining or measuring institutions is complex. 
Costantini and Monni use an index developed by Kaufman et al. (2003) including “rule 
of law, political instability, government effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory 
framework, and property rights and rule-based governance” (Costantini and Monni 
2008, 871) while Robinson et al. use a slightly different index including rule of law, 
bureaucratic quality, government corruption, expropriation measures and measures of 
government repudiation of contracts (2006, 27). Different again, Olayele (2010) uses the 
Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index as a proxy for institutional quality. But this 
institute is widely acknowledged as a Canadian right-wing think-tank supporting 
government deregulation. Hence AB, even where the regulatory system has been 
gradually eroded over decades of an explicit political neoliberal agenda, scores high on 
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this index of institutional quality.  
As Stevens and Dietsche note, “it is not objectively clear what institutional 
quality entails” and “there are serious conceptual flaws in the measurement of 
institutions” which entail the “risk that subjective assessments of what good institutions 
are will be based on more ideological perspectives than on scientific knowledge.”  
Further, even if we can define what institutional strength is, we might not have 
the data to measure it to do large-scale quantitative studies. And even if we were to 
figure out clearer causal chains, how would we then explain how institutions change or 
remain stable, or how they can be transferred to new settings? Another complicating 
factor is that institutional quality might be an indicator of some other variable—some 
other element might be driving institutional capacity. As elaborated by Humphreys and 
Sandbu (2007), for example, what made effective natural resource fund possible in 
Norway (which was key to averting the resource curse), was not the fund itself but 
political factors that facilitated the development of the fund in the first place and 
ensured its maintenance. 
The institutional turn in the resource curse literature is promising but it raises 
highly complex questions relating to the basic issues of defining institutions, measuring 
them, and explaining differences, stability and change. Still, this shift in the debate is 
very useful in challenging what appeared to be a deterministic relationship between 
resource dependence and political-economic outcomes. That “governance” (however 
ambiguously understood for the moment) could be a remedy to the resource curse is 
some cause for optimism. Of course there is an obvious conundrum: institutional 
quality or strength may be the way to avoid the resource curse yet one major impact of 
high resource dependence is the corrosion of that very institutional capacity. One 
important potential remedy to the resource curse is weakened by the resource curse. 
The resource curse, combining these major streams in the literature discussed 
above, makes a compelling and ultimately simple point that is fundamental for my 
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thinking in this study. The possession of large oil resources is not a blessing; fairy tales 
do not result where oil flows. Rather, oil wealth often produces effects diametrically 
opposed to our expectations or aspirations: slowed, vulnerable economies and 
tumultuous politics marked by receding democracy and institutional capacity (which, 
coincidentally, could temper or remedy the “curses”). Thus this body of work brings to 
light a puzzle that is central to my questioning of oil states. Yet is it also marked by an 
obvious environmental gap, hence my pairing of this theory with political ecology.  
 
An Environmental Blind Spot (and Turn to Political Ecology)  
The environment is an underlying but widely understated element of the resource curse 
theory: dependence on natural resources like oil poses a particular problem to states in 
great part because oil is a non-renewable, one-time asset that might bring high rents to 
states for a time, but is unsustainable in the long-term. The entire process of oil 
development also comes with an increasingly costly environmental price tag. Exploring 
for, extracting and transporting oil causes multiple forms of local environmental 
pollution and degradation (most obviously oil spills). Refining oil means still other 
negative environmental consequences (inefficient use of other energies; air and water 
pollution). Consuming oil represents more global and longer-term costs we are just 
beginning to understand (climate change). The economic and political costs faced by oil 
dependent states due to environmental impacts are growing. Yet the resource curse 
literature rarely accounts for the negative impacts on the environment, and the resultant 
economic and social impacts. 
That said, the resource curse literature does provide potential insight on the 
environmental impacts of oil dependence. Specifically, the literature elaborates on the 
“institutional molding” (Karl 1997, 16) of political and economic institutions caused by 
dependence on oil revenues. We can imagine the same patterns hold for environmental 
institutions with, for example, the petro-state not being accountable to citizens’ 
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environmental concerns; government capacity to regulate environmental impacts being 
weakened or incapacitated; and there being a regulatory inertia keeping the economy 
focused on oil development rather than shifting to renewable energy; or the state 
pandering to the interests of oil developers to the detriment of the environment.  
Some resource curse literature has made the link to the environment, however 
tangentially. A first hint comes from Auty (1993) who explains the risks of basing an 
economy on depleting resources:  
 
the economic staple is a fund (non-renewable) resource, unlike most soft 
commodities which may be regarded as flow (renewable) resources. Sustainable 
development therefore requires that mineral economies should adopt safeguards to 
ensure that future generations are not disadvantaged by the present generation’s 
depletion of the mineral asset.  
What is needed, according to Auty, is a “pattern of resource extraction which 
substitutes alternative wealth-creating assets for the depleting natural resource” (176). 
Stevens (2003) likewise notes that one dimension of the resource curse is the “regional 
impact” which includes local environmental damage (9) but he focuses only on the 
traditional outcomes (like “Dutch disease”) and does not elaborate on the 
environmental aspects. Humphreys et al. (2007) mention the resource curse risk of 
haphazardly draining a finite environmental asset as well, but without further 
elaboration. Tynkkynen (2007) also dealt with integrating resource curse and 
environmental issues in the case of Russia’s periphery. 
Perhaps the most thorough attempt to integrate arguments on the impact of 
natural resources on economic growth (via institutions) captured in the resource curse 
literature with arguments on the impact of economic growth on the environment dealt 
with in research on the Environmental Kuznets Curve was made by Costantini and 
Monni (2008). Their piece ends by arguing for ways to avoid the resource curse and 
environmental degradation—they combine both concerns. 
There are ideas to borrow from the resource curse literature to inform studies of 
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environmental issues and the new (albeit limited) work in this area. But the 
environment is far from the central focus of this approach. Instead, I take the resource 
curse literature as providing a general theory of the institutional impact of oil on states 
but giving little direction on environmental impacts. Therefore, to more solidly support 
my interests in understanding how environmental policy is molded by the political-
economic context, I sought a theory that could explain political-economic-environmental 
interactions. Hence my turn to political ecology theory, following the theoretical shift to 
political ecology undertaken by Le Billon (2001), which is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
III. Theoretical Frame 2: Political Ecology 
Political ecology4 is rooted in dependency theory, world systems theory, and staples 
theory (Biersack 2006, 3 and 35, note 2; M'Gonigle 1999, 15-16), but came of age in the 
1980s with the seminal work of Piers Blaikie (1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; see also 
Wolf 1972, who had first used the term as it now understood). Put most succinctly, 
political ecology is a multi-disciplinary analysis of the “human-nature nexus” (Bryant 
and Goodman 2008, 711) with a clear focus on political human relations.5  
By political, we mean power—or as Paulson et al. put it, the “practices and 
processes through which power, in it multiple forms, is wielded and negotiated” (2003, 
209). Political ecology initially captivated researchers for this reason: rather than seeing 
environmental degradation as a natural process of modernization or analyzing it in 
seemingly “objective” scientific, legal or rational choice terms, the field recognizes 
                                                
4 Here I draw primarily on Adkin 2000, 2003; Alperovitz et al. 2000; Benton 2000; Blaikie 
and Brookfield 1987; Brynt 1992; Gale and M'Gonigle 2000; Keil et al. 1998; Neumann 2005; 
Panitch et al. 2006; Peet and Watts 1996, 2004; Peluso 1992; Peluso and Watts 2001; Robbins 
2004; Walker 2003; Watts 2000 and other key pieces of research cited throughout this section. 
5 For example, Greenberg and Park define the field as studying the “interaction between 
political and environmental variables broadly conceived” (1994, 8), while Nygren and Rikoon 
describe it as focused on “the strategic confluence of political and ecological processes in the 
analysis of environmental change” (2008, 767). 
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environmental degradation as driven by politics (Forsyth 2008, 757; see also Le Billon 
2001, 563; McCarthy 2005, 954). These political relations produce deeply unequal social 
outcomes. Hence the issues of “justice, inequality, poverty, [and] exploitation” (Walker 
2006, 388; see also Walker 2005, 74) are central to the field and political ecologists have 
an “unabashed commitment” to addressing them.  
 Given the focus on power and inequality alongside the attempt to elucidate the 
“interrelationship between environmental destruction and social inequality” (Muldavin 
2008, 688; see also Kepe et al. 2008, 2540), the field is sometimes referred to as 
“ecological political economy” (M'Gonigle 1999, 12). This resonates well with Blaikie 
and Brookfield’s early definition of the field as combining “the concerns of ecology and 
a broadly defined political economy” (1987, 17). Also important, as discussed in more 
detail in the methodology section of this chapter, is political ecology’s “multi-scalar” 
approach. It is concerned with the mutual impact of the local on the global and the 
embeddedness of the local in global political economy contexts (Nygren and Rikoon 
2008, 769). 
One resounding criticism of political ecology has been the charge of theoretical 
incoherence (Peet and Watts 1996, 6), primarily due to its multi-disciplinarity and multi-
scalar approach. Is political ecology an unwieldy “everything pill” (Robbins and 
Monroe Bishop 2008) offering “explanations of everything” (Bryant and Goodman 2008, 
709) with little theoretical guidance? Is the field’s “intellectual eclecticism” really a 
“cover for anarchic development” (Bryant is quoted in Blaikie 2008, 767)? While I agree 
with Blaikie’s concern that the scope of political ecology research can be daunting,6 I 
would argue the field’s diversity is a strength rather than an obstacle as researchers in 
this field can draw on multiple pools of literature to accumulate insights required by the 
complexity of real problems (on this, see Kepe et al. 2008, 2541; Muldavin 2008, 688). 
                                                
6 Blaikie noted that the “sheer bibliographic overload of adequate research necessary for 
PE [political ecology] can be problematic in maintaining its intellectual quality” (2008, 767). 
  22 
I also would not settle for calling political ecology merely an “approach” without 
theoretical force (this is sometimes presented as a response to the theoretical criticisms 
of the field). It is true that political ecology does not provide a “single, overriding, or 
dogmatic set of inevitable conclusions,” (Robbins is quoted in Bryant and Goodman 
2008, 713). However, there are indeed valuable theoretical insights in political ecology. 
As discussed below, I understand the field as theorizing particular relationships 
between dominant state and economic systems that negatively impact environments 
and the communities dependent on them. And I stress how these impacts occur in great 
part through policy that manifests the interests of these dominant political and 
economic systems.  
 
A Theory of the Market 
When political ecologists write of the market, reference is predominantly being made to 
the dominant capitalist system (Benton 2000) or, more precisely, to its current neoliberal 
character.7 What specific dynamics are identifiable with regard to environmental 
extraction in this system?  
Political ecology theorizes that the current economic regime systematically 
results in ecological crises due to its requirement for continuously expanding and 
accelerating profit growth through increased mass production and mass consumption. 
This is facilitated, of course, by advances in extraction technologies that enable oil 
production from previously inaccessible fields at ever decreasing costs. Mass 
production requires a constant throughput of new material and energy often drawn 
from “distant elsewheres” (Adkin 2003, 396-8; Altvater 1998, 29),8 aided by 
                                                
7 Here I am following Heynen et al.’s position that “neoliberalism is capitalism, although 
a particular historical variant of capitalism. It is the most recent form of capitalism” (2007, 287, 
original emphasis). 
8 In Heynen et al.’s words, neoliberalism’s great environmental failing is due to “its 
ravenous craving for markets, commodities, and sites of accumulation across the planet” (2007, 
290). 
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technological development. This implies the continuous exploitation of environments 
that are finite and therefore often oversubscribed. 
In this production process, the environment is misunderstood as a mere factor of 
production rather than as the foundation of the economy (as well as human existence 
more generally) (Keil et al. 1998, 4-5). In Polanyi’s (2001) conception, the environment, 
like labor, is a false commodity (a “fictitious commodity”) as it was not created by the 
market and it exists for purposes far beyond those of the market. But it is mistaken as 
such. Worse, environmental costs and impacts tend to be “externalized” in the great 
competition for profit. Exacerbated by the longstanding difficulty in assigning dollar 
values to the environment and environmental “services,” environmental costs are often 
held “external” to corporate accounting—that is, many resources are used cheaply (or 
freely) and environmental impacts are not paid for by the user or polluter. Political 
ecology understands capitalism’s competitive nature as requiring the surplus extraction 
from (that is, exploitation of) labor and nature which, in terms of the environment, is 
accomplished by “expropriating nature’s capital and underinvesting in restoration or 
repair of impacted ecological systems” (Robbins 2004, 46, 51). The result is often 
extraction beyond the regenerative capacity of resources. 
At the same time, the dominant economic regime is resulting in social 
inequalities as environmental degradation and risk concentrate on marginalized 
communities. Blaikie and other political ecologists saw ecological problems such as 
erosion as “a symptom of dysfunctional societies and economies, and impacted mainly 
on the poorest and most vulnerable people” (Forsyth 2008, 757). Just as capitalism is 
defined by inequalities in power between those who control production and those who 
produce, the distribution of the environmental costs of production is also unequal with, 
for example, environmental degradation tending to concentrate on marginalized groups 
(Peet and Watts 1996). 
The capitalist system is in crisis due to how it undermines two essential elements 
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of its base: the environment and people (those working in the system and consuming its 
production). As M’Gonigle noted, there is a contradiction between capitalism’s 
“‘internal’ dynamics of growth” and its “expanding ‘external’ social and environmental 
imbalances” (2000, 8).9 
Two major tensions are notable in causing this crisis. First, firms experience a 
reduction in the scale or profitability of production due to the degradation of resources 
or environmental services. Environmental degradation adds costs to capitalist 
development that threaten profitability. Second, oppositional movements protest 
capitalism’s degradation of the environment and its effects on health, quality of life and 
other values (Benton 2000, 98). There is civil outcry against the degradation leading to a 
legitimacy problem (O'Connor 1994), a key argument developed by Prudham (2004). 
Theorists in the Marxist tradition have long noted the problem of capitalism 
undermining its labor base. Political ecology adds another dimension to this, what J. 
O’Connor (1998) described as capitalism’s “second contradiction”: its expansion via the 
extraction of resources resulting in environmental degradation means that capitalism 
erodes its fundamental ecological base. 
But political ecologists are also attuned to how the crises do not result in the total 
demise of the system because capitalism is constantly reconstituted. In response to 
profit risks, firms adjust by profiting from environmental destruction, for example 
through “green capitalism,” carbon markets (Panitch et al. 2006, xi), or new energy 
markets. As Buck argues, capitalism “may well accumulate itself out of, or through, an 
ecological crisis” (2006, 66), perhaps via some kind of “green capitalism.” Ultimately, 
however, these readjustments do not alter the systematic anti-environmental bent of 
                                                
9 Perhaps a great deal more than an economic regime is in crisis: Keil et al. paraphrase 
Altvater, Déléage and Martinez-Alier who argue that “current capitalist production is geared 
towards a relentless increase in entropy and will first lead to an undermining of the conditions 
of production (as Marx said: land and labour) and finally to an end to human existence on earth 
as we know it” (1998, 14). 
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capitalism and, worse, they may generate new and worse environmental problems 
(Alperovitz et al. 2000, 166). Further, in response to political threats to the system’s 
legitimacy, those benefitting from the system, the “political and economic élites,” work 
to “defuse protest, emasculate resistance, and reaffirm extant power relations” (Brynt 
1992, 27). There is also the risk that in an effort to have a place at the table, some factions 
of the environmental movement may buy into the “TINA” (“there is no alternative”) 
argument of neo-liberal capitalism and begin using market-based language, for example 
in calling for the development of pollution markets (Heynen et al. 2007, 11), rather than 
proposing system alternatives. 
Political ecology provides a theoretical framework for discerning the ecological 
and social contradictions of neoliberal capitalism. Political ecology’s understanding of 
the market-ecology interaction is also paired with theoretical positions on the state’s 
role in this pattern, elaborated below. But, to be clear, I should emphasize that in this 
work I am concentrating on the ecological contradictions of frontier oil extraction. I 
intermittently note the social inequalities leading to and emanating from this 
production but the social impacts are not the focus of the current analysis. 
 
A Theory of the State 
Capitalism works within—indeed requires—a context established by the state. Where 
capitalism threatens its production conditions (labor and the environment), state 
intervention could in theory offer correctives for the broader public good (Benton 2000, 
94). But political ecology has a far more critical view of the state’s role in ecological 
problems.  
Through the lens of political ecology, the state is seen as a primary resource 
owner yet it is not a neutral actor or mediator in debates over environmental extraction 
due to its own economic interests. Governments are greatly dependent on revenues 
from resource extraction (often generated by private corporations) and are therefore 
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reluctant to constrain or impede resource extraction. As M’Gonigle argues, there is a 
“structural antipathy” to regulations that restrain capital accumulation on 
environmental grounds: often “the administrative or bureaucratic arm of the state is as 
resistant to environmental innovation as would be any industry or corporation” as both 
the state and industry have a “shared commitment to economic expansionism” (1999, 
19). Governments support extraction given the confluence of interests with industry 
(both government and industry are motivated to continue and expand development to 
continue accessing natural resource oil revenues). Furthermore, reinforcing its 
dependence on revenue from extraction is the strong pressure exerted on the state by 
lobbyists of concentrated private interests gaining from the extraction.  
Hence the state is not autonomous from capitalists’ interests; rather, political 
ecology understands the state as possessing “at most only a relative autonomy from 
powerful societal forces,” as Gale notes, given that it is “structurally dependent on 
capital in a globalizing political economy” (2000, 203-04). As the state and its agencies 
are often dependent on and gain from environmental extraction, they cannot be 
expected to regulate to provide environmental protection that would “constrain the 
very sources of economic flow on which those agencies themselves depend” (M'Gonigle 
2000, 13).10 Governments are strongly influenced by industry (via well-funded expert 
lobby efforts) and also dependent on industry for oil revenues). Note that there is also 
the problem of the revolving door between government and industry that blurs the 
distinction between the two. Simultaneously, the state’s policy capacity is restricted by 
the limited time horizons of electoral cycles. Few political leaders seeking re-election 
will burden the electorate with the often significant immediate cost of shifting to 
sustainability. Coping with long-term change is therefore structurally difficult for 
                                                
10 Similarly, Gale argues that the current political economic system “is incapable of 
ushering in an era of genuine sustainable development. This is because its two central 
institutions—the state and the corporation—benefit too greatly from unsustainable growth” 
(2000, 195).  
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governments (Gale 2000, 205).  
Political ecology, therefore, interprets the state as compromised in terms of its 
ability to provide environmental protection by its dependence on revenue from 
environmental extraction, the lobbying force of capitalist interests, and the structure of 
the electoral cycle. Therefore, the view from political ecology sees the state as assisting 
the dominant class in its environmental extraction based accumulation: states are agents 
of capitalist expansion and, therefore, of environmental degradation. 
This is a long-standing observation noted in Blaikie and Brookfield’s early 
theoretical framing of the field. In 1987 they noted how “The state commonly tends to 
lend its power to dominant groups and classes, and thus may reinforce the tendency for 
accumulation by these dominant groups and marginalization of the losers” (1987, 17). 
This theoretical imagining of the state continues in political ecology literature. 
Combining these two pieces, political ecology’s theory of the market and the 
state, we understand the field as analyzing and challenging, as Brynt and Goodman put 
it, the “national and global political economies based on capitalism in general and state 
support for capitalist production in particular” (2008, 712). Political ecology theory then 
goes a step farther, I argue, to lay out the mechanics of how these market and state 
interests are mobilized: through policy. 
 
A Theory of Policy 
 
Neoliberalism hinges upon the active mobilization of state power. Neoliberalism does not 
entail simply the ‘rolling back’ of state regulation and the ‘rolling forward’ of the 
market. Instead, it generates a complex reconstitution of state/economy relations in 
which state institutions are actively mobilized to promote market-based regulatory 
arrangements and to extend the process of commodification (Brenner and Theodore 
2007, 154, original emphasis). 
The question underpinning Heynen et al.’s (2007) recent work is how neoliberal 
capitalism has altered environmental governance and with what effect. A similar 
question is of 
  28 
demands of neoliberal fossil capitalism) impacted environmental policy and with what 
environmental effect? Political ecology provides some theoretical guidance to 
answering these questions. But first it is worth noting that political ecology has 
sometimes struggled with policy. At the time of writing his key article on this subject, 
Walker described the field as “divided and ambivalent in its attitude toward and 
engagement with environmental and social policy. Indeed, it is possible at times to feel 
that political ecologists perceive policy as a kind of uncouth distant cousin to be kept at 
a safe distance” (2006, 382). 
However, political ecology literature does provide theoretical guidance on policy 
issues. Primarily, I see the literature as theorizing that policy is a manifestation of the 
compromised or development-biased state and the anti-environmental, dominant 
economic system. Here policy is understood as a key state tool to expand economic 
growth that often results in sacrificing environmental integrity.  
Which policies are most relevant here? Political ecologists focus on policies that 
structure access to or power over environmental resources or services, and the 
valuation thereof. There is also a focus on the kind of extraction or uses that are 
permitted (M'Gonigle 1999, 13; Watts 2000, 257). Further, the policy absences are as 
important as the policies enacted, as Blaikie noted: 
 
conservation practices left undone, legislation remaining unheeded, projects that 
only serve to keep research officers in salary and which never leave the 
experimental station (those things not done) are also political acts and not just 
omissions, or non-events which do not need explanation (Blaikie is quoted in Dove 
and Hudayana 2008, 744). 
Noting the policies that do not exist or not enacted may be as important as 
studying what exists.  
What is the general trend in policy for the cases at hand, at this political-
economic moment? Government regulatory capacity has been weakened by the turn to 
neoliberalism and the movement toward corporate self-regulation. Of course, 
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neoliberalism does not always result in deregulation; rather, it is often a reregulation in 
the service of deepened capital accumulation. Peluso, for example, emphasizes how 
privatizing environments or environmental services for enhanced capital accumulation 
requires the legislative framework and enforcement of the state. A “state-capital 
alliance” is “inevitably” required (2007, 89), she argues. 
From this alliance we can expect particular kinds of environmental policies such 
as (1) privatizing environmental regulation (outsourcing it to industry or volunteer 
organizations), (2) extending private and decreasing common ownership (that is, 
extending the commodification or pricing of environments or environmental services 
and “enclosing” more and more of nature), (3) reducing regulations that impede 
corporations or not regulating corporations’ interactions with the environment, (4) 
reducing governmental programs protecting the environment, (5) devolving 
environmental regulatory responsibility to lower levels of government such as 
provinces or cities which have fewer resources, and (6) using market mechanisms to 
regulate rather than “command and control” government regulations (Heynen et al. 
2007, 5-6). These policies amount to facilitating capital accumulation while reducing 
wealth redistribution or public protection measures. 
To summarize, then, as Brynt observes, for political ecology, policy is “the 
embodiment of societal divisions and struggle and the narrowed interests of the state 
itself” (1992, 18)—policies arise out of political struggles and conflicts that are marked 
by power inequalities (for instance, inequalities between well-funded professional 
corporate lobbyists against poorly-resourced volunteer environmental organizations), 
as well as by the interests of the state in its own revenue generation via private resource 
development. So rights to resources are unevenly distributed, historically contingent 
and structured by relations of power. As Adkin explains, “the question of who gets 
what share of the resources available is not a scientific or environmental question per se 
but a political one—one having to do with relationships of power” (2003, 396). And this 
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is about state politics and power: access to environmental resources is not directed by 
some neutral “invisible hand” of the market; rather, “the state makes access to the 
market unequal through specific policies and incentives” (Sundberg 2007, 269, my 
emphasis). 
Political ecology presents a theoretical framework elucidating how the state 
tends to forward environmental extraction by private capitalist actors rather than to 
strengthen environmental regulation that would constrain it. The trend “is not one of 
state institutions protecting their citizens and territories, but rather of their establishing 
regulations to gain or maintain a piece of their sale” (Peluso 2007, 90). Hence, from this 
perspective, the one also taken in this research, policy is inherently political. It is a tool 
wielded by those with political-economic power to forward their interests under the 
guise of bureaucratic objectivity, thereby providing legitimacy. But this does not imply 
other groups cannot challenge status quo regulatory regimes and advocate more radical 
policies to develop alternative state-market relations.  
The policy playing field is certainly not an even one. But we can also see 
evidence of policy debates occurring in ways that fundamentally challenge political-
economic-environmental systems, rather than simply tweaking them at the margins 
(and, therefore, maintaining those systems). Regulatory regimes can reproduce 
destructive human-ecological interactions. But, at least in theory, they have the 
potential to be used to transform current conditions. This potential is important in 
political ecology’s reconstructive commitments noted in the methodology section 
below.  
Given the discussions above, how can we succinctly define political ecology 
theory? I argue it is not as opaque or “messy” (Muldavin 2008, 695) as critics purport it 
to be. Instead, the field provides a clear framework for understand state-market 
interactions and the role of state policy in supporting these interactions. This theoretical 
perspective echoes recent work on the “mutually constitutive” (Neumann 2005, 42) 
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character of ecological change and the mode or relations of production or extraction. 
Attention is directed toward who accumulates wealth through environmental 
extraction (and who does not), where wealth and environmental degradation 
accumulate, and the logic organizing who has access to and control over resources and 
extraction (Peluso and Watts 2001, 27-29). I proceed forward in the current study from 
this basis. 
 
The Dynamics of Concepts, Theories and Narrative Description 
Together, the concepts and theories at the core of this research provide a rich and 
dynamic understanding of the realities of contemporary oil development and petro-
states or petro-provinces.  
First, the concept of petro-capitalism situates us within the most recent and 
highly problematic period in a long, global history of the struggle to create and 
maintain the energy necessary for human life. It places us at the tail end of the carbon 
age where the unexpected consequences of widespread dependence on fossil fuels has 
exposed humanity to hard new and perhaps now irreversible environmental realities. It 
is at this point that oil from the frontiers—often the “dirtier” fuels in ever more fragile 
and remote sites with growing environmental price tags—is increasingly more 
important to maintaining the energy supply. To understand the policy dynamics in 
these sites at this particular moment in our energy history, I use the resource curse and 
political ecology theories as complementary bodies of literature.  
From resource curse literature, I glean a basic paradox and logic. Rather than oil 
wealth resulting in the assumed positive economic and political outcomes of greater 
wealth and democracy, as governments become more dependent on oil development, 
we find, over the long term, stagnating economic growth and political development. 
This occurs in great part because of how oil dependence restructures and weakens 
economic and political institutions.  
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To this insight, I add theoretical contributions from political ecology. As 
elaborated above, I use understand political ecology as “ecological political economy.” 
Here I interpret political economy as the study of the interaction between politics and 
economics with emphasis on how dominant economic system—inherently marked by 
inequality with obvious winners and losers—gives rise to political systems that 
legitimate that economic system and permit its continuation. In this light, political 
ecology provides a rich theory of market and state relations with an emphasis on the 
ecological impacts of these relations. Thus I use political ecology as an environmentally 
relevant theorization of market and state interactions.  
The conjunction of these two theories, the resource curse and political ecology, 
permits an analysis of the environmental policy implications of oil dependent political 
economies. While coming from vastly different perspectives, there is a close link 
between political ecology and resource curse literatures in that they both show the 
declines—political, economic and ecological—associated with the pressures of 
dominant state and market systems.  
These concepts and theories then guide the narrative account of two crucial 
Canadian frontier oil sites; together, they provide good traction on the problem of 
environmental policy in frontier oil dependent cases.  
In the detailed description in the following two chapters, I discuss the recent 
environmental, economic and political circumstances of these frontier oil extraction 
cases. And at the very center of this discussion is a nuanced and critical analysis of 
policy that I interpret as formed or informed by political economy constraints revealed 
in the theories of the resource curse and political ecology. The narrative chapters 
ultimately capture the meaning of “petro-politics,” or what it means to be a “petro-
state” or “petro-province,” with concerted emphasis on the ecological consequences of 
anemic, compromised environmental policy.  
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IV. The Research Process 
In commencing my doctoral research I aimed to understand the environmental impacts 
of oil development in highly oil dependent cases, and more specifically, how these 
environmental impacts are not prevented or are permitted by government regulatory 
regimes that are reshaped by the constraints of oil dependence. Early on, I recognized a 
clear absence of research on environmental policy and oil development in Canada. This 
is unexpected given Canada’s significant dependence on the oil sector (with regard to 
oil revenue, GDP and exports), its large and increasing oil production (and exportation 
to satiate American intense and growing demand for oil), alongside the growing 
environmental impacts that were gradually being noted, particularly in frontier oil sites. 
I found that environmental impacts had not been a common subject of political debate. 
Instead, Canada was frequently assumed to have averted the resource curse—it is 
frequently listed as among the “resource blessed.” Yet there is rarely any analysis of this 
assumption. Given the highly federal nature of Canada, I felt that a study of the 
provinces, where resource curse impacts would be concentrated was needed. 
 
Cases 
To trace out regulatory patterns at work in areas of Canada with the greatest exposure 
to resource curse and environmental impacts, I selected two cases, AB and NL, as both 
are major oil producers that meet or exceed the threshold in the literature of high 
dependence on oil. The extraction sites that are the focus of this work are identified in 
the map below. 
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Figure 1: Map of Oil Extraction Cases:  
Regions of AB’s Tar Sands Deposits and NL’s Offshore Oil Fields 
 
 Source: ©2011 Google – Map data ©2011 Europa Technologies, Geocentre Consulting, INEGI, 
Tele Atlas 
 
Why the choice of these two cases? Over the last decade, eight provinces and 
territories have produced oil but, as demonstrated in figure 2 below, production is 
highly concentrated on AB, SK and NL.  
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Figure 2: Total Oil Production in Canada and in  
All Producing Provinces and Territories (in barrels) 
 
  
Source: Data on oil production are from the National Energy Board (NEB) of Canada’s 
“Estimated Production of Canadian Crude Oil and Equivalent Tables” (converting from cubic 
meters to barrels by multiplying cubic meters by 6.29287). Crude oil refers to hydrocarbons that 
are in a natural liquid state and remain so after extraction as well as condensate (which exists 
naturally as a gas but is liquid upon extraction), and oil produced from sand or rock, as in the 
case of tar sands extraction. 
 
In the above figure, it is clear that AB (with its production disaggregated by 
conventional and unconventional fuel production), Saskatchewan (SK) and NL are 
leading the country in oil production. All other oil producing jurisdictions (British 
Columbia, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and Northwest Territories) pale in comparison.  
The comparative production of these three oil producers as shares of total 
Canadian production is made clear in figure 3 below which concentrates on just the top 
three provincial producers.  
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Figure 3: Total Canadian Oil Production and Top 3 Provincial Producers (in barrels) 
 Source: Data on oil production are from the National Energy Board (NEB) of Canada’s 
“Estimated Production of Canadian Crude Oil and Equivalent Tables” (converting from cubic 
meters to barrels by multiplying cubic meters by 6.29287). Crude oil refers to hydrocarbons that 
are in a natural liquid state and remain so after extraction as well as condensate (which exists 
naturally as a gas but is liquid upon extraction), and oil produced from sand or rock, as in the 
case of tar sands extraction. 
 
Here we see AB’s growing unconventional oil production represents an increasing 
proportion of Canada’s total projection, with conventional production declining, SK’s 
production held constant, and NL’s production rising since 2002 but showing declines 
since 2009. 
However, comparative production volumes do not mean these provincial cases 
are equally dependent on or equally impacted by the oil industry. As noted in the 
discussion of resource theory above, the common threshold for determining high 
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dependence on oil is typically when oil represents one third of government revenues, 
GDP, and exports.  
AB and NL meet all three of these standard thresholds (I present detailed data on 
these two cases in chapter 4). However SK, while it is a steady, major oil producer—
ranking as the second largest oil-producing province in Canada—does not exhibit the 
same extent of economic dependence on oil across revenue and GDP. Oil and gas 
exports do make up a significant portion of SK’s total exports, as high as 38% in 2005 
and 2006, as shown in figures 4 and 5 below. But the impact of oil on revenue and GDP 
is much lower. 
 
 
Figure 4: Oil and Gas Exports & Total Exports in SK (in millions of Canadian dollars, 
in current dollars) 
 Source: Data on total and oil and gas sector exports are from Industry Canada Trade Data Online, 
Canadian Industry Trade By Industry (NAICS codes), available via strategis.ic.gc.ca. 
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Figure 5: Percentage of Total Exports from Oil and Gas Sector in SK 
 Source: Data on total and oil and gas sector exports are from Industry Canada Trade Data Online, 
Canadian Industry Trade By Industry (NAICS codes), available via strategis.ic.gc.ca. 
 
As depicted in figure 6 below, the impact of SK’s oil and gas sector on total GDP 
falls below the standard threshold and well below the levels seen in AB and NL (again, 
data on these cases is demonstrated in detail in figures 10 to 21 in chapter 4). 
 
 
Figure 6: Oil and Gas Sector's Contribution to Total GDP in SK (in millions of 
Canadian dollars, in current dollars) 
 
Source: GDP data are from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 3810015 - Provincial gross domestic 
product.  
 
Oil and gas sector accounted for 23% of total provincial GDP at the peak in 2006, as 
shown below in figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Percentage of Total GDP from Oil and Gas Sector in SK 
 Source: GDP Data are from Statistics Canada CANSIM Table 3810015 - Provincial gross domestic 
product.  
 
As for the impact of oil and gas on total government revenue in SK, data are not 
readily available to conduct the same kind of comparison over time as I do for AB and 
NL in the forthcoming analysis chapter. But the piecemeal available data indicate that 
the Government of SK’s total revenue is also much less impacted by revenues from oil 
and gas than in AB and NL. In 2010, the Government of SK had a total revenue of $10.3 
billion with $1.3 billion from oil and gas revenues, or 13% of the total (Province of 
Saskatchewan 2010). Compare this, for example, to the situation in NL just a year earlier 
in 2009 where oil revenues accounted for 30% of total provincial revenue. 
Therefore, although SK’s exports are strongly marked by oil and gas, the 
intensity of SK’s revenue and GDP dependence on oil is comparatively much less than 
in NL and AB. The reason for SK’s weaker dependence on oil is that this province has 
an economy that is comparatively more diversified. Alongside oil and gas production, 
the province is a global leader in uranium and potash production, with significant 
production of coal and other minerals, as well as agricultural products. 
The singular impact of oil is, therefore, less pronounced in SK that in AB and NL. 
So while SK is indeed a major oil producing in Canada, it is not a pronounced oil-
dependent province, certainly not to the same degree as in AB and NL; hence my focus 
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on these two provincial cases. 
Another valuable way to think about the comparative impact of oil on different 
jurisdictions might be to consider per capita oil production. This allows us to see how 
intensely oil production is on the population. Figure 8 illustrates Canadian production 
in this way. 
 
Figure 8: Annual Oil Production in Canada and Top Provincial Producers  
(in barrels per capita) 
 Source: For this per capita comparison, I used data on oil production from the National Energy 
Board (NEB) of Canada’s “Estimated Production of Canadian Crude Oil and Equivalent Tables” 
(converting from cubic meters to barrels by multiplying cubic meters by 6.29287). Crude oil refers 
to hydrocarbons that are in a natural liquid state and remain so after extraction as well as 
condensate (which exists naturally as a gas but is liquid upon extraction), and oil produced from 
sand or rock, as in the case of tar sands extraction. Population data are from Statistics Canada’s 
CANSIM table 51-0001. 
 
Production data displayed above demonstrate how Canadian per capita production is 
fairly flat across time, at an average of 29 barrels per person per year over the 1997 to 
2010 period. SK has a much higher average of 152 barrels per person per year with AB 
averaging higher again at 193. The data in NL, of course, tells an even more dramatic 
tale. The province went from virtually no production in 1997 to a high of 265 barrels per 
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person by 2007. Oil production is particularly concentrated in NL, followed by AB and 
SK. 
I have focused on AB and NL given that they are major oil producers in Canada 
and have economies that are intensely impacted by this oil development. Both AB and 
NL also experience significant, though frequently under-emphasized, environmental 
impacts and risks associated with these developments. These are, therefore, critical 
cases of the tensions between oil development expansions and environmental impacts. 
Studying these cases closely allows me to identify regulatory patterns to test in further 
comparative research.  
Oil extraction, particularly in frontier sites, results in negative environmental 
outcomes that environmental policies are expected to diminish or prevent. Yet 
environmental policy is often severely crippled to the point that it cannot serve this 
function. What are the specific trends in ineffectual environmental policy in these key 
cases of oil development in new unconventional and frontier sites? What interplay of 
governments and industry can explain these trends? Is the pattern anticipated in the 
theory above—weakened environmental regulation from a particular entrenched petro-
political regime—at work in these two key Canadian cases? I argue it is, with nuances of 
course. And from here, I ask: what are the policy solutions to avert this situation and 
from where does (or might) political pressure for change come? Therefore, this 
dissertation seeks to “document the workings of the regulatory process” (following 
Adkin’s intent, as noted in her 2008 Political Ecology of Alberta book proposal), and 
explain these “workings” in terms of petro-political power. It then concludes with 
reconstruction, with an analysis of the current or potential sources of resistance to this 
system and required policy recommendations. 
This research has centered on the recent period bookended by two significant 
American events over the last decade (alongside rising oil prices, of course) that had 
tangible policy impacts on these cases: the 2001 National Energy Policy and 2010 BP 
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Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). The former event signaled 
amplified pressure for increased domestic or near-domestic oil production to meet 
American oil demand, and the latter, after nearly a decade of intense pressures for oil 
development, signaled a (potential) shift in public debate. There is a moment of 
opportunity now to raise questions about the environmental costs of oil extraction, 
conduct assessments of regulatory regimes, and, hopefully, redesign environmental 
policy regimes. 
Note that while this work is focused on Canadian cases, the research that 
informed it included analysis of oil dependent American cases, Alaska and Wyoming. 
From the current analysis, I am developing a continental study of oil dependence and 
environmental policy that will eventually include other obvious international cases 
such as Norway. Walker notes the need for more “comparative broader-scale studies” 
that can “synthesize [local, individual case] studies into broader, integrated regional or 
global analysis (2006, 386-87). This dissertation lays the foundation for such a larger-
scoped comparative analysis. 
 
Methodological Framework and Methods 
To study these cases, I use political ecology’s methodological framework that I 
understand as tri-fold in its direction: it is descriptive, explanatory and 
normative/reconstructive. It encourages highly contextualized but also globally 
situated analysis of intertwined economic and political power. It also attempts to 
account for dynamic change (crisis, resistance, reconstitution, and a return to crisis), 
with a consistent eye to building greater environmental and social justice. 
First, with regard to description, the political ecology methodology entails a 
richly nuanced understanding of development processes in reference to the larger 
political-economic systems informing it with close attention—in the middle ground 
between the two—to state regulation patterns. The latter sets the context for human-
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environment relations, particularly the conditions of access to and use of resources.  
Strongly influenced by materialism, political ecology research often begins at the 
impacted landscape, often very local cases that are described in detail (Robbins 2004, 
22), with attention to ecological research (Walker 2006). It is “grounded engagement,” 
as Heynen et al. put it, “with actual places, people, and ecologies” (2007, 12). At the 
outset, the focus is on the direct causes of the problem, typically due to the people who 
are working directly in or extracting directly from the environment. Although rooted in 
these specific ecological contexts and an analysis of the economic and political systems 
at work in them, political ecology sees local crises as situated in a broader political 
economy. The analytical starting point is at the level of a particular ecological problem 
in a particular place, but attention is then turned to how the broader extraction patterns 
or the capitalist mode of production puts pressure on this environment. It entails a 
“rigorous cataloguing and contextualizing within broader political economic 
constraints” emphasizing, for example, commodity prices and subsidies, finance issues 
(investments, loans, debts), and building to the “complex contradictions” of the global 
economic system (Robbins and Monroe Bishop 2008, 748).  
Hence political ecology is methodologically committed to understanding the 
“multiscalar” and “intersecting processes” influencing resource extraction over space 
and time11 (Neumann 2005, 6, 10). The point is to study the interactions (as opposed to 
linear influences or hierarchies12) occurring between multiple layers of analysis from 
                                                
11 Time here refers to political ecology’s recognition that current modes of production 
and state regulation trends, and their consequent environmental outcomes, are historically 
rooted. Patterns of human-environmental relations and extraction methods are often long-
standing. 
12 Robbins suggests thinking in terms of networks as opposed to linear “chains” that give 
the impression of a clear top-down flow of power from global institutions to local places with 
little interaction between the levels. The approach is to understand complex multi-level, 
mutually-constitutive relations, or “the influence of variables acting at a number of scales, each 
nested within another” from local to global (2004, 11). For example, “Producers control 
landscape outcomes, their behaviour is prefigured by community dynamics, set within state 
politics, controlled by trade agreements, all within a vast system vaguely described as ‘global 
capitalism’” (211). 
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local communities to global institutions, particularly local ecological problems and 
actors, world politics and economics, and state interests and policies (Nygren and 
Rikoon 2008, 773). Each case is studied as a coherent unit, but also, following 
McMichael (1990), connections are sought between each case, and in the relationship 
between the cases and their local, federal, and North American context in an 
“incorporated” manner. I similarly aim for comparison within a grounded context and 
through multi-level analysis. 
As the second major element of political ecology methodology, from this 
grounded, material ecological problem understood in a rich multi-scalar context, the 
approach attempts to explain how the extraction patterns or the mode of production 
(capitalism) puts pressure on this environment. Areas of attention include who has 
access to or who controls the extraction process, who labors within it, how surplus 
production is extracted, and who profits (versus who is burdened with the costs). There 
is also attention on the opposition arising from these patterns (Nygren and Rikoon 2008, 
769). 
Central to an analysis of the extraction patterns is an analysis of regulation 
patterns that set the context for these human-environment relations, particularly the 
conditions of access and use of the resources. Extraction patterns are embedded within 
a system of property rights and other policies that regulate the appropriation and 
exploitation of nature. Therefore, identifying and studying the land managing 
institution and how it manages meting out access to resources and then controls these 
property rights is key in political ecology research. Questions typically raised include 
inquiries into how the land manager distributes property rights to whom, how it 
regulates how these rights are used, and what this means in terms of environmental 
change. Of course the state is often the owner and land manager, hence political 
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ecology’s renewed close attention to political institutions and power.13  
Finally, there is a commitment to normative reconstruction. Political ecology 
methodology directs researchers to understanding environmental problems in rich 
detail and explaining the multi-scalar political-economics that led to the problem. But 
the work is incomplete without emphasis on solutions. As Blaikie stated early in the 
field’s development, political ecology is “explicitly normative”: it offers the 
“opportunity to admit that something [is] terribly wrong with the state of politics and the 
environment and that, starting from there, an opportunity might be seized to make 
some kind of difference” (Robbins and Monroe Bishop 2008, 748, original emphasis).  
To do this, political ecology analysis must first develop alternatives to the status 
quo. Convincing “counter-narratives” (Walker 2006, 384) are needed. These must 
represent a more “just, accountable, egalitarian and democratically environmental 
future” (Blaikie is quoted in Dove and Hudayana 2008, 745) and more “socially-just 
environmental policy” (Blaikie is quoted in Muldavin 2008, 694). Hence the call to 
action in the last pages of Heynen et al.: “We require utopian forms of environmental 
praxis to help us imagine alternative possibilities, emancipatory projects, and an end to 
social and environmental destruction at all scales” (2007, 291).  
However, the development of critique and of these alternatives is still not 
enough. As Walker cautions, “Critique alone is insufficient to generate change. […] 
Critique by itself is not engagement” (2006, 392). Political ecology methodology requires 
actually working at the local level. It has “come to mean that you are concerned with 
inequality and environmental conservation enough that you want to theorize but also 
do something about it”; political ecology “without praxis does not make sense” 
                                                
13 Here I draw on Blaikie’s early “chain-of-explanation” that he employed to, using 
Neumann’s words, “differentiate between proximate and ultimate causation and to emphasize 
the structural context of degradation, including national land law, differential access to capital, 
the state’s role in regulating class relations, and geographic and social patterns of agricultural 
surplus extraction” (2008, 729).  
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(Muldavin 2008, 695). Political ecology is unapologetically involved in solving real-
world problems. It provides the “hatchet” of criticism but also the “seeds” of better 
alternatives (Robbins 2004). This, of course, means engagement with policy debates or 
as Walker metaphorically puts it, moving beyond arcane ivory tower debates—
“crossing over between academy and policy” (Rocheleau 2008, 720)—and figuring out 
how to “get the camel’s nose of radical critique under the tent of mainstream policy” 
(Walker 2006, 338).14  
As Heynen et al. note, neoliberal-inspired changes to environmental policy have 
become focal points for opposition to neoliberalism, for example, via social movements 
(2007, 11). The solutions proposed are potentially radical ones that involve not just 
tweaking policy to ensure better regulation but perhaps “re-designing the institutions of 
central power” and rethinking economic systems so that they “fit within the needs of 
maintaining ecosystem integrity,” for example through “steady-state” economics and 
“self-maintaining” economies (M'Gonigle 1999, 19-20, 22). Neumann makes a similar 
point: solving the political-economic problems uncovered by political ecology might 
require, for example, “major, if not revolutionary, redistributions of power and wealth” 
(2008, 729).  
To “do” political ecology, therefore, means to understand local ecological 
problems well, both in terms of what they are (description) and in terms of how they 
came to be (explanation). Further, political ecology methodology insists on criticism, the 
development of more socially and environmental political-economy alternatives, and 
active engagement with the policy world to work toward these changes. This 
methodological framework guides my approach in this project. 
  
                                                
14 Of course, contributing to real-world policy is no uncomplicated matter given the 
constraints against engaging with policy within academia as entrenched in the incentives of 
promotion and tenure. In addition, those who do engage seldom have a clear and direct impact 
on policy development and implementation (Blaikie 2008, 769). But this is hardly an excuse for 
non-engagement. 
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Methods 
In terms of specific methods, this research has relied on three forms of qualitative 
research. First, I conducted semi-structured interviews beginning in the spring of 2007 
with people directly involved in these debates. These interviews directed my research 
and analysis by identifying important material and actors in the debate and, more 
importantly, by clarifying key problems in the environmental policy processes and 
trends therein over time. Interviewees included current and former policy makers at the 
provincial and federal levels, elected government officials, representatives of involved 
environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) and social justice non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), researchers at public policy and law institutes, 
and independent researchers.  
Ethics clearance for the interviews was required and granted by the 
Interdisciplinary Committee on Ethics in Human Research at Memorial University of 
Newfoundland. Following the requirements of this clearance, the interviewees are not 
identified. Where direct quoting is necessary, I refer to the interviewee’s general 
position in his or her organization. See Appendix I for the complete list of the 
interviews. 
In addition, in the earlier days of this project when I was anticipating a broader 
comparative analysis including two American cases, I conducted an additional thirty 
interviews in both Alaska and Wyoming. Then, later in the research in the summer of 
2010, I extended interviewing to SK for further Canadian context. The analysis in this 
dissertation does not involve these additional cases directly. But this work did help to 
provide a clearer North American context for the Canadian cases. And it also lays the 
groundwork for the next step in this research, a larger pan-Canadian or Canada-U.S. 
comparative project. 
How did the interviews figure into the present writing? The presence of the 
interview data is sometimes muted in the following chapters because of how I have 
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used the interviews to guide the research. I began the research with a rough and 
preliminary analysis of public policy institute reports, government publications and 
media coverage of oil and environmental policy issues to get a general sense of the 
issues and people involved. From here, I spent time in each site to get an on-the-ground 
sense of the issues and to interview a range of people involved in the debates. As the 
interviews progressed, I began to identify trends in the environmental policy systems. I 
then used the interviews to focus my attention on the primary regulatory issues of 
concern. The interviews helped me to easily and quickly identify problematic patterns 
noticed by those working directly with these issues in these cases—they served as a 
rough cut into the cases. Guided by these insights, I then did further research using the 
public, government and scholarly literature used throughout the chapters (the second 
method discussed below). As the months passed, the interviews, although the initial 
starting point for the analysis, faded into the background of the writing and were 
overshadowed by written sources. Nonetheless, the interviews were essential starting 
places for my understanding of the cases.  
The second method at work here involved an extensive search and review of the 
relevant literature on oil and environmental policy. This included the following sources, 
used throughout this work: scholarly publications across the disciplines of political 
science, geography, economics, biology, environmental studies and beyond; “grey” 
literature such as government reports and policy documents; research institute, NGO 
and industry reports; and media coverage.  
Periodically I have also been actively involved in these debates and so able to 
observe them first hand. While conducting this research, I have lived in both provinces 
and become actively involved with the policy debates in these cases. My involvement 
included participating in meetings and workshops, writing policy recommendations to 
government, providing media commentary, making public presentations and 
conducting volunteer work with ENGOs. This work provided me with experiences that 
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informed my understanding of these cases, issues and policy trends. 
Of course, as evident in the figures throughout the chapters, I have also used 
basic quantitative data and statistics to identify economic and oil production and 
consumption trends essential to understanding these oil economies.  
Based on the information gathered through these methods, in the following 
chapters I present each case in detail in separate chapters. Each emphasizes the 
environmental impacts and who bears them, and explains major problematic trends in 
regulatory system surrounding oil developments. I then account for these trends by 
analyzing the petro-politics in each case, primarily government dependence on (and 
therefore various kinds of support for), the oil sector and the oil industry’s 
simultaneous strong lobby for non-obstructive environmental regulation systems. 
Opposition in response to this political-economic system that demands environmental 
policy change is also noted.  
After these case chapters, I analyze the cases together, drawing out comparative 
trends in oil dependence, political-economic outcomes and environmental policy. I then 
embed these cases in the larger continental and global context of petro-capitalism, 
showing how these provinces are major contributors to Canada’s role as an American 
oil colony. I conclude with policy recommendations to move from an environmental 
resource curse to a more sustainable energy economy in these cases. I present two ways 
forward, policy solutions that tweak the status quo and others that challenge the 
dominant system more fundamentally. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PETRO-POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY IN ALBERTA’S TAR SANDS 
 
Alberta’s tar sands15 developments are the most recent example of the province’s 
historical dependence on natural resource extraction for exportation that began with the 
eighteenth century westward expansion of the fur trade and then agriculture exports in 
the twentieth century. But the discovery of the Leduc oil field in 1947 and other major 
fields set off an unprecedented boom that was a “turning point” in AB from an 
agricultural to oil economy (Mansell and Schlenker 2006, 10). As Laird notes, petroleum 
resources “fuelled Alberta’s long run of prosperity that spanned much of the 20th 
century […]. Energy built modern Alberta” (2005, 156): the (predominantly foreign) 
capital investment, technology, and skilled labor required for developing AB’s oil 
extraction, upgrading and refining economy stimulated regional development and 
urbanization, and provided revenues to government independent of taxing citizens 
(Mansell and Schlenker 2006, 11). 
Although rich in multiple forms of energy including conventional oil, natural 
gas, natural gas liquids, coal, tar sands, coalbed methane (CBM) and renewables such as 
wind, the resources primarily exploited in AB over the last decade have been 
conventional oil and gas deposits. However, since the early 1970s and late 1990s 
respectively, conventional oil and conventional natural gas production have been 
declining. Conventional oil production peaked in 1973 and has fairly steadily declined 
since then; natural gas production is also now in decline. From the late 1990s until 2004, 
there was a steep increase in the number of gas wells drilled but this growth ended in 
                                                
15 “Tar sands” was the term originally used for the resource, and the geologically correct 
term, and I retain that term throughout this dissertation. But note that the resource has been 
renamed “oil sands” by industry and government officials (some would say in an act of public 
relations); therefore, this term is also frequently used as I cite material from these sources. The 
fuel produced from the tar sands is referred to as bitumen. 
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2005 and the number of wells drilled per year is expected to remain constant until 2013 
(Mansell and Schlenker 2006, ii, 13-14, 34).  
These declines in conventional oil and gas are being offset by the exploitation of 
a new carbon fuel, tar sands bitumen. The production of this fuel has outpaced 
conventional oil production since 2002 (Mansell and Schlenker 2006, 14). By 2006, tar 
sands production represented 62% of AB’s total crude oil and equivalent production 
(Alberta Energy 2010) and, by 2014, tar sands production is projected to surpass the 
combined production of all other energy forms in AB (Energy Resources Conservation 
Board 2008).  
The tar sands, depicted on the map provided in the introduction, are 
concentrated predominantly in the north in three major deposits, the Athabasca (the 
deposit with the greatest concentration of extraction activity), Cold Lake and Peace 
River deposits, underlying 140,200 square kilometers (Alberta Energy 2008) of boreal 
forest. Top bitumen producers include Syncrude Canada Limited,16 Suncor Energy 
(which recently merged with Petro-Canada), and Shell Albian Sands operated by Shell 
Canada Energy. The resource is extracted using either strip mining or in situ methods17 
but to date these major companies use primarily surface mining methods.  
Investment in these projects is massive. According to the Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), in 2007 capital spending in the deposits amounted to 
$18.1 billion dollars for mining, in-situ and upgrading activities, up from $14.3 billion in 
2006. And industry has forecasted $100 billion in new projects and expansions (Alberta 
                                                
16 This is a joint venture among Canadian Oil Sands Limited (36.74%), Imperial Oil 
Resources (25%), Suncor Energy Oil and Gas Partnership (12%), Sinopec Oil Sands Parnership 
(9.03%), plus smaller shares to Nexen Oil Sands Partnership, Mocal Energy Limited and 
Murphy Oil Company Ltd. 
17 From 1998-2007, on annual average, just over 60% of bitumen production came from 
mining techniques and nearly 40% from in situ technology; from 2008 to 2017, in situ mining is 
forecasted to grow to an annual average of 50% of total bitumen production. Data were 
provided on October 20, 2008 by e-mail by Jacob Irving, Executive Director of the Oil Sands 
Development Group in Fort McMurray. 
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Energy 2007a). These huge investments in the tar sands have supported the production 
of 1.199 million barrels of per day in 2007, up from 1.127 million in 2006 (Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers), while AB Energy predicts 2020 output will be at 3 
million barrels per day and, by 2030, potentially five million barrels per day (Alberta 
Energy 2008).  
Tar sands have become the fulcrum of the AB’s energy economy, hence of the 
entire provincial economy. But this new energy boom is built on environmental 
devastation far surpassing conventional oil development that has not been prevented 
by the regulatory regimes aimed at protecting the environment. These environmental 
impacts and the regulatory inefficiencies that led to them in AB, explained by reference 
to “petro-politics” dynamics, is the subject of this chapter.  
I begin by surveying the most pressing environmental impacts of the 
developments and briefly note who bears these impacts. The chapter then analyzes 
three major problematic trends in environmental regulation that permit, or do not 
prevent, these impacts. These include poorly positioned environmental consideration in 
the approval processes, important regulatory gaps or inadequacies (relating to 
greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), water withdrawals, reclamation and public 
consultation), and institutional analytical weaknesses regarding cumulative impacts. 
The chapter then frames out a comprehensive “petro-political” system of entrenched 
interests at work in AB to explain these ineffective environmental policies.  
This system is marked by a symbiotic relationship between governments and oil 
companies, with governments highly dependent on revenues from private oil 
developments and oil companies earning impressive profits from oil extraction on 
public lands. The provincial (and also federal) government ensures the continuation of 
the industry via funding or subsidies, by actively defending and promoting the 
industry at home and abroad, by being reluctant to dig deeper into environmental 
questions raised and by not intervening to protect the environment where regulatory 
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authority exists. The tar sands industry simultaneously reinforces this governmental 
tendency via coordinated lobbying efforts, political financing, and media and 
community public relations campaigns. Therefore, I argue that in the AB petro-state, 
which is driven by its interest in continuing revenues and pressured by a strong oil 
industry, environmental regulation processes and institutions have developed that 
forward rapid, extensive oil development—or at least do not meaningfully impede it.  
Resistance to this system is building, however, and demands for slowing tar 
sands developments and establishing effective environmental policy are articulated 
clearer and stronger than ever before. The potential for policy change now lies in multi-
faceted forms of resistance and opposition occurring at local to international sites that 
are channeled through media and new leaders to the point that the industry’s market, 
and hence the economic benefits to AB and Canada, are (potentially) threatened—or, at 
the very least, profoundly questioned. 
 
 
I. Environmental Impacts of Albertan Tar Sands Development 
This intensive, rapidly expanding tar sands development has created serious 
environmental impacts as summarized in the scientific literature by Timoney and Lee 
(2009) and Kelly et al. (2009). The Pembina Institute has also provided some of the most 
thorough, independent public-oriented analysis of the environmental impacts of tar 
sands developments that I also use extensively.18 
From 1967 to 2006 tar sands developments had a “cumulative disturbance” of 
650 square kilometers (Timoney and Lee 2009) with major expansions expected: as of 
                                                
18 Many interviewees also provided guidance on the type and intensity of environmental 
impacts of tar sands development including an Alberta Environment policy maker with 
Environmental Policy Branch (1) in a 2007 interview, an Alberta Environment policy maker 
with Environmental Policy Branch (2) in 2008, a Council of Canadians researcher in 2007, a 
Sierra Club researcher in 2007 and multiple Pembina Institute, Parkland Institute, and Polaris 
Institute researchers in interviews in 2007. 
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2010, 84,000 square kilometers had been leased for tar sands development with 
additional leasing regularly continuing (Pembina Institute 2010). As for freshwater, tar 
sands operations had licenses to divert 349 million cubic meters per year from the 
Athabasca River in 2008 (double Calgary’s yearly volume) with new projects potentially 
raising this to 500 million cubic meters (Dyer et al. 2008, 3, 8). There are now serious 
concerns about maintaining basic in-stream flow (Griffiths and Woynillowicz 2009; 
Griffiths et al. 2006; Pembina Institute 2011). Water withdrawals are worrisome but so is 
water output as toxic waste. Enormous tailings ‘ponds’ containing toxic materials from 
tar sands operations—now over one hundred and seventy square kilometers in total 
area (Energy Resources Conservation Board 2010a)—pose a risk to local ecosystems due 
to leeching at rates of millions of liters per day (Kelly et al. 2009; Price 2008; Timoney 
and Lee 2009).  
AB’s tar sands operations also emit vast volumes of air pollution (Timoney and 
Lee 2009, 73-74) including GHGs which have made the province the largest GHG 
emitter in the country (Miller 2007). Tar sands plants and upgraders, according to a 
recent report by Environmental Defence, Équiterre and the Pembina Institute, are the 
“fastest growing source of GHG emissions in the country,” adding 37 million tons or 5% 
of total Canadian emissions in 2008. Based on projections made prior to the recession, 
these emissions were expected to rise to 108 million tons by 2020, representing over 40% 
of the total increase in emissions in the country over this period (2010, 7; see also 
Bramley et al. 2005, 5). Tar sands projects are, therefore, significantly exacerbating AB 
and Canada’s growing contribution to the global problem of climate change. The 
extraction and upgrading projects also entail staggering emissions of nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), sulphur dioxide (SO2), and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (Dyer et al. 2008, 
25-33; Timoney and Lee 2009, 73-74).  
The most obvious burdens of tar sands developments on humans are on local 
communities in the surrounding area, predominantly aboriginal communities 
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downstream who are at risk of compromised water, air and subsistence food supplies. 
Connections have recently been made between the environmental degradation 
associated with the tar sands and illness in communities downstream (Timoney and Lee 
2009, 78). These local communities also see landscapes transformed and solely devoted 
to tar sands projections, limiting traditional uses. Broader still, tar sands developments 
stress a major river system in an increasingly drought-prone province and result in 
water pollutants being transported into the fragile inland Peace-Athabasca Delta and 
through the Mackenzie Basin to the Arctic ocean (Kelly et al. 2009, 22346-22351). 
Meanwhile, airborne pollutants increase soil and lake acidification in neighboring 
Saskatchewan and Manitoba (Bytnerowicz et al. 2010; Jeffries et al. 2010).  
Further, the consequences of climate-change-causing GHGs will extend to future 
generations of Albertans, Canadians, and the global community. Emissions from the tar 
sands are a significant barrier to Canada meeting its national GHG reduction 
commitments (Bramley, Neabel, and Woynillowicz 2005).  
Also, in terms of non-human impacts, the result on the ecosystem of these 
combined impacts has been a decline of numerous species, many endangered or 
threatened, for example caribou, lynx, marten, fisher, wolverine and multiple bird 
species (Schneider and Dyer 2006; Timoney and Lee 2009). 
Contrary to the claims made by AB’s government, there is convincing and 
growing evidence of serious environmental impacts from tar sands developments. And 
they are not being effectively prevented or managed by the provincial regulatory 
system. The following sections identify the key deficiencies in this regulatory regime. 
 
 
II. Environmental Regulation Trends 
The multiple, far-ranging and long-term environmental impacts are due primarily to a 
weak provincial regulatory system. Below I outline the regulatory process and major 
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applicable legislation, then the broad trends in the regulatory system that have 
permitted, or not prevented, these poor environmental outcomes. But first, a brief 
explanation is needed on regulatory authority that sets the frame for the analysis. 
Given the ownership of and regulatory jurisdiction relating to the tar sands, I 
focus on the Albertan level of governance.19 The AB Crown owns 97% of AB’s tar sands 
mineral rights with the remaining 3% are owned by freeholders (Alberta Energy 2006, 1 
-1) and, according to multiple sections of the Canadian Constitution, AB has “exclusive” 
regulatory powers over the tar sands (Vlavianos 2007b, 4-5).  
But the federal government also has jurisdiction in specific issue areas such as 
inland fisheries and environmental impacts, particularly those not easily contained 
within provincial boundaries, such as air and water pollution, GHG emissions and 
impacts on wildlife. Where the federal government has clearest jurisdiction, according 
to Vlavianos (2007b), is via DFO’s Fisheries Act, Transport Canada’s (TC’s) Navigable 
Waters Protection Act, the NEB’s National Energy Board Act (on pipelines crossing 
provinces or the Canada-U.S. border), Environment Canada’s (EC’s) Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act (CEPA), as well as the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency’s (CEAA) Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEA Act). In 
addition, the Species at Risk Act (administered by the Minister of Canadian Heritage, 
Minister of Fisheries and Oceans and Minister of Environment) and the Canada Wildlife 
Act (administered by EC’s Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS)) are also relevant. 
 However the extent of the federal government’s power via these pieces of 
legislation is ambiguous, contested, unpredictable and under-tested, unclear and 
lacking in predictability” (Vlavianos 2007b, 67-68, 72). To avoid two simultaneous 
environmental assessments at the provincial and federal level, there is now an AB-
                                                
19 The complexity and importance of jurisdictional authority was emphasized in 
interviews with an Environmental Law Centre lawyer in 2007 and with Canadian Institute of 
Resource Law lawyers (1 and 2) in 2007. 
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Canada agreement on a joint process, the Canada-Alberta Agreement on Environmental 
Assessment Cooperation. However, there is a great lack of clarity as to when this joint 
process will be engaged (some projects include this joint process and others do not and 
there are few clear trends to explain the path taken) (Vlavianos 2007b, 71-72, 74-75). 
It is this kind of uncertainty, combined with the federal government’s caution in 
intervening in Albertan resource development given previous federal-provincial 
conflicts, that explain the federal government’s “reluctance to exercise greater powers in 
relation to the environmental impacts of oil sands projects” (Vlavianos 2007b, 67-68, 72; 
see also Richardson 2007, 35-37). Of course, the federal government has had a major role 
in several projects (projects with joint panel reviews include, for example, the Jackpine, 
Horizon, Kearl and Muskeg projects). But given the clear lead the Albertan government 
takes in tar sands environmental regulation, this chapter focuses on the provincial 
regulatory regime. A summary of the most relevant provincial and federal regulators 
discussed in the forthcoming sections is below.  
 
 
Figure 9: Environmental Regulatory Key Actors in AB’s Tar Sands 
 
 
Lead Environmental Authority: Government of AB’s Alberta Environment 
 
 
Involved Provincial Authorities  
− AB Energy 
− Sustainable Resource Development (SRD) 
− Energy and Utility Board  
 
 
Federal Authorities With Jurisdiction 
− Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO) 
− CEAA 
− EC 
 
 
 Note the peculiarity of the AB case compared to global oil and gas developments, 
80% of which are nationally owned: the AB government owns the tar sands resource 
but has no direct role in developing it—tar sands developments are all private (or are 
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undertaken by oil companies owned by other governments). To access revenues from 
the tar sands, the AB government depends on and therefore must encourage private 
developers. 
 Tar sands regulation occurs in distinct phases: first, the disposition of exclusive 
rights in the form of a lease or permit to explore for and extract tar sands; second, 
approval for surface land access; and third, approval for the project including facilities 
associated with extraction, upgrading and product transport (pipelines).20 Finally, there 
are approvals associated with activity closure, such as remediation and 
decommissioning, although they have been are seldom engaged given the very long life 
span of these projects. See the simplified flowchart below for the basic framework. 
 
Figure 10: Major Regulatory Stages of AB’s Tar Sands Development 
 
 
Disposition of Rights to Explore 
 
Approval for Surface Land Access 
 
Project Approval 
 
End of Life-Cycle (Activity Closure) Approvals 
 
 
The first stage primarily involves AB Energy guided by the Mines and Minerals Act, Oil 
Sands Tenure Regulation and Mines and Minerals Administration Regulation. It commences 
with industry requesting that particular parcels of land be included in offers for tender. 
                                                
20 Interviewees within the Albertan government were helpful to me in understanding the 
approval processes. Particularly I note the interviews with an Alberta Energy policy maker, 
Policy, Planning and External Relations, (1) in 2007 an Alberta Energy policy maker, Policy, 
Planning, and External Relations, (2) in 2008, an Alberta Environment policy maker, 
Environmental Policy Branch, (1) in 2007, an Alberta Environment policy maker, Environmental 
Policy Branch, (2) in 2008, Alberta Environment policy makers, Oil and Gas Policy Sector and 
Electricity / Minerals Sector, (1 & 2) in 2007, an Alberta Environment policy makers, Oil and 
Gas Policy Sector and Electricity / Minerals Sector, (3) in 2007, an Alberta Environment policy 
maker, Strategic Policy and Innovation, in 2008, an Energy and Utilities Board policy maker 
(Business Operations and Development) in 2007, and an Energy Resources and Conservation 
Board policy maker in 2008. NGO interviewees were also helpful in clarifying the regulatory 
process, particularly a professor of Political Science (2) at the University of Alberta in 2008 and 
lawyers with Canadian Institute of Resource Law and Environmental Law Centre in 2007. 
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AB Energy than verifies the availability of that parcel and consults with the Crown 
Mineral Disposition Review Committee to check for restrictions on land access and use. 
Parcels are then released for auction every two weeks (rights are given to the highest 
bidder who must pay the amount bid, annual rent, fee for non-producing leases and 
royalties on extracted resources). 
 The next stage is managed primarily by AB’s Sustainable Resource Development 
(SRD) as well as Alberta Environment (AENV)—companies seek approval from SRD to 
explore for tar sands and SRD provides notice to AENV. Both departments are guided 
by a plethora of policies and regulations, primarily Public Lands Act (administered by 
SRD), Public Lands Operational Handbook (SRD), Code of Practice (administered by AENV, 
conforming to AENV’s Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act), Surface Rights Act 
(SRD), plus, where applicable, Provincial Parks Act, Historical Resources Act, and 
Wilderness Areas, Ecological Reserves, Natural Areas and Heritage Rangelands Act. 
 The third stage, project approval, is directed by AB’s Energy Resources 
Conservation Board (ERCB), formerly the Energy and Utilities Board (EUB),21 and 
AENV according to, primarily, the Oil Sands Conservation Act (ERCB), Energy Resources 
and Conservation Act (ERCB), Oil Sands Conservation Regulation (ERCB), Environmental 
Protection and Enhancement Act (AENV), and Water Act (AENV). Companies proposing 
projects conduct public consultation and submit an approval application to the ERCB 
which can investigate and hold public hearings before an ERCB panel (particularly in 
the case of unresolved objections raised in public consultation). Ultimately, the ERCB 
assesses whether the project is in the public interest in terms of social, economic and 
environmental impacts. Cabinet authorizes ERCB approvals that may be subject to 
particular restrictions. At the same time, tar sands projects almost always involve 
                                                
21 In 2008 the EUB was divided into the ERCB, mandated to regulate oil, natural gas, tar 
sands, coal, as well as pipeline developments, and the Alberta Utilities Commission, regulating 
the utilities sector (electricity and natural gas markets). 
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AENV through the EPEA and require an EIA report including publicly commented 
terms of reference and a final public report. In addition, the project proponents must get 
several authorizations from AENV based on the EPEA and Water Act that contain 
regulations and guidelines relating to pollution and emissions. 
To avoid the redundancy of conducting two environmental assessments, one 
required by AENV’s Environment’s EPEA and another by the CEAA’s CEA Act, the 
Government of AB and the Government of Canada have signed the Canada-Alberta 
Agreement on Environmental Assessment Cooperation. This allows for joint AB-Canada 
environmental assessment where one lead is assigned through federal-provincial 
advisory teams and joint panels. (On the complications and ambiguities caused by this 
agreement, see Vlavianos (2007b, 72-73).) Ultimately, the agreement allows for the 
Government of AB to manage its own environmental assessment processes with limited 
involvement from federal government authorities. The environmental assessment 
process, either with a joint process or within AB alone, is sketched below. 
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Figure 11: AB Tar Sands Development Environmental Assessment Process22 
 
 
Prior to land released for auction, the Crown Mineral Disposition Review Committee 
advises AB Energy about environmental impacts. AB Energy has  
the discretion to post rights to lands for auction 
 
Companies apply to the ERCB and AENV for project approval.  
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) is submitted to AENV 
 
Verification of federal and provincial “triggers” and regulatory exclusions 
                     
If federal CEA Act applies, then a joint federal-
provincial advisory team is formed, according 
to the Canada-AB Agreement on Environmental 
Assessment Cooperation 
If CEA Act does not apply, then only AENV’s 
EPEA environmental assessment process is 
followed 
 
  
A Comprehensive Study is conducted if one 
applies according to the  
Comprehensive Study List Regulations.  
If not, there is a basic screening. 
Level of screening (or assessment exemption) is 
determined 
  
In the case of a Comprehensive Study, the 
proponent conducts the study based on the 
scoping document (with public review), and 
submits it to the advisory team 
Where an EIA is required, the terms of 
reference are developed with public input and 
finalized.  
  
Public review period EIA is conducted by the proponent, submitted 
to AENV, is made public, and then undergoes 
an AENV technical review 
  
Recommendation to CEAA Minister and 
Minister of AENV who determine if the project 
proceeds and what mitigation measures might 
be required 
 
AENV Director deems EIA complete and 
makes recommendations to the ERCB based on 
the EIA 
 
This environmental assessment process, as well as the broader system framing it, 
exhibit three kinds of problematic trends: first, and most generally, poorly timed and 
incorporated environmental consideration; second, important regulatory gaps (relating 
to GHG emissions, water withdrawals, reclamation and public consultation); and third, 
institutional difficulties in addressing cumulative impacts.  
                                                
22 See the Energy Resources Conservation Board (2010) for a thorough new government 
publication on this process with a focus on in situ developments. 
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Ineffective (Weak and Delayed) Environmental Consideration  
AENV, the department responsible for regulating environmental impacts in the tar 
sands, is in a structurally weak position in the decision making and regulating process, 
particularly in comparison to the departments forwarding oil development (primarily 
AB Energy and the ERCB).23 The regulatory scope of the department is too narrow and 
its input occurs too late—after the leasing of land has occurred and property rights have 
been assumed.  
At the leasing stage, environmental impacts are considered at the Crown Mineral 
Disposition Review Committee’s (CMDRC) initial review of companies’ requests for 
land auction but only in a cursory manner. As Holroyd et al. note, this is “the one and 
only opportunity during the tenure process to consider the environmental and social 
impacts of granting oil sands rights,” but this process is too narrowly focused (there is 
no room for a consideration of cumulative impacts), too rapid, poorly informed, and 
has no “formalized” environmental assessment process (2007, 21-22). Even if the 
environmental analysis was improved here, the CMDRC is merely making 
recommendations for AB Energy to use at its discretion. AB Energy ultimately decides 
if land requested for auction will be posted. Note that AB Energy, the primary 
department promoting tar sands development is closely aligned with the oil industry 
which it considers as its “principal stakeholder”;24 indeed, industry sets the entire 
tenure process in motion as land leasing commences with corporate requests, not a 
provincial plan.  
                                                
23 This point was raised repeatedly particularly by lawyers and environmental non-
governmental organization researchers interviewed for this research. Interviewees emphasizing 
this problem include lawyers with the Canadian Institute of Resource Law and the 
Environmental Law Centre as well as Council of Canadians researcher in, Parkland Institute 
and Pembina Institute researchers, and a Sierra Club researcher (all interviewed in 2007). 
24 This is a quote from an Alberta Energy policy maker interviewed in 2007. 
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More thorough consideration of environmental effects occurs through AENV’s 
EIA. But even these have limited impact on the decision-making process because the 
EIA results are simply transferred to the ERCB. And here environmental considerations 
are continuously overridden by other interests, such as economic benefit. The ERCB, the 
issuer of project permits, is admittedly under political pressure to approve the projects 
for which Energy has already sold rights.25 According to Vlavianos, “it is clear that the 
EIA process under EPEA [AB’s Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act] is not 
a central feature of the oil and gas development process in the province.” The EIA 
“simply provides the EUB [now the ERCB] with environmental information,” then it is 
the EUB “who will make the final determination about whether a project is in the public 
interest or not, and environmental impacts are only one consideration in the EUB’s 
decision” (Vlavianos 2006, 46). AENV has no power to reject projects on environmental 
grounds. Even the results of the Environmental Appeals Board (EAB) (the quasi-judicial 
tribunal of AENV) hearings are weak, given that their results are non-binding and 
dependent on the Minister’s discretion.  
Overall, the ERCB’s and AB Energy’s interests seem to consistently override 
AENV in decision making on the tar sands from the very beginning of the development 
process. This is common knowledge both inside and outside the public service. As 
AENV policy makers note, even in interdepartmental initiatives that are supposed to 
offer a “level playing field” for all ministries, energy interests “typically carry the day” 
(interview with Alberta Environment (Oil and Gas Policy Sector and Electricity / 
Minerals Sector) policy makers (1 & 2) in 2007).26 There is also support for tar sands 
developments within AENV. When asked about AENV’s apparent reluctance to slow or 
                                                
25 This point was made by an Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) (Business Operations and 
Development) policy maker in a 2007 interview. Note that this political pressure is easily 
applied given the EUB staff: the board is a politicized entity with board members appointed by 
cabinet through non-debated orders-in-council. 
26 On this point, also see Vlavianos’ analysis of the relationship between the EUB and 
Alberta Environment (2007b, 58-59). 
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reject projects due to environmental impacts, policy makers interviewed in that 
department noted that “When things are good, you want to reap all the benefits you 
can. You don’t want to stand in the way of that” (interview with Alberta Environment 
(Oil and Gas Policy Sector and Electricity / Minerals Sector) policy makers (1 & 2) in 
2007). Another policy maker with AENV (Environmental Policy Branch), argued in a 
2007 interview that not permitting a tar sands development to occur is “stranding” 
resource revenue potential from Albertans. 
At the same time, policymakers committed to environmental protection have 
inadequate resources and staff to monitor and enforce regulations. Long-term research 
to compare budget commitments to environmental departments is currently lacking in 
AB but preliminary data indicate a problem. For instance Woynillowicz, referring to 
AENV’s capacity using statistics from the AB Government’s Fiscal Plans from 2001 to 
2008, notes declines in that unit’s staff since 2000, precisely when tar sands production 
was expanding significantly. Early numbers suggests, at the very least, that “the 
department’s budget has not grown in parallel with its workload” (Woynillowicz 2006). 
Boychuk, using more recent Alberta Federation of Labour data, notes that AENV’s 
budget for “monitoring, compliance and enforcement” declined by 26% just as $200 
billion was invested in developing an industry that particularly needed strong 
regulatory capacity (2010, 35).  
 
Key Regulatory Gaps  
More specific than the overall structural position of AENV are four specific regulatory 
gaps or inefficiencies in environmental regulation relating to GHG emissions, water 
withdrawals, reclamation and public consultation. 
 The most obvious and pressing example relates to GHG emissions. Tar sands 
projects are a major—and the most rapidly growing—contributor to Canadian GHG 
emissions (Richardson 2007, 37-38). For example, in 2008, Syncrude’s Mildred Lake and 
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Aurora North Plant sites were, combined, the third largest GHG emitter in the country 
(12.2 million tons emitted), and Suncor was the fourth largest (8.8 million tons) 
(Environment Canada 2010). While per barrel emissions are declining, improvements 
are outpaced by the continuous expansion of tar sands operations.  
The policy response to this situation is notoriously weak. To meet the goal of 
keeping global climate within two degrees of warming using a carbon emission 
“budgeting” model, the tar sands industry’s proportional share of GHG emissions must 
be reduced from 37 million tons in 2008 to 24 million tons in 2020 (Environmental 
Defence, Équiterre, and Pembina Institute, 7). However, current provincial targets will 
see GHG emissions rising until 2020 and only then will they begin a gradual decrease to 
arrive back at 2008 emission levels by 2035. The Albertan emissions policy, therefore, 
will delay real reductions in emissions for approximately three decades. And the 
promised reductions are to come from carbon capture and storage (CCS) projects 
(Alberta Government 2008b, 24) which are currently still in development and 
questionable in terms of their efficacy to reduce emissions within the critical timeframe 
(Le Billon and Carter 2010; as well as Dyer 2010; Thomson 2009). While it is true that AB 
moved quickest among Canadian provinces to establish a price on carbon emission and 
targets, the speed of policy implementation perhaps had more to do with wanting to set 
the bar low for coming federal policies rather than with creating effective policies. 
 Policies managing freshwater are equally problematic, especially with regard to 
in-stream flow needs (the level of water needed in a hydrological system to maintain 
the ecosystem), of the Athabasca River, the primary source for the water intensive tar 
sands projects. (Multiple interviewees stressed this point, in particular Canadian 
Institute of Resource Law lawyers in 2007.) Guided by its Water Act, AENV issues 
licenses for water withdrawals from the Athabasca River to tar sands companies. To 
date, the tar sands industry’s net water allocation is 2.3% of the Athabasca River’s total 
flow with licenses to withdraw amounting to 349 million cubic meters annually (double 
  66 
Calgary’s domestic withdrawals from the Bow River) (Pembina Institute 2007b), and 
approved projects not yet in operation would double this amount (Richardson 2007, 43). 
Given the problem of drought in a region which has experienced significant decreases 
in river flow over the last century (Griffiths et al. 2006, 13), withdrawals from the 
Athabasca River for tar sands developments have been a longstanding concern that has 
only begun to receive thorough policy consideration.  
The Cumulative Environmental Management Association (CEMA) struggled for 
years to define in-stream flow needs to guide withdrawal policy but, as is typical with 
this organization, it could not reach consensus by the December 31, 2005, deadline. 
Therefore, DFO and AENV developed the Water Management Framework (Alberta 
Environment and Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2007) which places limits on 
withdrawals during winter low flow periods at 5.2% of weekly historical median flows 
with maximum withdrawal caps of 15 cubic meters per second. Yet this policy runs 
counter to the recommendations of environmental organizations and aboriginal 
communities which advocate permitting no withdrawal during these periods given the 
risk to habitat (Pembina Institute 2007b). According to the Oil Sands Developers Group 
(OSDG), a regional oil industry association, by 2010 tar sands projects alone will have 
exceeded the 5.2% winter weekly withdrawal limit and continue to grow to 6%, at 
which level withdrawals will stabilize until 2035. In the “growth case” scenario, 15 
cubic meter per second water withdrawals—the current maximum withdrawal cap in 
low flow periods—may be standard by 2015 to 2030 period (Irving 2008). This problem 
is acknowledged in the framework:  
 
While current oilsands water use has generally been below the most stringent limits 
identified within the Phase 1 Framework, current licences have allowed for 
maximum amounts that could cumulatively exceed them. Further project development 
will add to the cumulative demands that are now subject to the Phase 1 limits (Alberta 
Environment and Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2007, 18, italics added).  
An additional problem with the framework is that its implementation and 
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enforcement provisions were delayed until 2010 with the results of more studies on in-
stream flow needs and broader consultations not available until that time. As these 
discussions slowly proceed and research accumulates, tar sands projects advance 
toward their anticipated five-fold expansion and additional water withdrawal licenses 
continue to be issued. Hence Wenig et al.’s (2006) criticism regarding the “regulatory 
foot dragging” within the AB government that has not secured in-stream flow needs. As 
they note, while “bemoaning” the lack of a cumulative effects plan, “the province’s 
Energy and Utilities Board has continued approving, and Alberta Environment has 
continued issuing new water licences for, successive oilsands operations.” This lack of 
vigilance was admitted by the AB Government’s 2006 Oil Sands Ministerial Strategy 
Committee report which noted that “Alberta Environment has not had the opportunity 
or the resources to undertake a review to determine whether there is sufficient water 
available” in key rivers to permit new developments (113). 
Reclamation is a third obvious regulatory gap primarily because the province 
lacks specific reclamation guidelines and monitoring processes. As Vlavianos explains, 
project permits are issued “without a clear sense that reclamation is currently feasible 
but in the hopes that new technology will be developed that will someday allow for 
proper reclamation.” Reclamation of tailing ponds is a particularly pressing issue given 
the lack of proven technology and methods (Vlavianos 2007b, 52). The results to date 
are telling: after over four decades of tar sands developments, AENV issued its first 
reclamation certificate on March 19, 2008, for 104 hectares of land.27 As one participant 
in the tar sands consultations noted, “Development is going along at hyperspeed but 
reclamation is going along at geological speed” (quoted in Alberta Energy 2007c, 18). 
Interviewees including Pembina Institute researchers, a Sierra Club researcher and a 
Council of Canadians researcher noted this problem as well in 2007. 
                                                
27 For an analysis and criticism of reclamation efforts to date, see Grant et al. (2008). 
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Finally, criticism is now frequently directed toward the ineffectual public 
consultation (or, where consultation is adequately conducted, the unheeded public 
consultation) on tar sands projects.28 During the rights issuance process there is no 
opportunity for public input and perhaps even little public notice.29 In Wenig’s (2004) 
appraisal, the CMDRC’s work is a “black box”: there is no public involvement at this 
stage and very little public information about what the committee does.30 With regard to 
the ERCB, public involvement can happen in its processes, but only if the proposed 
project is brought to a hearing and a hearing is only triggered if people protest that they 
have been “directly and adversely affected”31 by an ERCB decision. But if there are no 
landowners or occupants, a hearing cannot be triggered—there is no mechanism to 
commence hearings in “unoccupied” lands, where the great majority of these 
developments are occurring. 
Public involvement in AENV is greater than in Energy and the ERCB, but it is 
still delayed in both the EIA and licensing processes. During the EIA process, public 
involvement is permitted in a limited way but only in the later stages. There is some 
room during AENV’s license issuing processes for input from directly affected 
individuals and these licenses can be appealed through the EAB. But EAB decisions, 
like EIA reports, are non-binding and the Minister of the Environment has the ultimate 
decision on appealed issues (Environmental Law Centre 2006b, 1-2, 2006a, 7-9). Note 
                                                
28 A parallel problem not raised here, but common in environmental assessment 
processes is the issue of overwhelming public consultations: the frequency of the processes 
alongside the complexity and sheer volume of information to be assessed in a short period often 
alienates local communities.  
29 As AB’s Environmental Law Centre Fact Sheet on Oil and Gas Developments and 
Surface Rights explains, even for “potentially affected surface owners or occupiers,” there is “no 
direct notice” when rights to the land are offered for auction and leased (2006b). 
30 See also Vlavianos’ comments on the “complete lack of public participation” at crucial 
stages of the tar sands decision making process (2007a). This issue is explored in detail in 
Vlavianos (2007c). 
31 Here “directly and adversely affected” refers narrowly to property owners within a 
stated radius from the development (ranging from 100 meters to 5.5 kilometers) who would 
suffer economic losses or negative public safety impacts from the proposed development. Other 
types of impacts, such as health and environmental effects, are difficult to prove.  
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that Stelmach’s multiple public consultations appear to be improving on this closed 
system, but these consultations produce only recommendations that the government 
may or may not choose to implement.32  
Recent consultations such as the 2006-07 Oil Sands Consultation led by the Multi-
Stakeholder Committee and the 2007 Royalty Review Panel Consultation have been 
more inclusive than former premiers have allowed. But the consultations have 
produced only recommendations with no legal standing, and, therefore, no requirement 
that they be enacted by government (Vlavianos 2007b, 64). Therefore, as Acuña, now 
the Executive Director of the Parkland Institute, notes,  
 
although the actual consultation process is an improvement over the window-
dressing consultations of the Klein years, it would appear that the outcome will be 
no different—a government with no interest at all in actually acting on what 
Albertans are recommending (2007). 
These concerns seem founded to date: of the tens of recommendations resulting from 
the multi-stakeholder process in the government’s “Responsible Actions” twenty-year 
strategy for socially and environmentally sound oil sands development (Treasury Board 
2009), only two have been implemented over the last year (Cryderman 2010). For these 
reasons, NGOs frequently worry that government-initiated consultations provide a 
mere illusion of participation, while diverting the energies of activists.  
Note that the longstanding problem of accountability and public information 
access from AB Energy has been repeatedly emphasized in both internal governmental 
and more independent panel reports in recent years (Valentine 2008; Dunn 2007; 
Hunter et al. 2007). 
                                                
32 As an example of recent work on this question, Fluet and Krogman (2007) study one 
public consultation process, the Northern East Slopes Sustainable Resource and Environmental 
Management Strategy. They find it to be marked by industry-capture, ENGO exclusion, and 
overly narrow terms of debate (for example, one that excludes non-use or intrinsic values). They 
observe that these consultations can “serve to symbolically employ democratic processes, but 
simultaneously maintain the power relations that underlie the current model of economic 
development.” McInnis and Urquhart make a similar point and describe this phenomenon as 
“Public Participation as Symbolic, Manipulative Politics” (McInnis and Urquhart 1995, 247). 
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Analytical Gap: Cumulative Impacts  
Comments made during these public consultations frequently point to a final 
problematic regulatory trend in the regulation of AB’s tar sands development: 
environmental analyses are predominantly limited to the impact of specific projects 
whereas engaged citizens are concerned with long-term, long-range effects. As 
industrialization expands, citizens and observers note the inadequacy of a regulatory 
process examining individual permits or projects without an analysis of regional, 
cumulative impacts. This is a primary concerned raised during interviews with 
Pembina Institute researchers, a Sierra Club researcher, and lawyers with the Canadian 
Institute of Resource Law and Environmental Law Centre in 2007. 
 Since the late 1990s there have been multiple institutional integration attempts to 
address cumulative environmental impacts and to overcome the policy absences and 
the fragmented nature of decision-making on tar sands development. These include the 
more general Sustainable Resource and Environmental Management (SREM), and, 
specific to the tar sands, the Regional Sustainable Development Strategy (RSDS) for 
Athabasca Oil Sands Area, the Mineable Oil Sands Strategy (MOSS), the CEMA, and 
AENV’s Oil Sands Environmental Management division. Across all of these bodies, 
there have been continual delays primarily due to difficulties (genuine or contrived) in 
reaching a consensus. So far, there have been no tangible recommendations on 
development trade-offs and no clear framework for departments to address cumulative 
effects. Overall, these policy integration attempts on the tar sands have become, as 
representatives from ENGOs often note, “parking lots” for complex issues while tar 
sands developments continue on through inadequate processes. Even if these 
integration efforts were functioning, there is concern that they would be mere illusions 
of integration with AB Energy’s interests continuing to dominant the regulatory 
process.  
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Taken together, these trends—consideration of environmental impacts that is poorly 
timed and weakly integrated into the decision-making process on tar sands projects, 
alongside significant regulatory and analytical gaps—indicate a fragile system of 
environmental regulation. Given this, the environmental outcomes described in the 
previous section are unsurprising. But what accounts for these regulatory patterns? 
 
 
III. Explaining Environmental Regulation in the Tar Sands  
A political ecology approach provides a way to reach an explanation for the above 
trends by focusing attention on the broader political-economic system framing tar sands 
development. In this vein, below I outline the interests and strategies of the primary 
interests dominating the debate and note how they result in continued, expanded tar 
sands developments with weakened regulation.  
The dominant petro-political regime in AB is marked by two trends that I 
develop in the following two sections. First, the Albertan (and Canadian) government is 
strongly dependent on revenue from tar sands projects; hence there is widespread 
governmental consent for and support of these developments. Second, this support is 
reinforced by lobbying by oil industry associations and major tar sands companies 
which work to influence provincial and federal levels of government and, more 
recently, American and international organizations. 
 
Government Dependence and Support 
The province of AB (and, to a lesser but still significant degree, the federal government), 
depends on revenue from tar sands developments even more so than on taxes from 
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citizens.33 In this political-economic regime emblematic of Karl’s “oil-based social 
contract” (1997, 57), government institutions are readjusted to respond to these private 
developers rather than to citizens.  
Albertan government revenues—and the provincial economy in general—are 
dominated by the energy sector. Non-renewable energy resource revenues have 
accounted for an average of 31.3% of total provincial revenue over the last ten years, 
ranging from 13% to 51% (see figures 10 and 11 in chapter 4). Surveying a longer period 
of time, the 1971 to 2004 period, a recent ISEEE report summarizes the cumulative 
provincial economic impacts of oil and gas (in constant 2005 dollars) as amounting to 
over $1.5 trillion in GDP or value added, $600 billion in employment income (almost 12 
million person-years of employment), and approximately $280 billion in government 
revenues. All told, over this period the oil and gas industry is estimated, in terms of 
direct and indirect impacts, as contributing to 42% of the provincial GDP (Mansell and 
Schlenker 2006, ii-iii). These enormous investments have made Albertan a national 
powerhouse. In addition, employment gains, while more modest than GDP impacts, are 
still significant with estimates for direct and indirect jobs from the energy industry at 
approximately 14% of total employment.34 
Non-renewable revenues and other economic benefits are increasingly based on 
tar sands projects, a trend expected to amplify over time. In 2006, tar sands production 
was 62% of AB’s total crude oil and equivalent production (Alberta Energy 2008), and 
as noted above, by as early as 2014, mined and in-situ produced bitumen is projected to 
surpass the combined production of all energy forms in the province (Energy Resources 
                                                
33 Note that the AB government currently earns more from natural gas developments 
than from tar sands. But natural gas production is steadily declining therefore the province 
encourages tar sands developments as a substitute for dropping revenues from natural gas. Due 
to the low royalty rate for tar sands discussed in this chapter, provincial revenues from tar 
sands represent a very thin slice of total energy royalties, approximately 10% in 2005 (Taylor 
and Raynolds 2006). I thank Diana Gibson for raising this point. 
34 This estimate is based on data from the AB Government (2008c) and Statistics 
Canada’s May 8, 2008, Labour Force Survey. 
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Conservation Board 2008). 
 This unconventional oil is contributing significantly to provincial revenues: from 
1967 to 2009 the tar sands industry resulted in $17.4 billion in provincial royalties, with 
$2.1 billion in 2009. Peak annual royalties were in 2008 at $3.5 billion (Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers 2011, Table 4.16b). These developments have also 
attracted significant investment with indirect ‘spinoffs’ effects felt across the province 
and country.  
 Nationally, AB’s tar sands represent a major source of Canadian oil production 
and revenue. As demonstrated in figure 10 and 11 discussed in chapter 4, AB has been 
the largest oil producer by far in Canada over the 1997-2006 period, with Albertan tar 
sands production alone accounting for nearly 50% of Canadian crude oil and equivalent 
in 2006 (Alberta Energy 2009b). Over 70% of this bitumen flows south to the American 
market and the American-led Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
calls for a five-fold expansion of production (and export) of tar sands. These resources 
play no small role in Canada’s aspiration to become a world (or at least North 
American) “energy superpower.” (I return to this point in more detail in the fourth 
chapter.)  
Federally, in terms of direct economic impact, the federal government receives 
15% of tar sands rent (Alberta Energy 2009b). In addition, the projects provide 
employment to out-of-province residents who return money earned in AB to their often 
economically struggling home provinces, particularly in regions with high 
unemployment in eastern Canada (Hunter et al. 2007, 7; see also Pembina Institute 
2007c).  
 
Financial Subsidies  
But alongside this discussion of economic benefits, it is important to note that while 
revenues from the tar sands, and economic impacts generally, outlined above seem 
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impressive, rent from these projects is actually quite low. What we have, therefore, is a 
situation where the environmental costs to the resource owner (the public) are high (or 
unaccounted) and economic benefit to the owner is quite low. The public is not 
receiving what it could from the industry and this is due to the efforts of both levels of 
government to provide a welcoming fiscal environment for tar sands developers (often 
alongside or in response to industry pressure for this kind of favorable treatment).  
From the start of the tar sands industry in AB in the 1960s until the mid-1990s, 
there was no set royalty standard; rather, rates were negotiated on an individual basis 
between the Government of AB and companies. By the 1990s, this system was deemed 
ineffective, as there were no clear rates that new developers could anticipate.  
To provide more certainty, this “ad hoc” process was replaced, in response to the 
1995 National Oil Sands Task Force study, by a new “generic” royalty system. This 
system was based on the principle of the government requiring very low royalty 
payments until the projects reached “payout”—until all capital and operating costs had 
been recovered. The result was that the Government of AB collected a mere 1% of gross 
revenues until payout, then 25% of net revenues. As for taxes, corporate taxes 
provincially (and federally) were lowered throughout 1997 to 2007, dropping from 
15.5% to 10% provincially (and from 29% to 15% federally), with royalty payments 
deductible from both.  
Then in 2006, after public outcry regarding the lack of public benefit from the tar 
sands at a time of high oil prices, there was another shift in the royalty regime (research 
by the Pembina Institute was very important in this debate; see, for example, Taylor and 
Raynolds 2006). The government appointed an expert AB Royalty Review Panel that 
then recommended significant changes to the system to garner a greater share of the 
resource to the province (Plourde 2010b, 4653).  
The panel emphasized that the AB government’s take for tar sands was 
strikingly low—or “overly generous” to industry—particularly compared to similar 
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jurisdictions. By their data, in 2007 the oil industry got 53% of tar sands rent while 
Albertans received 32% and the federal government received 15% (therefore the total 
government take was less than half at 47%) (Hunter et al. 2007, 7; see also Pembina 
Institute 2007c). This is low compared to other “frontier oil” developments 
internationally (tar sands, heavy oil and offshore oil), with Norway getting 
approximately 76%, Venezuela 71%, and Californian, Angolan and Alaskan taking 64-
67% (Hunter et al. 2007, 23-34).   
But the provincial government did not follow the panel recommendation and 
instead accommodated industry interests. As Acuña at the Parkland Institute well 
notes, the royalty changes implemented by the provincial government represented a 
“Compromise on a compromise on a compromise” (2009)—a repeatedly weakened 
version of the royalties Albertans demanded and even the government-appointed panel 
strongly recommended. One very welcome change, however, was the termination of the 
provincial Accelerated Capital Cost Allowance (ACCA).  
Today, royalty rates for tar sands projects remain at 25% until the price of WTI 
oil reaches $55 in Canadian dollars, at which point the rate gradual increases to a 
maximum of 40% (although these royalties remain deductible from taxable income) by 
linear interpolation35 (Plourde 2010b, 4653-54). What this means in terms of the total 
revenue capture from the tar sands is highly complex. In Plourde’s recent analysis, he 
shows that (depending on factors such as the price of oil, the strength of the Canadian 
dollar and capital expenditures), companies take as much as 65% of total revenue, with 
the provincial government receiving a maximum of 55% and the federal government a 
maximum 10.6% (2010b, figure a and b, 4660). 
                                                
35 When oil is at or below $55 a barrel, royalties are 1% on gross revenue and 25% on net 
revenue. From here, rates climb very gradually, with 0.12% added per dollar increase on gross 
revenue and 0.23% per dollar increase on net revenue, until the price of oil reaches the $120 
royalty mark, at which point royalty rates reach a maximum of 9% on gross revenue and 40% 
on net revenue (Alberta Energy 2007b). 
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But data from the Parkland Institute shows a much less generous portion of tar 
sands value going to the provincial government. In these calculations, once corporate 
capital expenditures and operating expenditures as well as royalty payments are 
written off, the effective percentage of the rent going to the government averages out at 
a mere 8.9% over the 1992 to 2009 period. Since 1997, the value of the bitumen produced 
from AB’s tar sands was $205 billion—but companies paid the Government of AB only 
$20 billion in royalties and land sales. The provincial government received less than 
10% of the total value of their resource (Boychuk 2010, 31, 43).   
In addition to low provincial royalty and taxes are the federal financial subsidies 
to the tar sands. As noted above, federal corporate tax rates for the tar sands have fallen 
and an additional preferential tax incentive for these projects was added through the 
ACCA. This allowance was created in 1997 to permit tar sands mining and in situ 
companies to claim more costs against income from tar sands (Taylor 2006). Based on 
this, tar sands project operators did not pay federal corporate income taxes on income 
from new projects until “all eligible capital costs associated with those projects are first 
written off for income tax purposes” (Hunter et al. 2007, 76-77, 90). The federal 
government ended this tax break to new projects in 2007 but it still applies to earlier 
projects. 
Low royalties and taxes created incentives to keep reinvesting continually in the 
development of new tar sands projects. For this reason, between 1997 and 2008, 
government royalties were slow or stagnating even as tar sands production increased 
(Taylor 2006). Low royalties and taxes were meant to stimulate investment in the 
struggling tar sands industry. Yet by the turn of the millennium tar sands production 
had taken off, exceeding all expectations. In 1995, the Alberta Chamber of Resources 
estimated tar sands production would reach 1.2 million barrels per day in 2020 
(National Task Force on Oil Sands 1995). But this production point was hit in 2004, well 
ahead of production projections. The Pembina Institute argues this extreme pace of 
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development was due to the permissive royalty and tax regimes, as well as the oil price 
growth (Bramley et al. 2005). 
Given the rapid expansion of the tar sands over the last decade, AB’s continuous 
provision of tax breaks, subsidies and low royalties to industry is outmoded. In fact, it is 
counterproductive given the environmental and social impacts—a development 
slowdown is needed rather than growth. An argument could be made that such 
financial support was needed at the outset of the industry in the 1960s to stimulate 
investment. But the pace and high profits margins of the industry today indicate that 
this is clearly no longer the case.  
 
R&D and E&T Subsidies 
In addition to the tax and royalty benefits, extracting oil from the tar sands would not 
have been possible without early and significant direct investments by the provincial 
and federal government through research and development or education and training 
initiatives. These subsidies began very early, dating from the 1930s (as stressed early in 
the debate by Pratt 1976; see also the recent analysis by Boychuk 2010). By current 
estimates, over one billion dollars of public money has been invested in research that 
led to the technology to mine for bitumen (Boychuk 2010).  
One important example is AB’s Oil Sands Technology and Research Authority 
(AOSTRA), formed in 1974 and replaced in 2000 by the Alberta Energy Research 
Institute (AERI) (Boychuk 2010, 29). This was the provincial government’s “proactive 
response” to “Develop oil sands technologies that would allow AB’s vast resources to 
be exploited at relatively low costs.” Provincial “patient funding” to AOSTRA spiking 
in the mid-1980s to approximately $75 million annually (Alberta Oil Sands Technology and 
Research Authority (AOSTRA): History of AOSTRA and Accomplishments 2009). This 
publicly funded research to forward the development of the tar sands amounted to over 
$800 million (Boychuk 2010). 
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 This support has been supplemented by special injections of research funding to 
resolve new industrial challenges. For example, in July 2008, the AB government 
announced a $2 billion commitment to reduce GHG emissions via CCS projects. CCS 
technology is planned for use at tar sands sites (to date, only upgraders can use this 
technology) (Alberta Government 2008a). AB’s government-funded CCS initiatives are 
focused through the CCS Development Council formed in April 2008 led by former 
Syncrude president Jim Carter with eight members from industry and six others from 
provincial and federal government departments and the University of Alberta. Another 
example is the $1.5 million announced in June 2009 for research on reclamation of tar 
sands at the University of Alberta’s School of Energy and the Environment. This 
extensive, long-standing government funding of research to respond to challenges in 
the tar sands represent a major public subsidy to the industry.  
 
Defending the Tar Sands 
Further, both levels of government actively lobby for tar sands developments on both 
sides of the border. In Canada, political leaders are adamant tar sands development will 
continue, a point encapsulated in Premier Stelmach’s well-known statement upon 
taking leadership of the Conservative Party in December 2006 that the province will not 
be “touching the break” on tar sands development (see, for example, Government of 
Alberta 2007; McLean 2006). The provincial government also reacts quickly to 
contentious issues in the press threatening the tar sands, a point made obvious by the 
province government’s defense industry after hundreds of migratory birds were oiled 
in tar sands tailings ponds.  
In the U.S., AB has a consistent foothold in Washington to promote tar sands 
investment and imports through its “lavish” provincial office and permanent 
representative (Henton 2007). From here, AB defends the tar sands from U.S. policies 
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such as the California’s January 2007 Low Carbon Fuel Standard36 and the Bush 
administration’s December 2007 Energy Independence and Security Act’s (EISA).37 The 
office also actively promotes the tar sands, an obvious example being its June 2006 
participation in the Smithsonian Folklife Festival where the province spent $3.8 million 
over the ten day event to host U.S. legislators and dignitaries (such as VP Dick Cheney) 
to bolster trade and, specifically, to draw attention to the tar sands’ value to the U.S. 
This aim was symbolized by parking of a 200-ton heavy hauler truck used in tar sands 
extraction on the Washington Mall—a bold statement to American legislators that AB 
has the oil reserves to meet American energy security needs. (Although this strategy 
partially backfired as it made some legislators and environmentalists realize the 
enormity of environmental destruction in the tar sands.) 
In addition to a consistent presence in Washington, high-ranking politicians in 
AB frequently make special visits or trade missions to promote the tar sands. Stelmach’s 
first visit outside Canada as premier of AB in January 2008 was to Washington to meet 
U.S. Vice-President Cheney to defend tar sands developments and stress Americans’ 
need for energy security to be addressed by the tar sands (Stelmach defends oilsands in 
Washington January 16, 2008).  
While promoting a positive perception of the tar sands at home and abroad, the 
government of AB seems reluctant to unearth or release information critical of the 
projects, such as health impact studies in downstream communities. Ecologist and 
statistician Kevin Timoney suggests there are governmental attempts to cover up health 
and environmental impacts of the tar sands and observes that information control in AB 
                                                
36 This standard requires that all fuel sold in California have lower and declining 
lifecycle GHG emissions than industry averages. 
37 The EISA’s section 526 prohibits American federal agencies (such as the military, a 
major buyer of Albertan bitumen) from procuring non-conventional petroleum whose GHG 
emissions exceed emissions from conventional petroleum sources. This section was originally 
intended to curtail the development of fuel from liquefied coal, a very GHG intensive process, 
but it could also apply to the tar sands. 
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is “world class” (CBC 2007). One example of downplaying environmental impacts 
relates to the AB government’s reluctance to release new estimations of the number of 
migratory birds oiled in April 2008 in Syncrude’s tailings pond—1606 as opposed to the 
originally reported 500. Syncrude reported increased numbers in the summer of 2008 
but this more alarming count was not released by the government until April 2009. 
Similarly, the government downplays the seriousness of toxic waste leakages from 
tailings ponds even as scientific evidence mounts (Price 2008; Kelly et al. 2009). AENV 
scientist Preston McEachern explains that “You would not be able to distinguish this 
seepage from natural contamination” (Mittelstaedt 2008). Similarly, AB Energy Minister 
Mel Knight has argued that  
 
You can see bitumen running out of the banks of the Athabasca River on a hot 
summer’s day […]. It’s been going on for millennia and it’s not as if we’re dumping 
oil in the river and no one else is doing anything. Mother nature has done that for 
decades and eons (Knight is interviewed in Iwerks 2008).  
 
Federally, high-ranking officials also rapidly defend the industry from media 
criticism, sometimes even preemptively as Canadian Environment Minister Jim Prentice 
did in February 2009. Prior to the official publication of National Geographic’s March 1st, 
2009, article comparing the tar sands developments to “dark satanic mills” (Kunzig 
2009), Prentice took issue with the publication and stated that the tar sands are and will 
remain a critical resource for North American energy and the Canadian government 
will continue supporting them. Given Prentice’s history—as Minister of Indian Affairs 
and Northern Development from February 2006 to August 2007, Prentice was a key 
supporter of the Mackenzie Valley natural gas pipeline project—perhaps his position is 
expected. But Conservative members are not alone in this vocal support for the tar 
sands. Michael Ignatieff, leader of the Liberal Party, also publicly voiced support for the 
industry by elaborating on the employment it provides and the size of the resource 
(Prentice defends oilsands following National Geographic article February 25, 2009). 
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Federal actors have also been very active in supporting tar sands developments 
in the U.S. particularly in response to shifts in American policy that threatened the tar 
sands. The importance of the tar sands in Canada’s relationship with the U.S. was at the 
forefront during Michael Wilson’s time as Canada’s ambassador to U.S. (2006-2009).38 In 
response to the American EISA section 526, an act to reduce the use and imports of high 
GHG emitting fuels by federal buyers, Wilson wrote to the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 
the Secretary of State, and the Energy Secretary in February 2008 to advocate that tar 
sands be exempt from that section and considered conventional oil.39 He then actively 
intervened in the debates surrounding the development of California’s Low Carbon 
Fuel Standard in 2008 to 2009, reminding Americans that Canada “offers the U.S. 
enhanced energy security” increasing through tar sands production (2008). 
Such efforts were increased during Obama’s presidential campaign when a close 
aide of the candidate expressed reluctance in late June 2008 to import tar sands bitumen 
given its “unacceptably high carbon emissions” which contradicted Obama’s 
commitment to use fuels that reduce climate change (Alberts 2008). Soon thereafter, at 
the August 27, 2008, meeting in Denver of the Democratic National Convention, senior 
Canadian government officials, including Tony Clement, chair of the environment and 
energy security cabinet committee, as well as oil industry representatives such as Nexen 
Inc., met with Obama’s representatives. Clement was quoted as stating that the 
Canadian government was lobbying in the U.S. at all levels of government with senior 
leaders of both Conservative and Democratic parties, Congressional members, state 
legislators and governors as well as the mayors of major cities, to build a “sophisticated 
                                                
38 Upon taking office, Wilson (a former Mulroney cabinet minister and RBC asset 
manager and Vice Chairman of RBC Dominion Securities) stressed Canada’s position as the top 
exporter of oil to the U.S. compared to “less-secure” suppliers such as Mexico, Venezuela and 
Saudi Arabia. He noted “we must remind people of this reality so when the Americans come to 
us with another problem they have a more positive mindset. Our energy situation, particularly 
the oilsands, becomes a beneficial backdrop to any discussions with Americans” (Francis 2006). 
39 A coalition of American government agencies is simultaneously trying to have the tar 
sands considered conventional fuel (Agencies may clear oil sands under energy law 2008). 
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full-court press on Canada’s issues with the United States of America” (MacCharles 
2008). Then, upon Obama’s election in November 2009, Prime Minister Harper moved 
quickly to promote the tar sands to the new president. During Obama’s first visit to 
Canada in mid-February 2009, Harper specifically emphasized the importance of the tar 
sands to American energy security arguing Albertan tar sands are a conveniently close 
and stable replacement to Middle Eastern oil.  
While the federal government is quick—even preemptive—in responding to 
these threats to the tar sands, it hesitates to intervene where it has environmental 
regulatory authority. This point was well noted in the Standing Committee on Natural 
Resources report on the tar sands (Richardson 2007, 35-37).  
 Alongside these public defenses and promotion of the tar sands at both levels of 
government, there is also longstanding behind-closed-doors collaboration between 
Albertan, Canadian and American government representatives to increase tar sands 
exports to U.S. and streamline environmental regulation. The American-led North 
American Energy Working Group of the Security and Prosperity Partnership meets 
yearly to advance this agenda. Meeting discussions occasionally appear in the press, 
most notably references to a target developed at the January 2006 meeting in Houston 
for a five-fold expansion in tar sands production to meet U.S. national oil security needs 
(see, for example, U.S. urges 'fivefold expansion' in Alberta oilsands production 2007). 
 Government dependence, on and therefore broad-ranging support for, tar sands 
development—via research subsidies, low taxes and royalties, media and public 
relations efforts, political lobbying in the U.S., and reluctance to dig deeper on 
contentious environmental and health issues or intervene where possible—is reinforced 
by the industry lobby. This is the second major element of AB’s petro-political regime. 
 
Oil Industry Lobby  
The tar sands industry attempts to influence provincial government’s support for tar 
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sands developments to protect extensive investments in and profits from the projects. 
The most recent data on corporate spending in the tar sands shows that over the 1997 
and 2007 period, tar sands capital expenditures for in-situ production, mining and 
upgrading totaled $90.5 billion dollars, peaking in 2005, 2006 and 2007 at $10.4, $14.3 
and $18.1 billion dollars respectively. In addition, operating costs over 1997-2007 totaled 
nearly $68 billion, also peaking in the 2005-2007 period (Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers 2009b, table 4.16b). Significant investments continue even in 
periods of recession.40  
As for profits from these investments, over the last decade of available data 
(1998-2007), producers of tar sands in AB earned a total of $234 billion in sales from 
initial production in 1967 until 2009. The value of producer sales started to surge 
starting in 2000 rising to as high as $37.8 billion in 2008 (Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers 2011, table 4.19a and 4.19b). But discerning precise net profits after 
costs, taxes and royalties is complicated. A 2006 CAPP publication offers a general 
picture: twenty-five years into a tar sands project (the case of Suncor and Syncrude, two 
of the three largest producers), the projects’ return for companies after capital costs, 
taxes and royalties is 51% (Alberta’s Oil and Natural Gas Industry: Contributing to a 
Strong Provincial Economy 2006). Given this, based on sales revenues it could be 
estimated that in 2007, tar sands producers made net profits in the tens of billions of 
dollars.41 Then in addition to protecting investments and profits are the lucrative 
                                                
40 Prior to the 2008 recession, tar sands companies were forecast to invest nearly $30 
billion in capital investments in 2008 but some commentators note this has decreased to as little 
as $3 billion (Howard et al. 2009, 55). Yet other industry groups, such as the Oil Sands 
Developers Group, maintain high forecasts of over $20 billion in construction capital projects 
and $30 billion in operating costs in 2009 and 2010 (Producing and investing in energy 2009). 
The general trend has been that as oil prices declined due to a slowing global economy, tar 
sands companies without investments already made withdrew project proposals but those with 
the projects commenced or in operation continue production to repay investment costs. Note 
that Price at which tar sands operations are “economically viable”: $25 to $30 per barrel (in 
terms of U.S. dollars on a barrel of West Texas Intermediate oil) (Taylor cites Mawdsley et al. 
2005) (Taylor 2006). 
41 Profits continue flowing at lower oil prices: estimates of costs to produce a barrel of oil 
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salaries for tar sands company executives as noted in (Gibson 2007). 
Tar sands investments, profits and salaries represent high stakes and companies 
and industry associations have the resources to protect their access to the resources. 
And they have done so at critical points in the environmental debate42 using multiple 
methods.  
 
Political Lobbying and “Community Engagement” 
Lobbying the provincial and federal legislatures has been a primary method 
coordinated and led by the CAPP. CAPP is the upstream petroleum industry’s lobby 
force focused on the “economic sustainability” of its 130 companies that are exploring 
for, extracting and producing petroleum products in Canada. Together these companies 
produce over 90% of oil and natural gas in Canada. In addition, CAPP represents plus 
150 associated members who service the producing companies (Canadian Association 
of Petroleum Producers 2008a, 22). CAPP intervenes directly in the regulatory process 
to ensure fiscal and environmental regulatory regimes favorable to increasing access to 
oil and gas and profits for member companies.  
 For example, via CAPP industry repeatedly stresses to federal and provincial 
government bodies the undue costs and delays associated with new climate change 
policies. For instance in May 2009, CAPP, the Canadian Association of Oilwell Drilling 
Contractors and the Small Explorers and Producers Association of Canada presented 
arguments to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology for loosening environmental regulations generally and clarifying 
uncertainty around GHG regulations. These regulations have added to operating costs 
                                                                                                                                                       
from tar sands averaging around under $40 (although the established producers have lower 
averages still).  
42 Industry has also mounted strong lobbies in response to fiscal debates, exemplified in 
the response to royalty regime reviews and lobbying for tax breaks during economic 
downtown, most recently in winter 2008-09. 
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in Canada to the point that, according to Gary Leach, the executive director of the Small 
Explorers and Producers Association of Canada, “Canada provides among the lowest 
rates of return on investment in the world” (quoted in Akin 2009). The industry’s long-
standing lobbying effort against strong GHG emissions and adherence to the Kyoto 
Protocol, alongside its push for intensity-based targets with a low price on carbon, is 
another prominent example (Urquhart 2005, 149).  
 These calls for constraining environmental and GHG regulations are paired with 
lobbying for provincial and federal funding of technology to help meet new standards 
alongside demands for tax rebates for implementing the subsidized technology. For 
example, CAPP is currently lobbying the federal government for funds to research clean 
energy projects, primarily CCS, as well as to have costs associated with CCS and other 
actions to reduce carbon emissions be tax deductible and included in the ACCA (Daly 
2009).  
 The broad trend, then, is for tar sands companies to lobby for limited 
environmental regulations while simultaneously lobbying for public funding to meet 
these environmental standards as well as for tax deductions to cover costs incurred. The 
burden of companies meeting environmental standards in AB falls heavily on the 
public. 
 While lobbying key offices of the federal and provincial government budget, tar 
sands companies also fund political campaigns and parties to encourage policy 
development amenable to oil interests. Unfortunately, this is another under-researched 
subject in AB, however, initial work on this subject, for example by Harrison, note a 
close correlation between corporate donations by oil and gas companies (among the 
major funders of the Conservatives) to political parties and the policies of those parties 
(Harrison 2005, 100-01; see also Boychuk 2010). Some media commentators have made 
similar comparisons. For example, one journalist notes a parallel between the heated 
climate change debate in 2006 and increases in campaign donations to the Conservative 
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party by oil companies—a 50% increase over 2005 (Phillips 2007). Then two years later, 
as noted in Alberta Oil Magazine, there was a decline in oil industry campaign donations, 
particularly from Calgary-based corporations, in response to the Conservative Party 
leader election of “populist” and rural Ed Stelmach due to his early indications of 
tougher royalty rates. This drop in funding was meant to be a warning to Stelmach 
who, after his 2008 election, returned to “courting” oil companies (Romanowska 2009). 
These political strategies have been the focus of the industry’s efforts to secure 
and protect resources and the right to extract. They are complemented by more 
grassroots community “engagement” projects where the industry engages with the 
public directly through community projects.  
CAPP has a well-developed approach to public relations (referred to as public 
“involvement”) documented for its member organizations in a 139-page handbook 
(Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2003). CAPP’s primary community 
public relations activity is the “Energy in Action” program that “brings industry and 
communities together to care for our natural environment.” In 2009, CAPP facilitated 
member companies in environmental (as well as oil and gas) education and gardening 
projects at eleven schools across Canada (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 
2009a), at a cost of $2000 per school (Dahlman 2009). CAPP has also co-founded 
Synergy Alberta, a non-profit organization facilitating information sharing among 
Albertans and industry as well as participation by Albertan in oil and gas development. 
The aim of the groups created by Synergy Alberta is “to foster and support mutually 
satisfactory resource development outcomes in communities” (Synergy Alberta 
Conference 2008 2008) with current members representing communities, industry and 
government (aboriginal positions are currently vacant) (Synergy Alberta 2004-2009). 
Synergy Alberta is ultimately an attempt to secure community consent for access to 
resources by oil producers who, in Jaremko’s view, are “taking no chances on losing 
future access to resources.” These local organizations aim to speed along hearings and 
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“resolve disputes quietly rather than wage noisy conflict” (Canadian Group Hires Red 
Cross Exec as Industry/Community Peacemaker 2006). It is, therefore, as one journalist 
described it, a “civil peacekeeping organization” that measures success by pipelines 
developed or by wells dug or by profits created (Jaremko 2006).  
At the level of individual companies, the major players also make targeted, high-
profile donations to the region. For example, in 2008, Syncrude made a $500,000 
commitment to develop Fort Chipewyan’s Archie Simpson Arena alongside a $50,000 
gift to the Fort McMurray Food Bank, then a recent $95,000 donation to build a new 
indoor playground (featuring tar sands haul trucks and a crane) at the Wood Buffalo 
YMCA. Suncor recently announced $2.5 million for a performing arts center in Fort 
McMurray following its $2 million commitment in 2008 to help develop Northern 
Lights Regional Health Foundation’s programs and medical equipment (Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers 2008b).  
Even more significant is corporate funding to educational institutions with 
significant targeted donations made to the Keyano College system. From 2006 to 2008, 
major tar sands companies dominated, or were the only groups listed on, the top donor 
list for the college (Keyano College 2007, 2008, 2009). Syncrude recently announced $5 
million in funding to Fort McMurray’s Keyano College, with $2 million of this amount 
ear-marked for the Syncrude Aboriginal Trades Preparation Program (Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers 2008b). Since 2005, Shell Albian gave $150,000 in 
support of the Aboriginal Entrepreneurship Certificate Program. Companies also 
donate technology in kind so students can be trained on the very equipment tar sands 
operators use and then enter the workforce at faster rates. (Keyano is explicitly tied to 
providing skilled workers to the tar sands: one campus, the Suncor Energy Industrial 
Campus, offers training on company equipment and includes a Suncor Recruitment 
Centre; another in downtown Fort McMurray houses the Suncor Educational 
Technology Centre.) 
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 Universities in AB are similarly targeted by tar sands companies’ funding. The 
University of Alberta’s major fundraising campaign, Campaign 2008, included a $10 
million donation from Imperial Oil Limited for its Imperial Oil Centre for Oil Sands 
Innovation, a $7.5 million contribution from Encana Corporation for research on energy 
and the environment and a $3 million contribution from Canadian Natural Resources 
Limited for the Allan P. Markin/Canadian Natural Resources Limited Natural 
Resources Engineering Facility (Keyano College 2007, 2008, 2009). The University of 
Calgary’s donor impact reports note similar gifts, such as ConocoPhillips Canada 
repeated donation of $40,000 to support the Haskayne School of Business Petroleum 
Land Management program in 2007-08 and Shell Canada’s $1.5 million investment in 
2006-07. 
It is in these ways that the tar sands industry combines government lobbying 
with strategic, self-serving community involvement. The CAPP secures community-
industry relations through local organizations and programs. At the same time, 
individual companies help build a community to attract and retain workers and 
enhance their public image through targeted “gifts” to the region. Simultaneously, they 
invest in educational institutions that develop the labor force and research they require.  
But even subtler than governmental lobbying and financing and community 
public relations is the “revolving door” between industry and government posts. 
Government representatives are frequently drawn to the more lucrative careers in the 
oil industry and so oil industry is well versed in government processes and constraints. 
The industry is also well connected to policymakers still working within government 
who are planning an eventual transition to industry. Hence the industry’s often greater 
ease in communicating with government and accessing key decision makers. This 
aspect of Albertan politics is subtle and difficult to track but it is a point frequently 
made by interviewees and one that has begun to be documented by, for example, Taft 
(2007, 81, 84) and Laird (2000).  
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  Seen systematically, the case of tar sands extraction in AB shows particularly 
petro-political dynamics. While AB owns the land from which tar sands is extracted, it 
does not engage in or own tar sands production. Therefore the AB Government must 
get revenue from tar sands indirectly, via taxing corporations or collecting royalties and 
to ensure this, the government encourages and supports tar sands companies. The 
province depends on corporate interests for its economic stability yet industry has 
distinct interests in making private profits while working to avoid the costs associated 
with environmental regulation, taxes and royalties. This relationship—the government 
promotes private tar sands development to get revenue from the projects while 
industry lobbies government for the cheapest, easiest access public lands to extract 
profit—is the dominant political-economic dynamic in AB that amounts to strong 
consent for tar sands developments.  
This system translates into an environmental policy regime biased toward tar 
sands development: the regulatory system has been developed to support tar sands 
development and to restrain or impede environmental regulation, hence the 
problematic environmental regulation trends elaborated above and the multiple 
environmental impacts on the ground.  
Understood in these terms, AB has become a “company” province where what is 
good for the oil industry is considered good for AB—the province “retooled” itself 
around supporting this industry and spending its revenues as opposed to 
environmental protection, as noted in an interview with a New Democratic Party 
representative in April 2007.   
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IV. Resistance & Demands for Effective Environmental Regulation  
 
It’s time to stop the tar sands. (Mike Hudema, Greenpeace Climate and Energy 
Campaigner, quoted in Greenpeace strikes again: activists occupy Shell upgrader 
expansion site in Fort Saskatchewan 2009) 
 
Alberta is losing the public relations war when it comes to the tar sands. (Yaffe 2008) 
 
What possibility is there for change in the current regulatory system? As monolithic and 
as undemocratic as Albertan politics can seem, strong resistance to status quo 
environmental regulation in the tar sands has indeed grown, spread and developed 
coherent policy positions. Three trends are notable in this opposition and are elaborated 
below: a shift in scale from local to international levels of action, a shift in strategy from 
“inside” “normal” politics to more disruptive challenges to political institutions, and 
the development of a consensus on alternatives or policy changes required. 
First, there has been a strategic shifting of the scales at which organizing and 
action occur, from local to international levels. Resistance has been growing for decades 
across AB through the combined work of environmental organizations like the Sierra 
Club of Canada Prairie Chapter, labor organizations such as the Alberta Federation of 
Labour, aboriginal organizations and communities like the Athabasca Chipewyan First 
Nation, and with the support of research by organizations such as the Parkland 
Institute and the Pembina Institute. These provincial organizations, frustrated by an 
unresponsive provincial government (and the continuous re-election of Conservative 
governments due to electoral boundaries favoring that party and growing voter 
apathy), branched out to work in coalition with national and international groups. The 
opposition spread to the national level with the involvement of environmental 
organizations such as the David Suzuki Foundation, social organizations like the 
Council of Canadians, and research institutes, for example the Polaris Institute. Met 
with federal inaction, those opposing tar sands development crossed borders to 
combine with American organizations such as ForestEthics and the movement 
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continues to expand to Europe. Highly inclusive coalitions spanning environmental, 
social, labor, religious and aboriginal organizations now extend from local and 
provincial organizers to national, American and international scales.  
Before elaborating on the interventions at these levels, beginning with provincial-
level action, I should note that the aims and messages of those opposing tar sands 
development in AB are often paired with the strategies employed to get these messages 
heard or particular places of engagement. The general trend is that while initially 
working inside the institutional regulatory structures (for example, while participating 
in government panels), those opposed to status quo tar sands development were 
working toward an improved implementation of the regulatory system. But the 
stronger messages fundamentally challenging the government and its approach to tar 
sands development were made using more disruptive methods not within the halls of 
power, but outside, on streets, at worksites, off bridges and so forth.  
There is, of course, a particular path or flow at work. Why the shift from one 
kind of message and course/site of action to the other? We could pinpoint the transition 
point from one dominant method of opposition to the other as occurring in 2007 when 
aboriginal communities left a high-level committee on environmental issues in protest 
(discussed below). At this point, key groups openly acknowledged what was a 
longstanding underlying concern: that tar sands developments were continuing—even 
expanding at a rapid pace—with no perceptible improvement in the environmental 
regulatory process. Interventions to improve the system had had little impact; 
government processes to consult with and listen to stakeholders beyond industry were 
a distracting diversion—the government’s listening without action was understood and 
rejected as co-optation. Once these realizations coalesced and other major groups 
followed the lead of aboriginal communities and removed themselves from inside 
government institutions, there was a noticeable shift in the policy messages and tactics. 
 In AB, aboriginal communities downstream of tar sands developments, or in the 
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path of pipelines to carry gas to the projects or to transport bitumen from them, have 
been longstanding sources of opposition. Communities such as Fort Chipewyan are 
ever more vigorously protesting the projects’ environmental health impacts, their 
degradation of water and air quality, how they have increased the toxicity of 
subsistence food such as fish and game, as well as how the projects limit aboriginal 
peoples’ access to traditional lands.  
The issues that have garnered the most attention are the health impacts of the tar 
sands. Concerns were first raised publicly in 2006 by physician Dr. John O’Connor who 
noted high rates of rare cancers in Fort Chipewyan. O’Connor was later chastised by 
Health Canada and others which threatened to revoke his license to practice for raising 
undue alarm. Since then, two studies by the Alberta Cancer Board have demonstrated 
the need for further study but no clear correlation between the tar sands and local 
cancer rates has been shown. Given the apparent reluctance of both provincial and 
federal governments to study the issue and noted problems with the reliability and 
community involvement in the studies that have been completed, there is a growing 
distrust within the communities. As stated by Steve Courtorelle, Mikisew Cree First 
Nations councilor and representative with the Nunee Health Board, “We just don’t 
have enough faith in either government, and I just know they’re going to try to protect 
their interests with continuing to develop the tar sands” (Brooymans 2009). Hence the 
Fort Chipewyn Health Authority commissioned an independent study by Treeline 
Environmental Research in November 2008 that showed high levels of toxic and 
carcinogenic material (such as mercury and arsenic) in fish and soil downstream. Other 
communities are now conducting their own studies, such as the Mikisew Cree First 
Nation.  
Aboriginal communities were similarly disappointed in government and 
industry inaction on environmental issues in the region, which was made evident in the 
CEMA. The Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation and the Mikisew Cree First Nation 
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withdrew from the association in 2007 in protest against the committee’s lack of 
progress. The Pembina Institute, the Toxics Watch Society of Alberta and the Fort 
McMurray Environmental Association followed this lead and withdrew in August 2008. 
Having experienced the failure of these health and environmental institutions, 
some communities have opened court cases against the provincial or federal 
governments for failure to consult and for infringements on traditional lands or treaty 
rights. Examples include the Chipewyan Prairie Dene First Nation’s March 2008 case 
against the AB Government in relation to the Christina Lake SAGD project, the 
Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation’s 2008 court challenge of 2006 and 2007 land tenure 
permits to Shell and other companies, and the Beaver Lake Cree Nation’s 2009 case 
against the provincial and federal governments. Simultaneously aboriginal 
communities have vigorously protested pipeline projects running to and from the tar 
sands. For example, since 2007, Lubicon Lake Indian Nation, now in collaboration with 
local groups and Amnesty International, have opposed the installation of TransCanada 
Pipeline Limited’s North Central Corridor project through their non-ceded territory.43  
Opposition from aboriginal communities has been joined with resistance from 
environmental NGOs in AB such as the Sierra Club of Canada Prairie Chapter, Prairie 
Acid Rain Coalition, AB’s Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, and the Keepers of 
the Athabasca, sometimes collaborating through the Oil Sands Environmental Coalition 
which includes Toxics Watch Society of Alberta, the Fort McMurray Environmental 
Association and the Pembina Institute. These groups conduct or commission research 
on the environmental impacts of the tar sands, publicize this research through media to 
the public, intervene in government hearings and consultations, raise awareness 
through media and public education events, poll public opinion to understand the 
                                                
43 This pipeline would transport gas from northwestern Albertan, and eventually from 
the Arctic via the Mackenzie Valley pipeline, to the tar sands projects and into Saskatchewan, 
potentially to fuel that province’s new tar sands industry. 
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interests and concerns of Albertans and Canadians and lobby politicians and 
policymakers to redress environmental policy. Joint court cases are also becoming a 
more frequent tool of Albertan ENGOs. For example, in April 2009, Ecojustice, 
representing the Oil Sands Environmental Coalition including the Toxics Watch Society 
of Alberta, the Fort McMurray Environmental Association and the Pembina Institute, 
appealed to the Canadian Minister of the Environment, Alberta’s ERCB and the CEAA 
to reconvene Joint Panel review hearings on approvals for two of Shell tar sands 
projects (Jackpine and Muskeg River) after Shell broke written agreements with the 
coalition to reduce GHG pollution. Taking a different approach, Greenpeace, a newer 
addition to the environmental community in AB, has made headlines by more direct 
actions like unfurling a banner at one of the premier’s fundraising dinners in April 2008 
which read, “$telmach: the best premier oil money can buy,” creating a mock tourism 
website of tar sands in June 2008 to satirize the province’s new tourism campaign and 
underscore the environmental horrors of the tar sands, and erecting a sign at the mouth 
of one of Syncrude’s tailings waste pipes in July 2008 declaring the operations to be the 
“world’s dirtiest oil” and demanding action to “stop the tar sands.” 
These ENGOs are supported by research from policy institutes, most notably 
from the provincial offices of the Pembina Institute (which includes the “Oil Sands 
Watch” research program), and the Parkland Institute at the University of Alberta in 
Edmonton that analyzes issues relating to energy security and fair revenue. The ENGOs 
and policy institutes are then joined by organizations not primarily focused on 
environmental issues, such as Public Interest Alberta (focusing on protecting and 
building public services), and labor organizations like the Alberta Federation of Labour 
(working on reorienting AB’s economy to “green” development), and the 
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union (lobbying to slow pipeline projects 
exporting raw bitumen). Other institutions like the Regional Municipality of Wood 
Buffalo and Northern Lights Health Region have been involved in recommending a 
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slowing of tar sands projects that have overburdened the region’s infrastructure.  
Canadian opposition to the tar sands grew from this movement in AB. National 
ENGOs now focus their efforts on the tar sands, such as Toronto’s Environmental 
Defence (publisher of “Canada’s Toxic Tar Sands: The Most Destructive Project on 
Earth”),44 and other NGOs such as the Polaris Institute (with its “Tar Sands Watch” 
program) and the Council of Canadians (via its Energy Campaign). Religious 
organizations are also involved, spearheaded by KAIROS’ Ecumenical Justice Initiative 
which facilitates visits to the tar sands projects and impacted communities like Fort 
Chipewyan. National (and international) aboriginal organizations join provincial 
groups, for example, the Indigenous Environmental Network’s Canadian Indigenous 
Tar Sands Campaign out of Ottawa.  
Resistance is also growing in specific Canadian sites impacted by the need to fuel 
the tar sands projects and transport the product, or by the more far-reaching 
environment impacts. In B.C. there is strong opposition to pipelines and tanker traffic 
transporting bitumen (seen, for example, in the “Tar Sands Free B.C.” campaign). In the 
Northwest Territories, tension is building locally due to concerns about water pollution 
and quantity flowing north from AB. The Northwest Territories Association of 
Communities, representing all thirty-three communities in the territory, unanimously 
passed a moratorium in May 2009 to stop new tar sands developments (Cryderman 
2009). This resolution came after a February 2009 motion by the Dene Nation and 
Assembly of First Nations emphasizing the “urgent threat to all downstream 
communities in the Mackenzie Basin” due to tailing ponds leaks, the potential for a 
major breach, and the “colossal mismanagement” of AB’s tar sands (Dene Nation and 
Assembly of First Nations 2009). 
                                                
44 Of course, in some cases ENGOs are influenced by the lobbying power of the tar sands 
industry, a point raised by those tracking of corporate donations to organizations, such as 
Ducks Unlimited and the Canadian Boreal Initiative (Stainsby 2008). 
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These Albertan and Canadian efforts are increasingly paired with action in the 
U.S. This new scale of resistance was well demonstrated by the joint launch of the 
obama2canada.org campaign by Canadian, American and international NGOs prior to 
President Obama’s first visit to Canada in February 2009 when Prime Minister Harper 
was defending the projects and seeking to protect them against continental carbon 
emissions regulations. The campaign featured high-profile advertisements in major U.S. 
newspapers, such as the February 25, 2009, message to Obama in USA Today by 
Mikisew Cree, Athabasca Chipewyan First Nations and ForestEthics stating, “You’ll 
never guess who’s standing between us and our new energy economy.” The text was 
followed by an oil-splattered map of Canada, oozing south across the U.S. border.  
Opposition in the U.S. is heating up with emphasis on key political meetings and 
corporations. For example, Oil Change International and the Natural Resource Defence 
Council protested Stelmach’s attempts to defend and promote the tar sands during his 
January 2008 visit to Washington. ForestEthics joined with Toronto’s Environmental 
Defence to protest the Albertan trade mission in the capital in April 2008 to lobby for an 
exclusion of the tar sands from new American EISA. Then ForestEthics, NRDC and 
others protested the tar sands at a meeting of Western Governors’ Association biannual 
meeting in Wyoming in July 2008 to raise awareness of the environmental impacts of 
the tar sands. More recently, in the summer of 2009, “Dirty Oil Sands,” an international 
network of social, environmental, aboriginal and research organizations, pressured U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to refuse Enbridge Energy’s permit for the 
construction of the Alberta Clipper pipeline to transport bitumen from the tar sands to 
Wisconsin to provide feedstock for American refineries. This action is part of the 
coalition’s broader agenda to raise awareness about how AB’s tar sands projects are a 
threat to the new energy economy in the U.S. 
Groups in the U.S. have also moved the protest beyond political leaders with, for 
example, the NRDC launching a campaign to pressure major airlines to stop using fuel 
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from tar sands. Banks are a newer target of pressure in addition to the airlines and 
pipeline companies. In March 2009, Rainforest Action Network (original a Californian 
organization now with an Edmonton office) joined with members of the Lubicon Lake 
Indian Nation to lobby the Royal Bank of Canada—the Canadian bank providing the 
greatest amount of financing to the tar sands—to withdraw support from the projects 
(Financing Global Warming: Canadian Banks and Fossil Fuels 2009).45 
Europeans are also increasingly active in opposing tar sands projects. Europe is 
not an export markets for the tar sands but the region is a major source of investment 
for them, hence the building activism particularly in Norway and the U.K. to end 
investments in the projects. In August 2008, for example, the WWF complained to 
Britain’s Advertising Standards Authority that Shell’s advertising of the tar sands as 
“sustainable” was false and Shell was then prohibited from republishing the 
advertisement. Shortly thereafter in fall 2008, the U.K. Social Investment Forum 
emphasized the environmental and long term financial risks of Royal Dutch Shell and 
BP’s operations in the tar sands (Crooks 2008). UK’s Co-Operative Asset Management 
ethical investment fund lobbied the companies to withdraw from tar sands projects. In 
spring 2009, Norwegian and Swedish banks, insurance companies and investment 
funds followed this lead to pressure Statoil, the Norwegian predominantly nationally-
owned oil company, to withdraw investments in tar sands projects. Then in May 2009, 
the Lubicon Cree lobbied the Norwegian Government Pension Fund, Global 
(Oljefondet), to divest itself of investments in TransCanada. In addition to these 
investment protests, one financial institution in Europe is directly supporting the fight 
of one aboriginal community against tar sands projects: the U.K.’s Co-Operative 
Financial Services established a trust fund in July 2009 to support the Beaver Lake Cree 
                                                
45 Opposition to the tar sands in the U.S. is not just emanating from NGOs. Challenges 
have also come from within political institutions such as the U.S. Mayors with their June 2008 
resolution to reduce the use of fuel from tar sands due to its high GHG intensity (U.S. 
Conference of Mayors 2008). 
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Nation’s lawsuit to protective their lands against tar sands projects.  
Throughout the shift in scale from local to these international sites is the second 
trend in tar sands opposition, a strategic transition from working “inside” standard, 
institutionalized political processes directing tar sands developments to moving 
“outside” to challenge specific companies, investors and end users directly. Many of the 
organizers resisting the tar sands began by working with government and industry at 
the provincial and national level to manage tar sands projects via 
government/industry/community advisory organizations such as CEMA or through 
efforts such as the 2005 declaration on environmental standards and conditions for tar 
sands development (written by organizations such as the Canadian Parks and 
Wilderness Society, the Dogwood Initiative, the Prairie Acid Rain Coalition, the West 
Coast Environmental Law, and the World Wildlife Fund Canada) (Canadian Parks and 
Wilderness Society et al. 2005). But many of these collaborations with government and 
industry have failed and recommendations to manage the industry have gone 
unheeded just as environmental impacts became more apparent and more severe. 
Therefore civil society groups have begun to pull out of failed initiatives and use more 
direct action strategies to lobby the government, corporations, banks and public opinion 
from outside political institutions.  
The third notable trend in the opposition to the tar sands is the shift from 
organizations concerned about environmental impacts offering advice on tar sands 
developments to tweak the processes to opposing new developments outright—NGOs 
have transitioned from providing specific management recommendations to readjust 
the development process to developing a broad consensus and numerous campaigns on 
the need to end new approvals of tar sands projects until there has been a satisfactory 
analysis of the health and environmental impacts of tar sands projects on the 
environment and health. A more radical faction works for a complete cessation of the 
developments. But note that throughout all of these campaigns, there is emphasis on 
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using tar sands revenue to move Albertan to a post-oil economy more reliant on 
renewable energy than fossil fuels.46  
Formal calls for a moratorium have been made since at least the summer of 2007 
and now represent a broad consensus across environmental, social, labor, religious and 
aboriginal organizations. Related campaigns include the Tar Sands Time Out initiative, 
including a petition for a “Tar Sands Moratorium,” led by Sierra Club of Canada Prairie 
Chapter, and the No New Approvals (NNA) for Tar Sands Development campaign 
which has compiled signatories of over forty Albertan environmental NGOs, social or 
religious NGOs, labor organizations and research institutes, nearly forty national and 
international groups of the same broad range of groups, plus individual signatures by 
well-known academics, politicians, religious leaders and ENGO leaders (No New 
Approvals for Tar Sands Development). Then in February 2008, aboriginal leaders 
representing nations from Treaties 6, 7 and 8 in AB unanimously passed a similar 
resolution to stop new approvals until there is a development plan, particularly a 
watershed plan, for the region. The consensus took public form in Edmonton on the 
November 1, 2008, when Fort Chipewyan residents and representatives from ENGOs, 
policy institutes, social NGOs and other groups, provincial and national, convened to 
protest impacts of tar sands and demand no new approvals until the completion of a 
satisfactory environmental and health assessment (Ho 2008). These demands are on 
target with Albertan public opinion: a May 2007 poll conducted for the Pembina 
Institute indicated that 71% of Albertans wanted a hold on new tar sands projects until 
environmental regulations were improved. 
The more radical faction calls for a complete end to tar sands operations. 
Organizations such as Oil Sands Truth argue that “nothing short of a full shut down of 
                                                
46 A recent example that gained national attention was the April 2009 “green jobs” report 
commissioned by Greenpeace, Sierra Club Prairie Chapter and the Alberta Federation of Labour 
(Thompson 2009). 
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all related projects in all corners of North America can realistically tackle climate change 
and environmental devastation.” Groups such as the Edmonton and Calgary chapters 
of STOP (“Stop the Tar sands Operations Permanently”) forward this position through 
traditional letters to the editors of media and messages to election candidates but also 
through creative local organizing (hosting Oil Addicts Anonymous parties) and direct 
actions to publicly shame Albertan politicians.  
Albertan civil society organizations have long documented the environmental 
impacts of tar sands projects and more recently presented a coherent position on the 
development. And, at least since 2007, these messages have been picked up and 
forwarded through major international media outlets. One of the first among these was 
the December 15, 2007, Financial Times cover feature entitled “Crude Awakening.” 
Critical media attention was then particularly galvanized around the drowning of 
hundreds of mallards in Syncrude’s tailings ponds in April 2008. Images of the oiled 
birds made global headlines, reminiscent of iconic images from Alaska’s Exxon Valdez 
oil spill. Negative media attention peaked again with the National Geographic’s March 
2009 cover, “Scraping Bottom,” which was, according to reporter Don Martin, “a public 
relations hell equal to a seal pup’s skull-clubbing death that no amount of damage 
control can overcome, no matter how reasoned the argument.” This article, and many 
others like it, helped make the tar sands into “Canada’s most vilified global export” 
(Martin 2009). 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
AB’s tar sands developments demonstrate that the transition to unconventional and 
frontier oil result in environmental impacts even worse than conventional oil. 
Environmental policy could constrain these impacts, but the current regulatory system 
surrounding tar sands developments in the province permits, or does not prevent, the 
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multiple, long-term significant environmental impacts of these projects. Rather the 
regulatory system is marked by weakly incorporated and poorly timed environmental 
consideration, important gaps in regulation on GHGs, water withdrawals, reclamation 
and public consultation, and institutional difficulties in grappling with cumulative 
impacts. 
A political ecology approach suggests one explanation for this: the “petro-
political” relationship between the state and the industry. The provincial (and also 
federal) government are increasingly dependent on revenue from the tar sands and 
therefore encourage the continuation of these projects through research funding and 
subsidies, low tax and royalty regimes, public promotion and defense of the industry at 
home and abroad, and non-intervention were clear regulatory authority exists. At the 
same time, tar sands industry players augment this position by lobbying at multiple 
levels of government and society, from local communities to international sites, using 
media, political financing and community funding. Both government and industry are 
financially dependent on continued tar sands development and they are actively 
supporting these projects. In turn, this pressure has translated into particular policy 
patterns of ineffective environmental regulation of oil developments. Environmental 
policy is weakened to the point of not being effective in controlling the severe 
environmental impacts of tar sands development. 
Resistance to this regime has grown strong and united. Locally grown and 
gradually building to larger scales, gaining traction through media attention and 
sympathetic leaders, opposition to tar sands development and a movement for 
improved environmental regulation is becoming a threat to the industry’s market share, 
and, therefore, government revenue. Real gains in environmental policy could be made 
in response to this pressure. But, as discussed in the cross-case analysis provided in the 
coming chapters, the industry and governments are working hard to recast the 
perception of tar sands development to counteract the impact of those opposed to the 
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projects. The question, therefore, is how the oppositional movement can match the scale 
and strength of those ultimately gaining from the developments, particularly the 
industry and government response, and how much concern for environmental impacts 
will count against the continued demand for past-the-peak oil.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE PETRO-POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY IN NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR’S OFFSHORE 
 
NL has long been the poor cousin of its developed, capitalist neighbors, serving 
primarily as a site of resource extraction at the margins of more advanced states. It was 
considered, historically, “a classical case of an underdeveloped country peripheral to 
the centres of power in a capitalist world order dependent upon the export of raw 
materials to the metropolitan centres” (House 1985). Indeed, the province’s European 
history since the fifteenth century was one of a settler population focused on the export 
of raw materials trying to be meet subsistence needs while continually dependent on 
external forces. Since the late 1800s and most obviously since the mid-1900s, 
governments in NL have attempted to diversify and improve on this political economic 
circumstance. But the province has remained trapped in a position of high dependence 
on external capital and expertise (House 1985, 21-24; see also Cadigan 2009; Summers 
1994; Summers 2000). In recent decades, NL continued to rank at the bottom of most 
provincial economic indicators in Canada, a situation that reconfirmed its “long 
heritage of dependency and economic underdevelopment” (House 1985, 2). Then came 
oil.  
Oil production in NL occurs approximately three hundred kilometers off the 
south east coast of the island of Newfoundland in the North Grand Banks region. Three 
fields are currently producing conventional oil, Hibernia (the oldest field, producing 
since 1997), Terra Nova and White Rose. A fourth major field, Hebron, was announced 
in August 2008 with first oil expected in 2017.47 Since oil production began in 1997 until 
                                                
47 In addition, a significant discovery license has been granted for natural gas on the 
Labrador Shelf and exploration for oil continues in Western Newfoundland (both offshore and 
onshore), north and south of the North Grand Bank region on the South Grand Banks and 
Northeast Newfoundland Shelf, and in the Sydney Basin off the southwest tip of the island. 
Given that neither of these new sites is under production to date, this chapter focuses solely on 
offshore oil developments. 
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November 2009, 1.08 billion barrels of oil have been produced in the North Grand 
Banks.48 From 2002 until 2008, annual production has been fairly steady, ranging 
between 104 million to 134 million barrels per year (Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2010), but production in all three fields is now 
declining.49 
Oil is imagined to be the key to breaking NL from its history of poverty and 
underdevelopment and transforming the province from “have-not” to “have” status 
(House 1985, 96). Reminiscent of Coronil’s (1997) work, oil is imagined in this province 
as the economic and social “saviour” (Fusco 2007, 81). What, however, of the ecological 
consequences of this industry? How has the province fared in developing policy to 
sustain its ecological base? 
This chapter examines the environmental regulatory system surrounding 
offshore oil development in NL. First I note the most pressing environmental impacts of 
offshore oil developments and briefly note who bears these impacts. From this context, I 
turn to the focus of the chapter by elaborating the multiple trends in environmental 
regulation that permit, or do not prevent, these poor outcomes. These include a 
problematic environmental assessment process, limited transparency and public 
consultation, multiple inadequate regulations or gaps therein, weak monitoring, 
                                                
48 Hibernia uses a gravity-based structure (GBS) to extract oil, a concrete fixed structure 
while the newer project, while Terra Nova and White Rose, use floating production, storage and 
off-loading (FPSOs) vessels (mobile extraction tankers). 
49 Yet, as in other oil-dependent jurisdictions, high prices of oil in the mid- to late 2000s 
have masked declines in actual oil production. How much oil remains? Reserve and resource 
estimates—which may over-estimate remaining oil—indicate that 42% of NL’s offshore oil has 
already been produced (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2010b) after just over ten 
years of production. As oil reserves decline, attention now shifts to available gas and natural 
gas liquids (respective reserves and resources for these hydrocarbons are estimated at 10850 
billion cubic feet and 478 million barrels). Resources have not been tapped to date (Canada-
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2009, 32)—land rights were issued in 
2008-2009 for exploration licenses for gas resources offshore Labrador. 
Note the key distinction between oil reserves and oil resources: reserves refer to oil that 
can be extracted with current technology and with in current and estimated prices; resource 
refer to oil that have a “50% probability of occurrence” with “unknown economic viability” 
(Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2009, 31). 
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permissive or non-existent compliance and enforcement measures, and important gaps 
in research. 
What accounts for this weak environmental policy regime? I answer this 
question by analyzing the “petro-politics” at work in NL with reference to how both the 
provincial and federal governments have supported—indeed initiated—NL’s offshore 
oil economy. There is also pressure from the oil industry on which governments are 
dependent for keeping the oil revenue flowing, given the privatized nature of 
developments in this region.  
I argue that the “petro-political” system in NL is marked by a symbiotic 
relationship between governments and oil companies, with governments highly 
dependent on revenues from private oil developments and oil companies earning 
impressive profits from extraction on public lands. The provincial (and also federal) 
government ensures the continuation of the industry primarily via a range of financial 
incentives and subsidies. The oil industry reinforces these governmental approaches via 
“community engagement,” lobbying efforts and other measures to remind government 
of shared interests in oil development without significant constraint from 
environmental regulation. Driven by its prioritization of hydrocarbon extraction as an 
economic “strategy” for the province, and pressured and influenced by a powerful, 
globally-integrated industry, NL has developed environmental regulation processes 
and institutions that forward rapid, extensive oil development and do not meaningfully 
restrain the resulting environmental impacts. The shared interests of government and 
industry translate into an environmental policy regime that is biased toward offshore 
oil development. The regulatory system has been “molded,” to use Karl’s (1997, 16) 
term, to support these developments and to restrain or impede effective environmental 
regulation. 
In response to the weak environmental regulation system resulting from the 
mutual interests in oil development by government and industry there is some 
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opposition coming from non-government organizations, independent scientists and 
communities. However this resistance to unbridled oil development in NL’s offshore is 
weak and seemingly at a very early stage. 
 
 
I. Environmental Impacts of Offshore Oil Development 
Offshore exploration and extraction as well as the transportation of oil to market 
represent environmental threats to a biologically rich and ecologically unique area 
recognized by the scientific community as “one [of] the most productive marine areas in 
the world” (Wiese and Ryan 2003, 1091). The region of offshore oil production off NL 
supports an estimated forty million marine birds, local as well as migratory species 
from the Southern Hemisphere, the Arctic and from Northern Europe (Montevecchi 
and Burke 2005, 19). Some NL colonies of species such as Leach’s Storm-Petrels and 
Common Murres are “significant proportions of their global populations” (Montevecchi 
and Burke 2005, 29). In addition, the area supports “globally significant populations of 
marine mammals” (Burke et al. 2005, 588).  
This environment is degraded and threatened in multiple ways by oil 
developments offshore that add to a legacy of pollution from shipping in this area. As 
noted by Wiese et al., “Chronic oil pollution off the Newfoundland coast is among the 
highest recorded in the world. The best estimate of annual seabird mortality due to this 
pollution is equivalent to an Exxon Valdez–sized spill every year” (Wiese et al. 2004, 
211).  
The new oil industry is now exacerbating this condition in several ways. For 
example, scientists note that seismic exploration might be harming species as the 
chronic background noises interrupt mating and feeding (interview with Natural 
History Society scientist and researcher 2008). Another problem relates to species’ 
attraction to platforms by waste disposal and lighting, where there is a greater chance of 
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seabirds being burned in flares (which have been documented at thirty meters in height 
(Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 23)), colliding with the structures (Burke et al. 2005, 590-
91, 606; see also Montevecchi and Burke 2005), or coming into contact with toxic 
material. And the potential for this kind of contact is great given that sediment 
contamination, especially contamination with hydrocarbons, can extend as far as seven 
kilometers from the operations (Husky Energy 2006, 2). Furthermore, the regular and 
standardized “routine” discharges of small amounts of hydrocarbons from the 
platforms, such as those found in produced water, could have “significant cumulative 
effects on a variety of globally important seabird populations” (Fraser et al. 2006, 147). 
Hence the environmental impacts of offshore oil extraction have globally relevant 
impacts.  
Of course, the more publicly salient concern given recent events in the GOM is 
the risk of larger spills and blowouts associated with oil offloading and transportation. 
Spills have already occurred in the region, as elaborated in the section below on 
enforcement and compliance measures, with limited remediation success. And the risk 
of more and larger spills continues to grow in particular areas. The Brander-Smith 
report, Canada’s policy response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill, identified Placentia Bay as 
the area most at risk for an oil spill in Canada given the tanker traffic to and from the 
transshipment terminal servicing the offshore oil industry: “The risk of spills is highest 
in eastern Canada, particularly in Newfoundland,” the report notes. Specifically, 
“Placentia Bay is considered by many to be the most likely place in Canada for a major 
spill” (Brander-Smith et al. 1990, i). Traffic has increased dramatically since the 
publication of this report in 1990.50  
                                                
50 Transport Canada has recently released a new risk assessment to update this work 
(2007) but it was delayed extensively—as long as seven years—and is judged as 
underestimating spill probability. Public access to this research has also been very limited. 
These concerns were elaborated in interviews in 2008 with two long time employees with key 
federal departments involved in oil spills, including Transport Canada. 
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 Air pollution is also one of the primary concerns regarding waste discharges in 
the offshore, with emphasis on GHGs given the current debates on climate change. 
According to EC’s “National Inventory Report, 1990-2006,” fugitive sources from oil 
and natural gas and fossil fuel production have accounted for the highest emissions 
over this period (Environment Canada 2008, 5, 514-16, 43). Comparatively, GHG 
emissions in NL are just below national averages—NL’s average is at 18.4 tons per 
person as opposed to Canada’s 22.1 in 2006—and well below AB’s extraordinary 69.5 
tons per capita. All told, NL accounts for just 1.3% of Canada’s total GHGs (compared 
to AB’s 32.9%) (Environment Canada 2008, 5, 514-16, 43).  
Does this mean the emissions are insignificant and not worthy of concern? Given 
the enormity of the problem of climate change, I would argue this is not the case. 
Furthermore, not addressing this problem undermines the province’s credibility in the 
region. The Government of NL made a commitment in 2001 through a regional body, 
the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers 
(NEG/ECP), to reduce GHGs to 1990 levels by 2010, with further cuts to come. Yet the 
province was unable to meet even this goal, a goal much less ambitious than the 
original international Kyoto Protocol. And, of course, as noted by a Sierra Club 
researcher (1) interviewed in 2008, NL is not meeting its climate change targets 
primarily because of its offshore oil and gas industry. This problem has recently been 
confirmed by the provincial government’s new climate change office (Janes 2010). The 
province is blatantly not making even a small contribution to the global problem of 
climate change. It is missing an opportunity to show solidarity with the international 
community by reducing its share of global emissions.  
 Who ultimately bears the burden of these environmental risks and actual 
impacts? In NL’s offshore, as the saying goes, the solution to pollution is dilution—
routine and accidental discharges directly pollute the ocean that is assumed to dilute 
the pollutants to non-toxic levels. Given the dominant ocean and wind currents the oil 
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pollution is driven northeast, away from NL’s coasts. Therefore citizens in that province 
do not directly observe the environmental impacts of oil development (except, perhaps, 
when bird corpses occasionally land on the NL coastline).  
That said, even spill scenarios that tend to underestimate spill impacts show the 
potential for widespread coastal oiling in the case of a large spill from the platforms, 
transshipment terminal or tankers (Transport Canada 2007). Further, the consequences 
of carbon emissions from the fossil fuel industry and the ensuing climate change 
impacts extend to the global community and to future generations.  
Direct negative impacts to humans from NL’s offshore oil industry have not been 
obvious to date but there is a clear scientific case for the negative impacts on species’ 
habitat. In addition, the risk of major spills, as made clear in the BP Deepwater drilling 
disaster in 2010, is ever present, as is the problem of climate change causing pollution. 
Yet these risks and impacts of NL’s offshore oil industry are not adequately mitigated 
by the environmental regulation system surrounding these developments. This system 
is flawed in multiple significant ways elaborated below. 
 
 
II. Environmental Regulation Trends  
Problems in the regulation of environmental impacts are numerous and widespread, as 
demonstrated in this section. But note from the outset that given the seat of regulatory 
jurisdiction in this case, the focus of the regulatory critique is on the primary regulator, 
the C-NLOPB (hereafter referred to as the Board). 
Regulatory jurisdiction in the NL offshore—the question of whether these 
resources are owned by the federal or provincial government—has been fiercely 
debated since the 1960s and has involved protracted legal proceedings (House 1985, 57-
60; see also Arvey 1979; Black 1986). 
In 1984 the Supreme Court of Canada finally confirmed federal ownership and 
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jurisdiction of the offshore. Premier Peckford continued to lobby for provincial 
ownership with the federal opposition leader, Brian Mulroney who agreed to a 
“political compromise” should he be elected. After Mulroney’s election in 1984, the 
promised compromise was created through the 1985 Atlantic Accord (AA) and the 1990 
Canada-NL Atlantic Accord Implementation Act which established NL as the principal 
beneficiary of offshore oil and gas and secured joint federal-provincial management 
through the C-NOPB (Black 1986, 456), now the C-NLOPB.  
While forwarding offshore oil and gas development, the Board’s Environmental 
Affairs Department (EAD) also has final authority for and full responsibility of 
environmental protection and environmental “compliance functions” (“prosecution, 
notices, and orders of offenses”) as well as any investigations that may follow. There are 
also responsibilities for spill response monitoring and emergency response. The 
environmental regulation responsibility of the Board in NL’s offshore also emanates 
from EC: under the CEA Act51 the Board is the designated “federal authority” or “lead 
agency” and Federal Environmental Assessment Coordinator for environmental 
assessments required for exploration and drilling projects. 
Environmental regulation, primarily emanating from the Board, is marked by 
several outstanding weaknesses relating to environmental assessment, transparency 
and public consultation, specific policies or regulations (on land leasing and access 
rights, carbon emissions, waste disposal, spill response and decommissioning), 
monitoring and compliance, enforcement and research, particularly on cumulative 
impacts.  
First, however, a word is needed to frame out the environmental assessment 
processes at work in this sector. The major regulatory stages from exploration to 
                                                
51 Section 59(i)(v) of the CEA Act permits variance or exclusions of “any procedure or 
requirement of the environmental assessment process” established in the CEA Act with regard 
to projects related to the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, as established by 
the Atlantic Accord Implementation Acts. 
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decommissioning, outlined in the flowchart below, each include work authorizations 
that require operators to submit an environmental assessment. This is often in the form 
of an EIA and environmental protection plan (EPP). 
 
Figure 12: Major Regulatory Stages of NL’s Offshore Oil Development 
 
 
Exploration License 
 
Development Application 
 
Production License 
 
Decommissioning Authorization 
 
 
From the outset of this process, in seeking an Exploration License, the operator (the 
project proponent) submits a project description to the Board. At the point of 
developing (producing) oil reserves is a second instance where environmental 
assessment is required. At this time, the operator submits a Development Application to 
the Board that includes a project description as well as an EIA and EPP that may be 
integrated into the CEAA review if one is required. The submission of an Oil Spill 
Response Plan is also a requirement for project approval. 
Based on the submitted project description, the Board determines if the CEA Act 
applies. Again, the CEAA typically administers this act but the Board has been 
designated as the lead responsible authority in NL’s offshore, as discussed above. Of 
course, while the Board leads the environmental assessments, it seeks input from expert 
federal authorities such as DFO, EC, Natural Resources Canada (NRCan), and, where 
relevant, the provincial counterparts of these departments.  
 The applicability of the CEA Act depends on if the project involves one of four 
specific “triggers”: (1) the federal government is involved in the project (either as the 
proponent or is otherwise committed to its completion), (2) a federal authority provides 
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financial assistance for the project, (3) it involves federal lands, and/or (4) other federal 
laws apply. Comprehensive studies are required if a project falls into Comprehensive 
Study List Regulations—and, if this is the case, public review will be a part of this. Oil 
well drilling for exploration and production is listed under the CEA Act as an activity 
requiring a comprehensive study (or a panel review).  
If “triggers” are not present, the Board decides if there will be further 
environmental assessment, and if so, what kind. A simplified flowchart of the process is 
below. 
 
Figure 13: NL Offshore Oil Development Environmental Assessment Process 
 
 
Project Description submitted to Board 
 
Verification of “triggers” and regulatory exclusions 
(for example, as per Exclusion List Regulations) 
 
If CEA Act “triggers” are not present, the Minister of NRCan  
has the discretion to decide whether further assessment is merited, 
and, if so, what kind 
OR 
If CEA Act “triggers” are present, Board commences Comprehensive Study  
(if the project falls within the Comprehensive Study List Regulations), or a basic screening 
 
If a Comprehensive Study applies, then the Board defines scope of study 
 
Operator writes Comprehensive Study Report and submits it to the Board 
 
Public review period 
 
Board writes recommendation to Minister 
 
Minister determines if the project proceeds 
and what mitigation measures might be required 
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In addition to the CEA Act, operators must follow other environmentally relevant 
federal legislation, listed below.  
 
− Fisheries Act (administered by DFO) 
− CEPA Disposal at Sea authorizations (administered by EC) 
− Marine Conservation Areas Act (administered by the Minister of Canadian Heritage) 
− Migratory Birds Convention Act (administered by EC) 
− Species at Risk Act (administered by the Minister of Canadian Heritage, Minister of DFO and 
Minister of Environment) 
− Canada Wildlife Act (administered by EC’s CWS) 
− Canada Shipping Act (relating to marine pollution discharges, administered by TC) 
 
The Board consults with the departments and agencies involved in the legislation above 
and may also require that all relevant federal approvals from these bodies be in place 
prior to authorizing work (and work cannot proceed without these approvals). Note 
that provincial authorizations, specifically the Environmental Protection Act administered 
by the NL Environment Department, would be required only when activities occur 
onshore. The table below summarizes the key regulatory actors in this process. 
 
Figure 14: Environmental Regulatory Key Actors in NL’s Offshore 
 
 
Lead Environmental Authority: the Board 
 
 
Consulted Federal Authorities 
− DFO 
− CEAA 
− EC 
− Minister of Canadian Heritage 
− TC 
 
 
Consulted Provincial Authorities (only in the case of onshore activities) 
− Department of Environment and Conservation 
 
 
Problematic Environmental Assessment  
There are broad problems with the environmental assessment process framing offshore 
oil discussed above. 
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First, the Board consistently favors the least stringent form of environmental 
review, screenings, which include a very weak or non-existent opportunity for public 
comment and do not provide for follow up programs to verify or mitigate impacts 
(unlike in comprehensive studies or review panels) (Erlandson Consulting Inc. and 
Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada 2004, 15-17).52 Second, when more stringent forms 
of assessment are required, for example, a review panel, the final recommendations of 
the panel are non-binding and can be ignored or overridden by the Board.  
This practice was evident in the case of the most recent joint panel review 
relating to offshore NL oil development: multiple panel recommendations53 to improve 
environmental outcomes offshore were not addressed by the Board and they continue 
to reappear in subsequent debates on offshore oil, as this chapter will make clear.  
Third, regardless of the type of assessment, the threshold for identifying a major 
or significant environmental impact is too high: it requires impacts on entire 
populations therefore most effects are classified in the environmental assessment 
documents as “negligible.” This point has been raised in reference to each oil 
development project.54 Finally, there is a misleading slippage in the environmental 
                                                
52 The CEAA does not require environmental assessment for exploration activities 
offshore but according to the AA Implementation Act, the Board has the authority to require 
environmental impact statements and may conduct public consultations (AA Implementation 
Act 1990, 44.2.(c)).  
53 Recommendations included increased Board transparency with the public, a “zero 
tolerance” for oil spills, enforced waste standards, long-term independent, peer-reviewed 
research and monitoring, a detailed review of offshore to shore oil transportation, and a 
reformulation of significant effects that could take into account more than large-scale 
population impacts (Report of the Terra Nova Development Project Environmental Assessment 
Panel 1997). 
54 For example, the issue was raised by DFO during the Hibernia panel (quoted in 
(Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997, 171-72) and by the Wilderness 
Society on the Terra Nova development project which noted that “the scale is warped in favor 
of making anything less than massive disasters fall into an innocuously labeled category of 
“minor” or “negligible” (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997, 178). 
More recently, Fraser et al. argued that “the definition of a significant environmental effect used 
in the White Rose EA (‘having a high magnitude or medium magnitude for a duration of 
greater than one year and over a geographic extent greater than 100km2’) makes it virtually 
impossible that any rating of significance will occur” (Fraser et al. 2006, 152-53). 
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assessment process where unknown effects are assumed to indicate no effects. As 
scientists Montevecchi and Burke explain, the lack of data is “often assumed to be 
indicative of absence of wildlife disturbance, pollution and mortality” (2005, 29), yet 
actual impacts are not known (see also Fraser et al. 2006, 150). 
 
Limited Transparency 
Information disclosure is essential to public involvement of and evaluation of offshore 
oil developments’ environmental impacts (Fraser et al. 2008). Yet the Board has long 
been criticized for its lack of transparency—one interviewee described interactions with 
the Board as meeting “a wall of silence” (interview with a university environmental 
sciences professor (2) in 2007). Fraser et al. experienced this problem acutely as she 
worked for years to obtain basic data on offshore spill incidents that would allow for 
comparisons, by platform, of spill predictions and actual outcomes (Fraser et al. 2008).55  
Another important example of the lack of transparency relates to environmental 
effects monitoring (EEM). The Board has committed itself to transparency in EEM.56 Yet, 
in reality, public access to environmental effects monitoring is very limited. Each 
operator has a program in place (C-NLOPB 2004, section 8.0), but for all but the White 
Rose projects, the reports are not available to the public. This lack of data accessibility 
impedes independent reviews of the monitoring programs. 
 
                                                
55 Other examples of information protected by the Board include environmental 
monitoring reports from Hibernia and TN (two years are available from White Rose, the 
operation credited as being more responsive and transparent) and data on oil sheens. Regarding 
the latter, the Board has been collecting this data from since 2003 but the information is not 
public (see Fraser et al.’s description of denied requests for this information from the Board and 
Environment Canada (Fraser et al. 2006, 151). Public information available on the Board’s 
response to oil spills is also very limited. 
56 For example, in its 1997 decision to approve the TN development plan the Board noted 
that the EEM program “should include provision for input and review by outside experts and 
by interested groups or individuals in the general public” and that “the results of EEM are 
made publicly available in a prompt manner following the completion of individual survey 
programs” (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 1997, 56). 
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Limited Public Consultation 
The public does not have great access to information about offshore oil impacts and nor 
does it have direct access to the process via effective public consultation processes. The 
initial step in offshore oil developments is not very open to public involvement: lands 
are selected primarily by confidential industry nomination and, as Shrimpton explains, 
“only internal assessment and limited consultation with other government departments 
is undertaken before the Boards decide whether to issue a call for bids.”57 Research on 
public participation at the rights issuance stage indicates that the Board’s current 
consultation standards are “inadequate and ineffective in engaging community 
groups.” If public comment is received, the process for incorporating it into the Board’s 
decision on issuing calls for bids is unclear—it is not apparent “what factors the Boards 
take into account in arriving at these decisions and, in particular, how any public input 
is taken into account” (Shrimpton et al. 2003, iv, vii, 68).58 
At the point of development, public consultation is again missing in most 
projects due to the Board’s proclivity for screenings (where public reviews are 
discretionary) as opposed to more thorough comprehensive studies or panel reviews.59 
If the Board is “of the opinion that the public hearing is not required on grounds the 
board considers to be in the public interest,” one may not be conducted (AA 
Implementation Act 1990, section 44.(1)). Then in processes that do engage more with 
the public, in comprehensive studies and review panels, there is often the problem of 
                                                
57 Public consultation at this stage is not required by statute but is merely 
“administrative practice” and applies to a narrow range of stakeholders, primarily those in the 
fishing industry (Shrimpton et al. 2003, vi). 
58 The problem of a dearth of consultation with the public also holds to some degree 
with other governmental agencies. For example, in the case of license issuance after the call for 
bids, the decision “is a Board decision and is not made in consultation with governments” 
(Shrimpton et al. 2003, 18). Similarly, the Board consults with its Newfoundland Environmental 
Advisory Committee (NEAC) only after issuing a call for bids. 
59 Public consultation is required for a comprehensive study—the public participates in 
developing the scoping document, during the study and once the report has been written 
(Erlandson Consulting Inc. and Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada 2004, 15-11)—and in the 
case of a panel review, public hearings are also conducted. 
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short commenting timelines. For example, the Natural History Society (NHS), primary 
commentators on the Terra Nova project, were given only fourteen days to submit 
comments (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 2001, 3). Citizens 
and NGOs do not having the time, resources and expertise to participate in 
consultation, unlike industry and government bodies (Shrimpton et al. 2003, viii, 70).  
Furthermore, where public consultation occurs, it may have a limited impact on 
the final project decision. This point was raised most clearly by the NHS in comments 
on the Terra Nova environmental assessment panel. Group members noted that their 
comments on this project were repetitions of the points they had made over a decade 
prior on the Hibernia project. “We cannot help but question the value of the review 
process when the criticisms and suggestions are not acted upon,” they stated (Natural 
History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997, 6). Furthermore, “One possibility 
that worries us,” the group noted, “is that the Public Review process is simply a Public 
Relations exercise” (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997, 6, 
185).60 This is a concern widely shared by NGOs involved in these processes, as noted in 
interviews with Sierra Club researchers (1-3) in 2008, university environmental sciences 
professors (1-2) in 2006 and 2007, long time employee with key federal departments (1-
2) in 2007, and a Newfoundland and Labrador Environmental Association 
representative in 2008. 
 
Few “No-Go” Areas 
An additional issue of concern, beyond the problems of environmental assessment, 
transparency and public consultation, is that, in approving projects, The Board protects 
few areas and there is no regional plan to guide land leasing. Lands are chosen for 
                                                
60 In their subsequent comments on the White Rose project, the NHS again noted the 
problem of comments that had not been incorporated from the Terra Nova panel, such as 
underestimated zones of influence (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 
2001, 7). 
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exploration not with environmental protection in mind but based on corporate parcel 
nominations. The Board can nominate lands on its own but it “typically waits for 
nominations to be made by the industry” (Erlandson Consulting Inc. and Petroleum 
Research Atlantic Canada 2004, 6-2) where the “sole criterion” for allocating parcels is 
bid size (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board) (Erlandson 
Consulting Inc. and Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada 2004, 6-5).  
Although there are key ecological areas offshore NL meriting protection against 
oil and gas development, such as the Southeast Shoal on the Grand Banks, on the 
border of Canadian and international waters, few offshore areas have been designated 
as marine protected areas prohibiting oil exploration and development (in contrast to, 
for example, neighboring Nova Scotia (Shrimpton et al. 2003, 19)).61 
 
Unrestricted Carbon Emissions 
As noted in section 2.1 above, NL’s oil industry is driving up the province’s carbon 
emissions and making it exceed targets emissions. This problem is now acknowledged 
as a major environmental impact of this industry (Janes 2010). Yet environmental 
regulatory authority in the offshore, the Board, has no regulations for emissions 
offshore in place—operators must only report estimated annual emissions (National 
Energy Board et al. 2002, section 2.2), for example to the federal National Pollutant 
Release Inventory (NPRI).  
As noted early on in the Terra Nova panel review, the Board merely 
recommends operators “evaluate and report” on the “feasibility” of designing its 
facilities to reduce GHG emissions (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore 
Petroleum Board 1997, 49). Ultimately, it is defers responsibility for the problem to the 
                                                
61 To date, in NL only two small areas have been set aside for protection, Gilbert Bay, an 
area less than fifty square kilometers off the southeast coast of Labrador, and Eastport Peninsula 
in Bonavista Bay (Department of Fisheries and Oceans 2008). 
  119 
federal climate change plan regulating large final emitters. Meanwhile, the local oil 
industry is slowly awakening to this issue. A former senior provincial energy policy 
maker interviewed in 2008 noted that the industrial community “discovered” climate 
change in 2005 and is finally engaging with the issue, notable in a panel discussion of 
the issue at the 2008 NL Oil and Gas Industries Association (NOIA) meeting. But this 
engagement is in some ways self-congratulatory because the local industry deems itself 
much “cleaner” compared to AB’s tar sands, which is cast as the real culprit in this 
debate. 
 
Permissive Waste Disposal 
Similar problems are evident with other forms of waste due to unclear or inadequate 
regulations. To start, there are multiple regulatory exemptions for waste disposal 
offshore.62 Where discharges are not exempt from regulation, the Board has numerous 
environmental standards for waste disposal— non-enforceable “guidelines” or 
“targets”—but not clear limits. Worse, there is limited publicly available data on if 
companies are meeting these limits. The data available data show that one company, 
Husky Energy, operator of the White Rose FPSO, fails to meet these goals.63  
The Board shows a high tolerance for the extent of waste effects: sediment 
contamination, especially with hydrocarbons, has been noted up to seven kilometers 
                                                
62 A university environmental science professor interviewed in 2007 noted the numerous 
environmental regulatory exemptions for the oil and gas sector under federal laws. NGO 
groups have noted this as well, with particular concern about the applicability of the Migratory 
Bird Act Convention (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 2001, 12). And 
under CEPA, 1999, paragraph 122(l)(j), it is noted that discharges associated with “the 
exploration and development phases” are exempt (Erlandson Consulting Inc. and Petroleum 
Research Atlantic Canada 2004, 17-1). 
63 For example, as of 2008 White Rose has not reached the Board’s Offshore Waste 
Treatment Guidelines target of 6.9% or less of synthetic based drill fluid on drill cuttings. Husky 
noted it was “trying to reach the CNLOPB’s 9.9 percent target” but the actual range (no average 
is provided) of the percentage of synthetic fluid on cuttings discharged from well drilling was 
from 3.8 to 13.3%, with the latter percentage, the higher end of the range, representing nearly 
double the suggested target (Husky Energy Inc. 2002-2008). 
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from the operations (Husky Energy 2006, 2). Also, the limits on oil concentration on 
drill cuttings are much higher in offshore NL than in other jurisdictions (Natural 
History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997, 2). 
 Another key waste issue of increasing debate in NL is the lack of effective 
regulation on produced water (the regular discharges of water containing trace 
amounts of oil and other toxic material). The NHS, in reference to the White Rose 
development project, noted that “intentional (operational) discharges represent the bulk 
of oil that will be introduced into the environment” and that the amount of oil lost in 
blowouts in other jurisdictions is far exceeded by the quantities of produced and other 
discharges and disposal activities (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and 
Labrador 2001, 8). This produced water has been acknowledged as a key problem by 
the scientific community—researchers show that chronic oil pollution may be “more 
detrimental to long-term population stability than occasional large spills” (Wiese et al. 
2004, 205; see also Fraser et al. 2006). This point was also stressed in an interview with a 
NHS scientist and researcher in 2008.  
Yet contrary to these widespread concerns—and although the Board has the 
authority to regulate (and prohibit) discharges (AA Implementation Act 1990, section 
145(1)(g-h))—the reinjection of produced water (a practice acknowledged as a key 
method in reducing this discharge), is not currently required.64 Instead, according to 
Offshore Waste Treatment Guidelines, produced water discharges are limited only by 
average monthly and daily oil concentrations produced water in terms of milligrams 
per litre,65 as opposed to immediate concentrations and absolute, cumulative oil 
                                                
64 There have been repeated calls for produced water reinjection throughout the 
environmental assessment processes (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 
2001, 8). 
65 These non-absolute limits questionable in their own right: the NHS scientist and 
researcher I interviewed in 2008 suggested there was no scientific basis for these limits the 
permissible average monthly limit oil concentrations of produced water offshore, at 30mg/L, 
are double the 15mg/L regulation for instantaneous discharges of ship’s bilge waters (Fraser et 
al. 2006, 150). This point was also raised formally by NHS (2001, 12)). These bilge water 
  121 
discharges (Fraser et al. 2006, 150).66 As explained by the NHS in 2001, there continues 
to be “no limit to the total amount of oil that can be discharged with produced water 
and oil on cuttings (there are only concentration restrictions)” (Natural History Society 
of Newfoundland and Labrador 2001, 12).  
Hence in this regulatory environment, the Atlantic Ocean effectively serves as 
the offshore oil and gas industry’s “tailings ponds” for toxic waste. But unlike in the AB 
case, they are not contained and they are well hidden from view given the distance of 
the facilities offshore. 
 
Questionable Spill Response 
The routine disposal of waste is a regular issue that needs attention in NL’s offshore oil 
sector. But another impact of the sector, one that captures more public attention, is the 
problem of larger, unexpected spills. And spill response in NL is also marked with 
difficulties due overarching questions relating to privatization and the specific issues of 
underspecified standards.  
Spill response was privatized in 1993 as a result of the Brander-Smith report 
(Brander-Smith et al. 1990) which advocated the polluter pays principle (that industry 
ought to pay for the costs of spill response). The East Coast Response Corporation Ltd. 
(ECRC), the only private response organization for NL, is a for-profit company owned 
by oil industry shareholders with a mandate to provide “effective response at 
affordable cost” (interview with an East Coast Response Corporation - Atlantic Region 
representative in 2008). But does an industry-owned company focused on affordability 
                                                                                                                                                       
limitations are understood as in great part arbitrary, based on a consensus during International 
Maritime Organization negotiations. 
66 Permissible concentrations are outlined in “Offshore Waste Treatment Guidelines” 
(National Energy Board et al. 2002). For example, thirty-day averages of produced water must 
not exceed 30mg/L, and not exceed an average of 60mg/L in a 24 hour period; synthetic-based 
drilling muds must have a “total polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon concentration of less than 
10mg/kg”; and storage displacement, bilge and ballast water or deck drainage must be treated 
to bring oil concentrations down to below 15mg/L (7-8). 
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and profitability provide the best protection for the public environment? This is a basic 
but important criticism seldom addressed in public debate (numerous interviewees 
raised this point including the long time employees with key federal departments 
involved with oil spills (1-2) in 2007 and 2008 and Sierra Club researchers (2-3) in 2008). 
Another problem with spill response is NL’s offshore are the under-specified 
response organization (RO) standards. For example, there are no set regulations on the 
type of equipment or type and number of responders that ROs must have, beyond the 
vague requirement for equipment that is “necessary for the operational requirements in 
that geographical area” (TC’s “Response Organizations Standards,” section 6). Specific 
standards are established between the ROs and TC (the ROs submit a plan and TC 
approves it, using a national review board), but the agreed upon standards are not 
public information.  
Whether the equipment available is sufficient and properly located is a second 
frequent point of debate. The ECRC representative interviewed in 2008 argued that no 
extra equipment is required because the ECRC has never used all of the equipment it 
has. Yet RAC members and the long time employee with key federal departments who 
has been closely involved with oil spills (1) in this province continue to recommend 
more equipment that can be rapidly deployed in high-risk areas. Most of the equipment 
is in Donovan’s Industrial Park, many hours drive from Placentia Bay which was 
identified by TC as the most likely site of a spill. Yet perhaps the question of equipment 
type and amount is ultimately a moot point as the typical oil recovery rate of a spill 
response is at best 20%. And in bad weather conditions, this rate could very well be zero 
(interview with ECRC representative in 2008). 
There have also been longstanding calls for escort tugs to guide tankers in and 
out of Placentia Bay, a basic safety measure now required in Alaska (interview with 
Newfoundland and Labrador Environmental Association (NLEA) representative in 
2008). A finally obvious gap in spill response policy is the limited proper disposal 
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capacity for recuperated oil (Earle and (Wiese 2002, 29) or for the rehabilitation of oil 
birds (interview with NLEA representative, 2008). Finally, TC has not established a plan 
for a place of refuge for compromised tankers (interview with long time employee with 
key federal departments involved with oil spills (2) in 2007).  
 
Weak Monitoring 
Monitoring to prevent or respond to oil spills and to the other environment incidents 
elaborated above is also weak in NL.  
Regarding on-site monitoring, this process is questionable because it is not 
independent (operators self-monitor and self-report), the monitors are not dedicated to 
the task full time (this is a duty attached to an employee’s primary position), and these 
monitors are not trained biologists. While scientists have long documented the need for 
on-site, independent, trained, full-time monitors (Burke et al. 2005, 607-08; see also 
Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 3; Natural History Society of Newfoundland and 
Labrador 1997, 182), according to Burke et al., “it has been impossible to station 
independent, dedicated, trained observers on offshore hydrocarbon platforms in 
eastern Canada.”67 Instead, operators self-monitor and self-report to the Board via 
compliance reports (for example, reports on waste discharges). Compliance reports are 
submitted by the Board’s EAD by the operator’s Chief Conservation Officer (Canada-
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2007b, 25). Yet as argued by 
the NHS, this process “places the operator in a conflict of interest position where they 
must provide records of their compliance with regulations” (Natural History Society of 
Newfoundland and Labrador 2001, 11).  
The Board justifies the lack of on-site independent monitors in terms of safety. In 
                                                
67 At the same time, site access is permitted to others: “it is difficult to comprehend how 
it can be justified that photographers, journalists and musicians are given access to the Hibernia 
and Terra Nova platforms while such access is denied to independent contracted biologists” 
(Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 3).  
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response to the TN panel’s recommendation for independent monitors, it responded: 
“in the interest of safety, personnel complements on offshore drilling and production 
facilities should be kept to the minimum necessary for prudent operations” The Board 
has “concluded that insufficient evidence has been presented to justify requiring the 
placement of additional, dedicated personnel on drilling or production platforms as 
observers” (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 1997, 56). 
However note that independent monitors are present in NL’s other major offshore 
industry: they were common practice in the offshore fishing industry to monitor catch 
(as noted in interviews with the former senior provincial energy policy maker in 2008 
and with a university environmental science professor in 2007). 
Given the “interested” nature of monitoring, the risk of under-reporting concerns 
observers. Gaps in reporting have been noted by Montevecchi and Burke who note 
information on oiled seabirds at the Hibernia and Terra Nova sites that was reported to 
them “informally by crew members of support vessels” while no formal reports on 
these incidents were reported by the operators (Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 3).68 
Another clue to underreporting offshore comes from an interview with an Environment 
Canada policy maker, Newfoundland Provincial Office (2) in 2007. This person noted 
that after the TN spill in 2004, spill reporting offshore increased. This, of course, raises 
the question of what was not being reported previously. This problem has been noted 
by prominent people within the federal government. For example, Terry Harvey, 
director of the Canadian Coast Guard's (CCG) Prevention of Oiled Wildlife Project was 
paraphrased in a New York Times article on NL’s new industry as stating that the “Coast 
Guard believes that there were many other unreported spills [off Hibernia]” (DePalma 
                                                
68 An issue infrequently addressed but important regarding the risk of underreporting 
relates to employees being afraid to report environmental incidents they witness offshore (this 
point was raised by environmentalists interviewed by Fusco (2007, 87-97)). There seems to be a 
need for confidential environmental reporting processes to parallel confidential safety reporting 
used in other jurisdictions. 
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1999). 
In addition to this questionable on-site monitoring, aerial surveillance is 
problematic as well. This surveillance of offshore facilities is frequent and wide ranging 
but it does not provide complete coverage of the area. Offshore surveillance is 
conducted by TC, DFO, and the Department of National Defense (DND)—but there is 
“absolutely” a chance that spills or other environmental incidents associated with 
offshore oil production can go undetected due to weather that impedes surveillance and 
the sheer size of the offshore (interview with Fisheries and Oceans Canada policy 
maker, Environmental Response, in 2008). Also, this level of surveillance is noted to be 
low compared to other jurisdictions (see, for example, Wiese’s point that coverage off 
NL’s coast is much lower than off the UK and in the Baltic Sea (2002, 18)).  
 
Ineffective Enforcement and Compliance Measures 
When environmental offences offshore are remarked, the Board uses a range of 
methods to secure compliance from “soft” methods of communicating with the 
operators to encourage them to meet guidelines and regulations (the most frequently 
used compliance method), to “hard” methods of persecuting and fining. Even more 
serious to the operators, but even less frequently used, is the Board’s authority to 
suspend operations. 
Fines—ranging from low voluntary settlements to fines in the millions of dollars 
and imprisonment—could act as compliance mechanisms. However there are many 
instances of environmental infractions for which the Board never seeks compensation. 
Small spills from the offshore facilities are very frequent, for instance, but there is never 
any “hard” response to them from the Board. Yet the environmental impact of small 
spills may be serious: depending on the movement of seabirds and the timing of a small 
spill, it “may kill substantially more birds than large spills” (Fraser et al. 2006, 147). 
Also, in the case of larger spills from emergency situations, for example the January 
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2007 spill of drilling fluid from the Erick Raude rig after an emergency disconnect in the 
Orphan Basin, there were no fines as the operator was found to have done its due 
diligence. According to the AA Implementation Act (AA Implementation Act 1990, 
section 156(3)) spills are prohibited and the Board has the power to make companies 
comply and to fine companies, yet spills happen frequently with little regulatory 
impact.  
When environmental offences offshore are remarked and legal action is taken, 
the compliance mechanism is mild. As of February 2008, the Board had conducted 
twelve investigations and two resulted in persecutions. For the 2004 spill of 160,000 
liters of crude oil at the Terra Nova platform, total claims against Petro-Canada 
amounted to $290,000. Only $70,000 of this was required by the courts and the rest was 
voluntary and took the form of contributions to the Environmental Canada (EC) Enviro 
Damages Fund and IBES. Yet the spill had effected approximately 793 square 
kilometers and results in seabird mortality estimated at 10,000 to 16,000 alcids (mostly 
murres and dovekies) (Wilhelm et al. 2006, 13). Similarly, Husky Oil paid a low fine of 
$50,000, including a $30,000 contribution to an Environmental Protection Fund, for the 
2004 spill of 96,600 liters of synthetic drilling mud from the GSF Grand Banks drill rig at 
the White Rose field.69 Compared to the enormous profits made by operators, these 
fines lack impact. 
A concurrent problem frequently raised is the lack of compliance mechanisms in 
place for operators who exceed their environmental impact predictions made in the 
                                                
69 Agreed Statement of Facts and Joint Submission, R. v. Husky Oil Operations Limited, 
October 2007. The investigation revealed that there was a lack of reporting and monitoring, as 
well as a lack of an appropriate process, for a routine diverter system test. A valve was left open 
and drilling muds were therefore discharged directly into the ocean without treatment to meet 
the Offshore Waste Treatment Guidelines. 
Note that this problem of low fines is a generalized one in Canada’s offshore, in oil and 
gas production as well as in the shipping industry. For example, data for marine pollution in 
NL indicates that since 1994, there have been 674 investigations, 49 prosecutions and the total 
fines have amounted to $937,500, an average of $19,133 per prosecution (Government of Canada 
2007). 
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environmental assessment process. Terry Harvey, director of the CCG's Prevention of 
Oiled Wildlife Project was quoted in the New York Times as stating, “In its 
environmental impact statement, Hibernia said the possibility of spills occurring was 
nearly nil. Yet we have oil in the water almost every week” (DePalma 1999). Predictions 
of spills are notably exceeded by actual spills yet there is no regulatory process to 
ensure operators address this discrepancy. As Rutherford and Campbell note, whether 
the development is unfolding as approved by the authority cannot be verified 
(Rutherford and Campbell 2004, 22). 
Even worse, these same predictions are then repeated in future environmental 
impact statements without a regulatory process to improve the predictions. Fraser has 
recently drawn attention to this problem. She notes that  
 
The White Rose EA predictions did not incorporate Terra Nova’s spill experience: in 
the project’s first year of development drilling, Terra Nova had almost exceeded 
their life-time prediction for small batch spills (<50 barrels) at the time, yet White 
Rose continued to provide similar predictions (Fraser and Ellis 2008, 16). 
Note that when I raised this issue with a C-NLOPB Environmental Affairs researcher 
during a 2008 interview, I was told that this was not an issue that was frequently 
verified or noted by the Board. 
 
Significant Research Gaps 
A more general problem touching each of these aspects of environmental regulation 
and impact at issue here is that of research. Research is essential in managing and 
evaluating offshore oil developments as it is the basis of determinations (or predictions) 
of oil development’s various impacts. If this research is incomplete then so is our 
understanding of current and possible impacts, and so are mitigation efforts. In NL’s 
offshore, however, there are significant gaps in knowledge regarding cumulative 
environmental impacts of offshore oil extraction and problems with currently available 
research.  
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Assessing impacts is made difficult from the outset by the lack of baseline data 
and adequate research programs. At a most basic level, there is a lack of baseline data 
on species offshore which impedes that crucial comparison of the ecosystem prior to, 
during and after oil extraction. Frequently noted gaps include “species-specific at-sea 
distribution and abundance of marine birds” (Fraser et al. 2006, 151; see also 
Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 5), as well as data on other marine species such as the 
endangered leatherback turtle (James et al. 2006). Without baseline data, it is difficult or, 
in the NHS’s determination, even “impossible,” to ascertain the impacts of oil 
development (Natural History Society of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997, 3).  
 Then the research programs that do exist are marked by the problems of being 
overly “piecemeal,” lacking independence and lacking appropriate support. Hence the 
repeated calls in the literature for support for long-term, comprehensive, independent, 
peer-reviewed and publicly accessible research.  
For example, research on seabirds—which are key research species because they 
are the “most conspicuous marine organisms” and are therefore used as “monitors of 
the marine environment” (Wiese and Ryan 2003, 1090))—is “insufficient” and 
“inadequate” to ascertain impacts on the species (Burke et al. 2005, 588, 608). Scientists 
such as Burke et al., therefore, call for  
 
independent, scientifically rigorous surveys of seabirds in relation to ongoing 
hydrocarbon activities. Assessments could be greatly enhanced with independent, 
year-round on platforms. Without such surveys, it is impossible to document 
seabird mortality associated with marine hydrocarbon activity in eastern Canada, 
and hence not possible to effectively mitigate environmental effects (2005, 588).  
Independent analyses are also required to evaluate the environmental assessments 
conducted by consultants on behalf of the oil companies. For example, when Fraser et 
al. reanalyzed of the predictions made on the impact of produced water discharges on 
auks in the White Rose environmental assessment estimates, they found far different 
impacts, ranging from low to high, than Husky Oil’s “negligible” effects prediction 
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(2006, 152). Other key examples of research gaps include a dearth of information on the 
effect of produced water discharges and the relationship between produced water, oil 
sheens and seabird mortality (Fraser et al. 2006, 149-52), the impact of rig lighting and 
flaring on seabirds, and the effects of extended seismic explorations offshore. 
Independent scientists are constantly seeking the resources to conduct regional, 
cumulative research70 but support is not forthcoming (Burke et al. 2005, 608; 
Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 29).  
Instead of cumulative, regional research conducted by independent scientists, 
research on environmental impacts in NL’s offshore is primarily conducted through the 
Environmental Studies Research Fund (ESRF). There are, however, several 
shortcomings with depending on the ESRF for offshore research. First, the ESRF budget 
is limited and only a portion of it can be devoted to NL issues as the funds are shared 
by several provinces with different research needs.71 Second, the origin of this budget 
and the control this exerts is questionable. The ESRF is funded by levies required to be 
paid by companies in section 81 of the Canada Petroleum Resources Act and the ESRF 
twelve-member board includes four industry representatives (Imperial Oil Resources, 
Petro-Canada, ExxonMobil Canada and CAPP).72 In the mid-1980s, House observed that 
research conducted through the ESRF is “firmly controlled by the oil industry” and that 
                                                
70 Contrary to scientific opinion, note that there is doubt within the Board about the 
relevance of cumulative analysis. According to the researcher with the C-NLOPB 
Environmental Affairs unit interviewed in 2008, the need for cumulative research was raised in 
both review panels but the Board feels such a study is not needed in NL because the operations 
are much less intense and there is more distance between operations compared to, for example, 
in AB’s sector.  
71 The budget for ESRF’s environmental research on the east coast was $750,000 in 2006 
and $500,000 in 2007 (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2007b, 
26). Compare this to the estimated one million dollars required annually to run an appropriate 
monitoring program to determine the effect of oil development offshore (interview with 
university environmental science professor (2) in 2007). 
72 Other members include four federal government representatives (EC, DFO, DIAND 
and NEB), one public member, one representative from each offshore petroleum board (NL and 
Nova Scotia), and a representative from the Joint Secretariat Inuvialuit Renewable Resource 
Committee (representing Northwest Territories and Yukon interests). 
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“the Newfoundland and Canadian governments seem prepared to accept the principle 
that he who pays the piper calls the tune when it comes to oil-related research” (House 
1985, 99). So rather than independent scientific research, some interviewees wonder if 
the ESRF is merely providing research to help industry get through environmental 
approval processes (interview with Environment Canada policy maker, Newfoundland 
Provincial Office, (2) in 2007). A third problem is the timeliness of this work and how it 
is being incorporated into decision making processes on oil and gas development. Much 
of the research, for example on developing seabird monitoring programs and taking the 
effects of produced water seriously, is coming far too late, after decades of concern 
expressed about these issues and three facilities are already in production.  
 
Ambiguous Decommissioning Requirements 
Once production ends and the risks associated with oil production subside, different 
issues then come to light relating to decommissioning. Decommissioning practices in 
offshore NL are, to date, largely undefined and awaiting technology and standards to 
be established at the time of future site abandonment. Financial responsibility for 
decommissioning lies with the operator (at least for a short period), yet it is unclear how 
operators will be required to pay for the extraordinary cost of these under-defined 
procedures. It is unknown whether decommissioning practices will be established on a 
project-by-project basis or if the same processes will apply to all projects. 
In the major legislation guiding offshore oil development, there is little mention 
of decommissioning. The 1987 Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act 
and the 1990 Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation 
Newfoundland and Labrador Act make no mention of decommissioning or abandonment 
except that to note the Board’s authority over abandonment activities and time 
limitations to damage claims due to abandoned materials. The Newfoundland Offshore 
Area Petroleum Production and Conservation Regulations, pursuant to the AA, offers 
  131 
only short comments on the basic plugging of wells (Newfoundland Offshore Area 
Petroleum Production and Conservation Regulations, SOR/95-103 1995, part III section 
21). So perhaps the clearest statement on decommissioning requirements—although still 
vague—is contained in the Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installations 
Regulations in section 42 which notes that 
 
Where the removal of a fixed production installation is a condition of a 
development plan approval, the operator shall incorporate in the design of 
the installation such measures as are necessary to facilitate its removal from 
the site without causing a significant effect on navigation or the marine 
environment (Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Installations Regulations, 
SOR/95-104 1995).  
Precise decommissioning procedures are still being defined (Erlandson Consulting Inc. 
and Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada 2004, 14-1) and are rather rudimentary. For 
example, the plan for decommissioning of larger fixed-based rigs was to leave them at 
sea. See the discussion in (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum 
Board 2008b, 26-27).  
The financial responsibility for decommissioning is clearer but still questionable. 
Offshore work guidelines note that “residual liability” will be managed by the operator 
in the case that “any subsequent claims arise after such 
abandonment/decommissioning occurs” (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board 2000, 13). However, after structure abandonment there is a 
six-year time limitation on this responsibility (AA Implementation Act 1990, section 162 
(5)). And given the enormous costs of decommissioning (an estimated half a billion 
dollars for a GBS structure, as noted below), it is fair to question if companies will easily 
agree to pay especially at the end of field production, when profits are dwindling, and 
whether or how the Board will force them to do so.  
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III. Explaining Environmental Regulation in the Offshore  
Understood systematically, this series of regulatory problems and weaknesses indicate 
a fragile environmental regulation system in NL’s offshore oil industry. Given this, the 
environmental outcomes described in section 2 are unsurprising.  
But what accounts for these regulatory patterns? A political ecology approach 
provides some insight by focusing attention on the broader political-economic system 
framing offshore oil development. Guided by this, below I outline the interests and 
strategies of the primary interests dominating the debate and note how they result in 
continued, expanded offshore oil development rather than enhanced environmental 
regulation.  
The main thrust of the argument here is that the dominant petro-political regime 
in NL is marked by two trends. First, the NL government is strongly dependent on 
revenue from the offshore. The Canadian government also sees clear gains from the 
industry. Hence there is widespread governmental consent for and support of these 
developments. Second, the oil industry reinforces this tendency via various forms of 
lobbying. In the next section I begin by discussing the economic impact of the oil 
industry in NL, then describe the ways in which the government attempts to continue 
these economic benefits by supporting the industry. 
 
Government Dependence and Support 
Provincially, the impacts of the offshore oil industry are seen primarily in the industry’s 
contribution to revenues via royalties (particularly in most recent years), its significant 
impacts on GDP and the impact the industry has had in encouraging major 
infrastructure developments and improvements in the province. 
Direct revenues from oil accruing to the provincial government from 1997-98 to 
2008-09 amounted to $6.22 billion. As shown in figures 12 and 13 presented in chapter 4, 
significant revenue dependence on oil and gas has been particularly marked since 2007. 
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Direct oil revenues contributed less than 5% of total provincial revenue until increases 
starting to be seen in 2004, and then a notable shift occurred in 2007 that saw oil 
revenues surging to 33% of total revenues and continuing to rise to 41% in 2008. This 
trend is expected to continue. Then in addition to these revenues, there have been funds 
from the AA: nearly half a million in 2007 and close to a million in 2008. Therefore, in 
terms of direct revenues to government alone, the industry accounts for nearly half of 
all government revenues. 
But there are much broader economic impacts of this industry beyond these 
direct revenues from royalties and funds from the AA. The cumulative economic 
impact of offshore oil in NL has been analyzed over the last decade by Mark Shrimpton 
who draws on data from the provincial government’s Economic Research and Analysis 
Division of the Department of Finance (Jacques Whitford 2003; Stantec 2009; Jacques 
Whitford 2005). This research indicates that one of the most obvious impacts of the oil 
industry on the province has been on GDP. Using the widest possible notion of 
impact—including direct, indirect and induced impacts73—from 1999 to 2007 the 
offshore oil industry in NL accounted for an average of 25.8% of real GDP, ranging 
from 14.3% in 1999 and peaking at 32% in 2004 (Stantec 2009, 10). GDP growth is 
notably significant in comparison to other provinces: over the last ten years, the 
province has had the fastest GDP growth in the country (Locke 2010).74 
Provincial economic benefits also include personal income and employment 
impacts. The offshore industry accounted for an average of only 5.3% of total personal 
                                                
73 Direct impacts refer to those from the exploration, development or production of oil 
offshore by the directly involved companies; indirect impacts are those from work associated 
with supporting, supplying or servicing the offshore oil industry, but not directly engaged with 
it; induced impacts refer to the impacts of spending by people directly or indirectly employed in 
the offshore industry. 
74 However, note that GDP data include income accruing within the province to non-
local companies and not necessarily to citizens of the province (as noted in the Stantec report, 
“much of the business income earned in the oil industry accrues to nonresident companies” 
(Stantec 2009, page 6 of Appendix A)). 
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income from 1999 to 2007, fluctuating from 3.7% to 7.5%. The trend is similar for 
employment income: over the same period, the industry contributed an average of 5.1% 
of total employment, ranging from 3.5% in 2002 to 7.3% in 2004. In terms of actual jobs, 
the direct, indirect and induced impacts of the industry have meant an average of 
10,600 jobs per year, ranging from 3,500 jobs to 15,600 at the respective lowest and 
highest job years. CAPP estimates that the industry has resulted in an annual average of 
$663 million for NL residents from 1997-2007 (Canadian Association of Petroleum 
Producers 2010b). Yet note that these jobs have not had a great impact on relieving the 
province’s high unemployment rates—the offshore oil industry has meant an average 
reduction in the unemployment rate of a mere 1.7% over the 1999 to 2007 period 
(Stantec 2009, 10). The lack of returns to labor were noted in early work by Stanford 
(2003) and are being extending by Cadigan (forthcoming).  
Similarly, the industry has had some impact in terms of indirect effects such as 
retail sales (between 1999 and 2007, the industry contributed an estimated annual 
average of 5.3%) and housing starts (an average of 4.9% in the same period) (Stantec 
2009, 10). An additional impact, the development oil-related infrastructure in the 
province, is another significant impact of the oil industry in the province. Oil 
development has incited the development of other new projects in the province to 
support the offshore developments such as the Bull Arm construction site, the 
Marystown Shipyard, the NEWDOCK sub-sea systems fabrication center, the 
Newfoundland Transshipment Terminal, and other expansions to local supply and 
service businesses.  
In summary, the impact of oil on provincial revenues is recently very significant 
and growing; oil’s contribution to GDP is very high; infrastructure impacts are notable. 
These major impacts are combined with milder indirect impacts such as increases in 
personal income and employment, decreases in unemployment, and more retail sales 
and housing starts. 
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Based primarily the increased revenue to the province since 2005, and even more 
dramatically in 2007, the provincial government has been able to balance spending, pay 
down debt, increase spending, and lower taxes. And most culturally significant, oil 
revenues have allowed the province to transition from a “have not” to a “have” 
province—one that is no longer receiving equalization payments.  
The province eliminated its deficit for the first time in 2005-06 thanks to oil 
revenues and AA revenues. And since this year, coinciding precisely with the province 
starting to receive significant oil revenues, the province has had budget surpluses every 
year, surpluses which reached nearly $2.5 billion in 2008-09. These provincial deficits or 
surpluses are entirely contingent on the price of oil: for example in 2009-10, the province 
will have a surplus only if oil prices were above a yearly average of $70 (CBC News 
2009). 
The provincial government has chosen to use these new budget surpluses and 
one-time funding injections from the AA to dramatically reduce the great debt of the 
province.75 As explained in the 2003 Royal Commission on Renewing and Strengthening Our 
Place in Canada, the province entered confederation in 1949 with a surplus and no debt. 
But since that time, the province has regularly run deficits and steadily accumulated a 
debt to the point that it had the highest, or second highest, debt and deficit load of all 
provinces. Total public sector liabilities, including public sector debt and unfunded 
pension liabilities was estimated at $11.3 billion in 2002 (Norris 2003).  
Paying down the debt has long been acknowledged as a key use of oil revenues 
in NL. As Norris explains, “the dedication of oil revenues to debt reduction would be 
one way that the exploitation of these non-renewable resources could be invested for 
the lasting benefit of future generations” (2003, 416). Prior to receiving significant oil 
revenues in 2005-06 and only months after the election of Premier Williams and the first 
                                                
75 I thank Wade Locke for his insight on these points. 
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Progressive Conservative Government in the province since the late 1980s, the 
provincial government commissioned an independent review of its finances using 
PricewaterhouseCoopers which demonstrating a worsening financial situation. The 
report stressed the growing deficit and debt projected to reach $15.8 billion by 2007-08, 
debt which amounted to 25% of all provincial revenues going to interest payments 
alone (Speaking Notes: Honourable Loyola Sullivan, Minister of Finance, President of the 
Treasury Board: Release of Independent External Review 2004). Williams emphasized the 
severity of the economic crisis in his State of the Province Address on January 5, 2004: 
reviewing the province’s finances, he noted the $11.6 billion debt in 2003-04 which costs 
23.87% of total revenue, unfunded pension liabilities, a $827.2 million deficit and 
outstanding infrastructure needs (Province's Financial Situation: Premier Danny Williams 
State of the Province Address 2004). This moment set the framework for Williams’ 
government’s prioritization of debt reduction and this continues to be a long-standing 
theme—note, for example, the “debt clock” presented to the public during budget 
consultations in 2008. Participants watched as provincial debt payments increased at 
$1400 a minute (McLean 2008). 
Therefore, after the passage of federal budget via Bill C-43 when the province 
received $2 billion as an upfront AA payment (after a long federal-provincial conflict 
over equalization claw back policy), in February 2006, Premier Williams allocated 
$1.953 billion of this to Newfoundland and Labrador Teachers’ Association pension 
plan fund (which had been raided by previous governments to be used as general 
revenues and was forecasted to be bankrupt by 2014). This reduced the provincial debt 
at the time from approximately $12 billion to $10 billion. Since then, as of January 2010, 
NL’s debt has been further reduced by about one third, down to $8 billion. This debt 
repayment has of course resulted in a reduction debt servicing as portion of spending. 
Alongside budget balancing and debt reduction, oil revenues have also allowed 
the province to strategically increase spending. The shift since the late 1990s is dramatic: 
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as tracked in the auditor general’s reports on the provincial fiscal situation, over the 
decade from 1999 until 2009, there was 51% increase in spending—a 77% increase for 
health and a 71% increase for education (Noseworthy 2009, 86). Health and education 
have seen significant spending increases and in recent years. Emphasis has also been 
placed on infrastructure spending, primarily roads (with, for example, 38% of the 2009 
infrastructure stimulus package, $270 million, going to roads). Spending increases have 
grown steadily since 2005, with fiscal year 2009 representing the largest increase in 
spending: an 8.8% increase in spending over the previous year (Noseworthy 2009, 85; 
Office of the Auditor General 2006, 17).  
Spending has been paired with tax reductions. In 2002, NL had among the 
highest levels of personal income taxation in Canada, the highest rate of fuel taxes, and 
corporate income tax rates within the middle of Canadian provinces (Norris 2003, 348-
53). Since 2007, the province has boasted that it has “delivered the biggest personal 
income tax reductions ever in Newfoundland and Labrador” (Department of Finance 
2011). 
Oil has made many economic changes possible in NL: debt reduction, spending 
increases and tax cuts. But perhaps more importantly in terms of the political culture of 
the province, after six decades in the Canadian federation as perhaps the most 
economically depressed province, oil revenues have transformed NL from a “have not” 
province receiving federal equalization payments, to a “have” (non-receiving) province 
(although the AA of 1985 and 2005 protect the province from dollar-for-dollar 
“clawbacks” until 2011-12). This transition happened recently in 2008-09 and was 
interpreted as a mark of self-reliance, a very culturally significant shift. 
The federal government also sees a significant impact from NL’s oil 
development. First, in terms of the basic issue of oil supply, NL offshore oil production 
accounts for over 12% of total oil production in Canada (Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers 2010b) and it is the only significant oil production site in eastern 
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Canadian. This is a key point given the near-total exportation of oil from western 
Canada to the U.S. and eastern Canada’s reliance on foreign oil.76 It is for this reason 
that NL’s oil is featured in Laxer’s recommendations for Canadian energy security: 
Laxer argues that redirecting NL oil exports into eastern Canada could reduce 
Canadian oil imports and enhance national oil security (2008, 6, 24). 
Second, and more tangibly in terms of revenues, the federal government’s gains 
from the NL’s offshore industry is significant. Locke notes that the Government of 
Canada captures 21% of total revenue over the life of the Hibernia, Terra Nova and 
White Rose projects, compared to the province’s 32% share (Locke 2006, 17). Given this 
split, and based on calculations noted above indicating that the provincial government 
received $6.22 billion in direct revenues from oil over the 1997-98 to 2008-09 period, the 
direct value of the industry for the Government of Canada can be estimated at 
approximately $5.5 billion. Data from the provincial government’s Department of 
Natural Resources indicate a similar revenue (but lower comparative provincial 
revenue): Minister Dunderdale noted that as of 2007, the federal government saw $5 
billion dollars generated by the three projects (with the provincial government 
receiving only $2 billion and the companies receiving $11 billion) (Carter 2007).  
The real economic powerhouse for the federal government is Hibernia 
(aggregate data on the three projects mask the particularly large share of revenue 
received by the federal government from this project). Given the federal government’s 
8.5% ownership stake in this project and corporate taxes, up to December 2006 the 
federal government received $4.8 billion from Hibernia (compared to $8.8 billion made 
by oil companies and $1.2 by the provincial government) (Department of Natural 
Resources 2007, 20). In addition taxes and equity, as of 2009 the federal government 
began receiving a 10% net profit interest on Hibernia (compensation federal 
                                                
76 According to Laxer, 90% of Atlantic Canadian and Quebec oil comes from foreign oil 
supplies with Ontario’s reliance on foreign oil at 36% (2008, 6). 
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government loan guarantees and grants to build the GBS), which is now worth billions 
of dollars. Note that the federal government’s “payout”—when cumulative revenues on 
the project equaled cumulative expenses—was reached on Hibernia in 2007 (Locke, 
personal telephone communication, February 22, 2010). 
 Oil development in NL is a central driver in the provincial economy, now 
representing over 40% of total revenues in direct impacts, as well as a large revenue 
source for the federal government. Both levels of government are careful to protect and 
support the industry. And this support has been long-standing: NL’s oil industry was 
initiated and developed based on significant government financial, research, and other 
support, such as retooling the college and university system around the oil industry. I 
describe these below. 
 
Financial Subsidies  
In her political economy analysis of NL history, Summers writes that both the 
provincial and federal governments made “costly commitments” to start an oil 
economy in NL (2000, 38). What are these, precisely? 
Government support for offshore oil development in NL began in the 1963 to 
1965 period with the federal government allocating east coast offshore exploration 
permits for over four hundred thousand square kilometers that were “exceedingly 
liberal in their terms.” Thanks to this, House notes that “hundreds of thousands of 
prime exploratory acres [were] taken up by major oil companies and numerous smaller 
companies at minimal cost.” Major players included the Canadian subsidiaries of key 
international oil companies such as Exxon and BP (1985, 55, 104).  
 The oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 following the OPEC embargo and the 
Iranian revolution resulted in enhanced governmental support for east coast offshore oil 
development. Not only were oil prices rising sharply, but oil companies operating in 
Canada were simultaneously issuing warnings to the federal government regarding 
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national oil supplies: although companies had stated only a few years earlier that 
Canada had virtually unlimited energy supplies, in the early 1970s, companies 
indicated that Canada’s Western reserves would not meet demand and new supplies 
must be found (Voyer 1983, 17-18). So, with the aim both to protect the country against 
high oil prices and out of fear of oil scarcity (Doern 2005, 12-13), the federal government 
actively sought in increase oil development in Canada’s oil frontier regions, the 
“Canada Lands,” the Arctic and offshore. NL’s offshore was of particular interest. Prime 
Minister Trudeau’s Liberal government considered NL’s resources as “an important 
component in their national energy strategy” (House 1985, 56). High oil prices resulting 
from these crises had also made offshore oil development economically feasible. 
The federal government invested heavily in frontier oil development. In 1977, it 
created a “super depletion” allowance to all oil companies which saw most offshore 
exploration “underwritten” by the government (House 1985, 130; see also Plourde 
1989). Then Trudeau’s 1980 National Energy Program (NEP) and its subsequent 
regulations in the Canada Oil and Gas Act established further exploration incentives as 
well as a crown corporation oil company, Petro-Canada, “designed to stimulate 
activity” in Canada’s frontier oil areas (Voyer 1983, 8). 
The NEP’s exploration incentives replacing the super depletion allowance were 
Petroleum Incentive Payments (PIP), grant-based incentives as opposed to tax 
incentives. Funded by federal revenues from frontier lands development, on which the 
government had a 25% interests (Doern and Toner 1985, 118-19), the grants favoured 
Canadian firms and paid the majority of exploration costs: for every dollar a company 
invested in exploration, after-tax costs were reduced to 8 or 9 cents in frontier areas 
(with exploration on provincial lands reduced to 31 cents) (Doern and Toner 1985, 380; 
see also House 1985, 130; Voyer 1983, 21).77 The grants did result in marked increases in 
                                                
77 Doern and Toner critique the PIP grants as a “scatter-gun ‘come and explore and we’ll 
give you grants’ approach” to increasing Canadian oil supplies. They note the PIP also resulted 
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exploration but at a high cost to the federal government—$1.9 billion in the 1981-1983 
period alone (hence the PIP became economically unwieldy when oil prices fell in the 
1980s recession (House 1985, 97)). Note that this exploratory work led to the discovery 
of the Hibernia oil field in 1979 as well as Terra Nova. 
 A second major federal subsidy to oil development in the offshore from this 
period was through the NEP’s creation of the national oil company Petro-Canada which 
was intended, among other aims, to “act as a catalyst to encourage frontier oil 
development” (House 1985, 116). Petro-Canada was formed in 1975 with generous 
funding provided by the federal government which transferred its earnings from 
frontier oil development to the company (such as the Crown’s 25% interest in frontier 
land development and its 25% equity stake in Hibernia (Voyer 1983, 30), as well as 
federal shares in other projects (Pan-Arctic Oils Ltd. and Syncrude). Federal earnings 
from oil developments that had been passed on to Petro-Canada were reinvested by the 
company in frontier oil exploration. Voyer notes that Petro-Canada spent “a 
disproportionate amount of its budget on exploration (60 to 65 per cent, compared to an 
industry average of 20 per cent).” The company spent over half a billion dollars in 
exploration from 1976 to 1982, a sum that represented half of total funds spent on 
offshore exploration in that period. By 1983, Petro-Canada was involved in “practically 
every venture” of frontier oil exploration offshore (1983, 28-29)—it had quickly became 
a major player in Arctic and offshore exploration (Doern and Toner 1985, 99). The 
provincial government made a similar investment creating the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Petroleum Corporation in 1977 by the Newfoundland and Labrador 
Petroleum Regulations under The Petroleum and Natural Gas Act. The company was 
given exploration leases outright by the provincial government near Hibernia (House 
1985, 50-51). 
                                                                                                                                                       
in inefficiencies such as overinflated drilling costs and “frivolous or wasteful” drilling (1985, 60, 
117, 380-82, 417; Petroleum Production in Canada 2010, 91-92). 
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 The next major government subsidy to offshore oil development in NL was for 
the funding of the Hibernia project. The development of this project was negotiated at a 
time of 1980s low oil prices and so to ensure the field’s development, the federal 
government agreed to 25% of costs up to $1.04 billion and a loan guarantee of 40% of 
construction costs up to $1.66 billion. Concessions on provincial taxes were also given 
(Petroleum Production in Canada 2010, 89; Shrimpton 2003). Therefore this massive 
project, with total project costs of $5.2-$5.8 billion, became known as “one of the most 
costly regional development projects in Canadian history and one of the biggest 
gambles in Newfoundland history” (Summers 1994, 195). As noted above, this 
investment is now paying off substantially. 
 The next major subsidy by government to this industry was the $300 million 
dollar Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Development Fund (ODF), created in 1986 via 
section 202 of the Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act to “help 
prepare the province to take advantage of offshore petroleum development 
opportunities.” It funded forty projects (Department of Natural Resources), for example 
the Offshore Skills Training Fund, including initiatives likes the Equity Fund to 
encourage and permit women to find employment in the oil sector. Funding for the 
ODF was 75% federal and 25% provincial, a $225 and $75 million dollar investment 
respectively (House 1985, 308).  
 As for the provincial government, its direct support of the oil industry now 
occurs primarily through Nalcor Energy, a provincial energy company created and 
funded in 2007 via the province’s Energy Corporation Act. Nalcor (with gross revenues in 
2008 and 2009 of $0.57 billion held separate from general government revenues) is a 
partner in three offshore projects, Hebron (a 4.9% interest purchased for $110 million in 
2007), White Rose new fields and extensions (a 5% interest purchased for $30 million in 
2009) and Hibernia Southern Extension (a 10% interest purchased in 2010 for $30 
million), and it also holds an average of a 67% interest in onshore exploration permits in 
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north-western Newfoundland, where it is also an operator of onshore oil exploration 
projects (acquired for $0.6 million in 2009) (Nalcor Energy 2010, 2009; Baird 2010). 
Nalcor also operates the Bull Arm Fabrication Site, a major industrial facility developed 
in the 1990s to service the offshore oil industry (it was here that the Hibernia platform 
was built and the Terra Nova Floating Production Storage and Offloading vessel was 
completed). In addition, the provincial government allocated $2.75 million for upgrades 
at the Bull Arm site (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 2008). 
 Complementing these notable investments are ongoing subsidies provided by 
the provincial government to bolster the oil industry through the expansions of 
infrastructure and services. For example, the Government of NL’s 2008 budget included 
$1 million for new geological mapping and $2 million for Oil and Gas Manufacturing 
and Services Export Development Fund (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador 
2008). Similarly, the 2009 budget included $7.76 million for the implementation of the 
Energy Plan through initiatives such as the marketing of oil and the acquisition of 
geoscience data as well as $1.5 million in additional funding to the Oil and Gas 
Manufacturing and Services Export Development Fund (Government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador 2009). 
Contrary to analyses of Canadian energy policy which note a shift to a “pro-
market” model with limited government intervention since the mid-1980s, in NL’s 
offshore oil economy, the trend has been significant and continued federal and 
provincial government direct support for this industry (Doern and Gattinger 2003, 33; 
Doern 2005, 8-10) via low or no permitting costs, subsidized exploration costs, and 
funding infrastructure important to the industry. Both levels of government have also 
made investments in research and development (R&D) and education and training 
(E&T). 
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R&D and E&T Subsidies 
Since the 1970s, all major public educational institutions in the province (Memorial 
University of Newfoundland (MUN), the Marine Institute and the College of the North 
Atlantic (CNA)), have reoriented research and teaching programs around oil 
development with assistance from the relevant provincial and federal bureaucracies 
(House 1985, 291-92). The need for retooling education and research in the province 
around oil has been long noted by the provincial government, an early example being 
NL’s 1977 Act Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas. By the late 1970s, the provincial 
Minister of Education noted how policymakers and training institute administrators 
had “already visited Alberta and Europe to further investigate oil-related education 
programs” (Oil and Gas: Are We Ready? 1979, 32) and major investments were already 
being made, for example, in focusing MUN programs on cold ocean engineering (Voyer 
1983, 59), a research orientation initiated with $1 million in funding for the C-CORE 
building by the Minister of Mines and Energy and the Minister of Industrial (Oil and 
Gas: Are We Ready? 1979, 104). 
Since this early period, MUN has further honed its research and educational 
support of the oil and gas industry, a point made unequivocally by the former MUN 
President Axel Miesen. In a keynote address to participants of a 2007 policy conference 
on the benefits of oil and gas development in NL, Miesen noted that MUN is facilitating 
the transformation of the provincial into a global center of expertise for oil and gas 
development in harsh environments through research, teaching and infrastructure, with 
more than $88 million dollars raised for oil and gas related initiatives between 2003 and 
2010. He noted nineteen new faculty members hired to conduct geological, engineering 
and marine research on oil and gas (including a $2.5 million Husky Energy Chair in Oil 
and Gas Research) through new programs such as the executive Master’s of Oil & Gas 
Studies, programs in engineering, geology and marine studies and developing 
programs such as an Executive MBA Petroleum program (Carter 2007, 25). Hundreds of 
  145 
MUN graduates specialize in oil-related programs, 345 in total from 2005-2007 (Stantec 
2009, 15). Oil industry employs literally hundreds of MUN and CNA work-term 
students from these programs (Stantec 2009, 16) and is also a key employer of MUN 
graduates. New facilities to support faculty research and student learning include a 
harsh environment bridge simulator, the Landmark Graphics Visualization Lab and the 
Inco Innovation Centre (Carter 2007, 25). More recently, Shrimpton’s report noted new 
provincially funded infrastructure such as process engineering and geomechanics 
laboratories valued at $5.2 million over the 2005-2007 (Stantec 2009, 13-14). 
There are now close ties between the oil industry and MUN with oil and gas 
research often conducted through university-industry-government joint ventures, such 
as via the Oil and Gas Development Partnership and Atlantic Petroleum Systems 
Consortium (Carter 2007, 25). These ties are also confirmed in events like the June 2010 
Calgary Affinity Newfoundland and Labrador Dinner at the Calgary Petroleum Club. 
Here Premier Williams and MUN President pro tempore Loomis thanked the audience 
members, who he acknowledged as national and international leaders of the energy 
sector, for their financial support of MUN as well as for providing employment and 
mentorship opportunities to MUN students. Retiring president and CEO of Husky 
Energy, a former honorary degree recipient from MUN, was given a gift of thanks for 
his support of MUN (Furst 2010) the centerpiece of which is the Husky Energy Chair in 
Oil and Gas Research funded by a $2 million endowment, MUN’s the first endowed 
research chair. 
At MUN’s Marine Institute there is a similar emphasis on oil and gas through the 
institute’s Centre for Marine Simulation and the Southside Marine Base, a facility to 
enable training in the offshore petroleum industry, particularly safety—in 2001, $3.1 
million was provided for this facility from the ODF, $1 million from MUN, and $761,500 
from the CAPP (Memorial University of Newfoundland 2001). Similarly, at the CNA 
the provincial government funds new programs through the Oil and Gas Technology 
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Fund (Stantec 2009, 16). The CNA now includes a Petroleum Training Centre and 
Engineering Technology Centre emphasizing the oil sector and it receives provincial 
funding for related infrastructure, for example, $1 million annually since 2006 for 
facility upgrades for its Industrial Trades and Engineering Technology programs. 
 In addition, the federal government contributes research funding via National 
Research Council (such as its $2.8 million investment in facility upgrades to the Institute 
for Ocean Technology (Stantec 2009, 13-14)) and through research funding through 
programs such as the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, 
the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and its Atlantic Innovation Fund, the 
Canada Foundation for Innovation, and the Canada-Newfoundland Offshore 
Development Fund (Carter 2007, 26).  
 
Institutional Development Bias 
The above governmental support for the oil industry in terms of direct financial support 
for exploration, infrastructure, research and development, training and education, and 
low taxes is accompanied by a more subtle form of support: an institutional 
development bias in the form of a permissive regulatory authority body, the Board. The 
Board, the designated as the federal authority on environmental assessment, has the 
lead responsibility for environmental issues offshore and great discretion on 
environmental policy matters. Most significantly, the Board makes the final decision on 
whether projects will proceed after environmental assessment processes—it can 
determine that significant negative environmental impacts are “can be justified in the 
circumstances” (Erlandson Consulting Inc. and Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada 
2004, 15-17) (although the process for deciding on what is “justified” is not clear). Yet 
this powerful body is arguably compromised by its relationship with industry and its 
pro-development leaning.  
The Board is no longer considered a neutral regulatory actor; rather, it is 
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frequently charged with being in a conflict of interest or experiencing “regulatory 
capture”78 (as noted by a former senior provincial energy policy maker interviewed in 
2008) given its close relationship with the oil industry. Members of the ENGO 
community are under the impression that the Board is “in the pockets of the oil 
companies” (or, as described by one interview, a NHS scientist and researcher in 2008, 
the Board is “in bed” with the oil companies). Therefore regulations are made for the 
convenience of industry (Fusco 2007, 87-97). Likewise, representatives from the fishing 
industry and local communities are concerned that the Board has been “partly co-opted 
by the petroleum industry” (hence the limited public awareness and debates 
surrounding rights issuance) (Shrimpton et al. 2003, 20). Federal government 
representatives also raise this point. In a 2007 interview, a long time employee with key 
federal departments involved with oil spills (2) observed that the Board seems to 
represent industry rather than the public interest. A policy maker with Environment 
Canada, Newfoundland Provincial Office (2), agrees. Based on this person’s years of 
experience with the Board, there is extensive evidence that it is clearly promoting the 
industry. Perhaps a problem related to this is the evident lack of environmental 
expertise on the Board—Board members have industry and government experience 
exclusively (Bailey 2010). 
The Board seems reluctant to use powers available to it and this makes sense 
given the potential conflict of interest. Hence the Terra Nova assessment panel’s 
recommendation that the Board “take a more active role in the exercise of its full 
mandate” (Report of the Terra Nova Development Project Environmental Assessment 
Panel 1997). Two infrequently used powers are most obvious. First, the Board has the 
authority to hold an inquiry after an environmental incident (AA Implementation Act 
                                                
78 West Coast Environmental Law warns that the Boards (in NL and NS) are “vulnerable 
to becoming captive to the industry they regulate and, in focusing on regulation, may overlook 
the more fundamental questions, such as “should we even be doing this at all?” (Rutherford 
and Campbell 2004, 22). 
  148 
1990, section 161.(1)), yet this power is seldom used. Second, the CNLOPB has the 
power to prohibit the commencement or continuation of work offshore in the case of 
“an environmental or social problem of a serious nature” (AA Implementation Act 1990, 
section 55(1)(a)). This has happened only once and briefly, after the Terra Nova oil spill.  
Rather than bolster environmental regulations, the Board and the provincial 
government actively attempt to “streamline” the regulatory process—to cut regulatory 
redundancy and speed up approval times—to support the industry. One obvious 
example is the Atlantic Energy Roundtable (AER), formed in 2002 and includes 
government, industry and labor in NL, NS, NB and PEI, which aims to forward oil 
development by cutting costs and development times, thereby making investments in 
Canada’s east coast offshore more attractive. The AER has expressed concerns about the 
time lag prior to development due to required comprehensive studies and public 
reviews (32-4) and it now works to “improve regulatory efficiency” (Erlandson & 
Associates 2003, 2). As of 2005, the AER had developed Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) for Nova Scotia and NL between key provincial and federal departments, the 
Boards and the NEB “to ensure regulatory approval processes and environmental 
assessments for future offshore development projects are handled in a coordinated and 
concurrent manner” (Atlantic Energy Roundtable 2005, 2). AER is also recommending 
environment assessments of classes of activities, as now discussed in AB: “The 
proposition is to eliminate or limit the need for further assessment unless circumstances 
vary” (Erlandson & Associates 2003, 35).  
As a second example, the Board is experimenting with basin-wide assessments in 
the form of “Strategic Environmental Assessments” (SEAs).79 SEAs, praised within 
government as a way to provide cumulative research, can also be interpreted as a 
strategy to assist companies in avoiding individual project analyses (on the aim of 
                                                
79 Current proposed SEAs include the Labrador Shelf, Northeast Newfoundland Shelf 
and Orphan Basin, Laurentian Sub-basin, Western Newfoundland Offshore and Sydney Basin. 
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SEAs, see, for example (Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum 
Board 2008b, 3), and, ultimately, to accelerate the environmental assessment process. 
Indeed, SEAs were recommended by the AER as a way to speed up the approval 
process—and also to “shift the onus for regional studies to governments of the Boards” 
(Erlandson & Associates 2003, 34).  
 In addition to the main regulator’s compromised position, there is evidence of a 
pro-development bias at the federal level. Federal departments and agencies seem more 
inclined to support, or at least to not impede, oil development offshore and they are 
cautious about engaging with environmental issues in offshore NL. First, as noted 
above, the federal government has a significant revenue stake in that industry. Second, 
given the long and acrimonious debates and federal-NL tensions surrounding oil 
development offshore, the federal government is not inclined to be seen as obstructing 
NL’s chance to be a “have” province (interview with a Newfoundland and Labrador 
Environmental Association representative in 2008). 
EC has delegated its environmental assessment and regulatory authority to the 
Board. It could, in theory, take over if the Board was deemed to be doing an inadequate 
job, but it never has and it does not have the capacity (for example, EC has just one 
fulltime staff person in its NL Environmental Enforcement section), or the industry 
knowledge to do so (interviews with Environment Canada policy makers, 
Newfoundland Provincial Office, (1-2), in, 2007).80 Should EC disagree with the Board’s 
or companies’ actions, EC staff prefer to use “soft” methods of influence: 
“conversations” or subtle threats behind the scenes, hidden from The Telegram (NL’s 
major daily newspaper) (interview with an Environment Canada policy maker, 
Newfoundland Provincial Office, (2), in 2007). 
                                                
80 DFO is in a similar situation. According to NHS scientist and researcher interviewed in 
2008, DFO research staff have not been renewed so there are few people left who have even 
understand the environmental assessments to provide comment. 
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But EC leadership on environmental issues offshore probably would not change 
the tenor of the approach offshore on environmental issues. As one interviewee stated, 
there is “no room to be an environmentalist” at EC (interview with an Environment 
Canada policy maker, Newfoundland Provincial Office, (2), in 2007). Environmentalists 
within EC are considered to be “zealots” that this particular person works to 
“moderate”; environmentalists and scientific researchers in the local ENGO community 
are referred to as having “extreme” and “sensationalist” perspectives. 
One stark example of EC’s support of oil development as opposed to 
environmental protection is the department’s rapid defense of Petro-Canada after the 
TN spill: within one day after the spill, EC denied that 487 birds washed up on Avalon 
were related to the spill even though there had not been time to test samples (interview 
with university environmental science professor (2) in 2007. One long time employee of 
these departments interviewed (2) in 2007 suggested federal departments tried to hide 
or cover up data on the TN spill. Rather than hold companies accountable for 
environmental damage, EC thanked Petro-Canada for taking the time to appear at 
discussions on the spill.  
TC, for its part, while it is not involved with offshore oil and gas production, has 
a major role in regulating oil tankers, FPSOs in movement and ships servicing the 
platforms and it exhibits problems echoing those in EC. Its limited commitment to 
analyzing environmental risks posed by oil transport in the most at risk area in the 
province, the south coast, was evident in the recent south coast risk assessment. The 
document, delayed over seven years, was disjointed, overly technical and hundreds of 
pages long, and therefore, it was inaccessible to the general public. It was also deemed 
overly optimistic in terms of the risks (interview with Newfoundland and Labrador 
Environmental Association representative in 2008). According to a long time employee 
with key federal departments involved with oil spills (2), it was also full of 
“inaccuracies” and “assumptions” with regard to predictions of spill frequency. Worse, 
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federal employees with some role in writing the report note that the consultants were 
told by TC to “tone down” the worst-case scenarios, such as the risk associated with 
two full tankers colliding at sea. TC just released the risk assessment in April 2009 and it 
demonstrated that the risk of an oil spill in the Placentia Bay area, an expanding 
industrial zone seeing increasing tanker traffic to the oil transshipment terminal is zero. 
The public was, however, incredulous. 
 The financial, rhetorical and institutional means discussed above constitute the 
provincial government’s longstanding legitimation and encouragement of the offshore 
oil industry. This is the first major part of the structural explanation for anemic 
environmental policy in this case. The second part is the industry lobby that 
simultaneously forwards the industry. I explore this aspect in the next section.  
 
Oil Industry Lobby 
NL’s offshore oil resources are publicly owned, albeit via a complex federal-provincial 
shared arrangement. But NL’s basic approach to oil development is a purely privatized 
one. Although NL motioned toward public oil development in the 1970s and 1980s, in 
House’s words, the province “decided to rely upon multinational and national 
corporations to develop the oilfields off the province”; thus the “motor power” for oil 
development would come from large, often foreign corporations (1985, 102-03). 
 Four companies now dominate oil exploration and development in NL: 
ExxonMobil (the world’s largest publicly traded company with headquarters in Irving, 
Texas, with an American chairman/CEO and board); Suncor, formerly Petro-Canada 
(with headquarters in Calgary, with a predominantly Canadian board); Husky Energy 
(also out of Calgary, also with a mostly Canadian board); Chevron (headquarters in San 
Ramon, California, with a predominantly American board). Production licenses in the 
Grand Banks and the Orphan Basin are dominated by ExxonMobil which owns 58.16% 
of the licenses and Suncor with 34.9%. In terms of significant discovery licenses, Husky 
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Oil owns 38.85%, ExxonMobil 22.11% and Suncor 13.67%.  
These major companies alongside numerous smaller players have made 
substantial investments in NL’s offshore. Oil industry expenditures in exploration, 
development and operations from 1995 to 2008 amounted to $20.4 billion (Canadian 
Association of Petroleum Producers 2010c), and $24.7 billion since 1966. Yearly 
spending data indicates that over the 2005 to 2008, operators spent no less than $1.34 
billion (in 2005), increasing to $1.68 billion in 2008 (Canada-Newfoundland and 
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2009, 38, 2008a, 31, 2007a, 41, 2006, 29). As of 
January 2010, operators have also made work expenditure commitments of $872 million 
for future exploration.  
What of profits from these investments? Together, the three projects result in 
high earnings—a total of $11 billion dollars as of 2007 (Carter 2007). But ascertaining 
profits is more difficult because these data are considered proprietary information of 
the companies. That the provincial government does not have a precise sense of 
corporate profits from offshore oil development was made clear in 2006 when 
ExxonMobil asserted Hibernia was not meeting profit expectations. The provincial 
government disagreed and requested proof but Exxon refused to provide information 
to conduct a revenue audit of the project. Using publicly available data, the NL 
Government conducted a piecemeal audit and found that Exxon was doing very well in 
NL’s offshore: Hibernia was earning higher than projected operating revenues (over $10 
billion), alongside lower than expected capital and operating costs with gross revenues 
estimated at $19.9 billion per year (Executive Council 2006).  
 
“Community Engagement,” Political Lobbying and Legal Challenges 
These offshore oil investments, profits and salaries represent high stakes and companies 
work to protect their access to resources. The four big oil companies operating in NL’s 
offshore, Exxon, Suncor, Husky and Chevron, each build legitimacy through a range of 
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“community engagement” (public relations) activities. This seems to be the 
predominant strategy of choice although there is also evidence of political lobbying 
and, at key junctures, legal challenges. 
Husky Energy leads the companies in community engagement initiatives with, 
for example, its $2.5 million endowment to The Rooms, NL’s largest public museum, art 
gallery and archives which resulted in a major section of the facility was then renamed 
The Husky Energy Gallery. The gift was hailed by the provincial government as the 
“largest gift ever made to a cultural institution in Atlantic Canada” (The Rooms 
Corporation 2010). The company has also made a $2 million endowment to MUN in 
2003 for a Husky Energy Chair in Oil and Gas Research, plus other scholarships at 
MUN. Suncor engages with environmental educational institutions in NL, primarily 
through its longstanding support of the Fluvarium, a freshwater environment 
educational center in St. John’s. The facility was renamed the Suncor Energy Fluvarium 
after the company’s $500,000 donation in 2007. Suncor’s precursor, Petro-Canada (the 
two companies merged in 2009) had made a $1.2 million donation to MUN to build the 
Petro-Canada Hall, a rehearsal and performance hall opened in 2005. Suncor also 
supports various youth and non-governmental programs including, ironically, the 
Climate Change Action “The Job Begins at Home” project of the Conservation Corps 
which encourages people in the province to reduce their individual GHG emissions 
(American Petroleum Institute 2010). (Yet individual emissions are a minor slice of the 
total emissions in the province which are driven primarily by the oil and gas sector.) 
Chevron is similarly involved with educational program, for example through the 
Chevron Open Minds school program and through supporting environmental 
education such as the province’s Conservation Corps. Recently, Chevron created a new 
partnership with MUN through funding a new Process Engineering Design and 
Research Laboratory in partnership with MUN and the province’s Research and 
Development Corporation, a Crown corporation developed to increase R&D in NL.  
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These initiatives serve to demonstrate oil companies’ significant interest and 
investment in the local community, building legitimacy for their activities and greasing 
the wheels of interactions with government. It is this more subtle form of engagement 
with NL society that marks this case. As House noted at the commencement of this 
industry, “seduction” is the strategy of big companies operating in the province. The 
companies incorporate Newfoundlanders and Labradorians into the oil process by 
noting their involvement in and “concerns about environmental and social affairs,” 
while also hiring local people to represent them in local negotiations (for example in 
real estate and human resources discussions) and socializing with the local elite (1985, 
124-25). 
Of course, companies also engage in political lobbying typical of oil rich cases. 
House notes early lobbying efforts in response to the province’s Petroleum and Natural 
Gas Act in the early 1970s. Companies protested the nationalist policy by reducing 
exploration to the point that no wells were drilled in 1978 (drilling recommenced in 
1979 only after “a generous federal superdepletion allowance”). In these early days, the 
Canadian Petroleum Association’s Offshore Operators’ Division was also calling for 
reducing government “interference” in the offshore to generate more local wealth (1985, 
105, 34-35). 
When these lobbying measures combined with social capital built from public 
relations activities has not secured policies of choice for oil companies in NL’s offshore, 
some have resorted to hostile legal challenges. A key example of this was how operators 
fought CNLOPB research and development spending requirements in the Supreme 
Court of NL, Hibernia and Petro-Canada v C-NOPB, 2007NLTD14, and Exxon and 
Murphy Oil’s filing suit under NAFTA against Canada for the same (Canada-
Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board 2007b, 39). 
 There is a clear “mutuality of interests,” to use House’s formulation, between the 
oil industry and the provincial government: oil companies get access to highly 
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profitable resources that are managed through a stable political system close to major 
markets; the province sees employment and business opportunities expand alongside 
increased revenues and, therefore, public services (1985, 126). In addition to these 
economic contributions, companies further secure their legitimacy and credibility in the 
province by high-profile public relations activities and traditional lobbying methods—
and threatening or engaging in legal challenges when these strategies to no suffice to 
provide industry with the investment environment it seeks.  
 In contrast to state owned oil development, which is the global trend in oil 
development in 80% of the world, revenue to government from NL’s offshore must 
come indirectly from companies’ work via taxing corporations or collecting royalties. 
To ensure the flow of revenue to the government continues both levels of government 
actively support the industry. The mutuality of interests between government and 
industry for oil development and for “streamlined” environmental regulation translates 
into an environmental policy regime biased toward offshore oil development: the 
regulatory system has been developed or retooled to support offshore oil development 
and maintain weak environmental regulation, hence the problematic environmental 
regulation trends elaborated above and the multiple environmental impacts observed 
offshore. Based on the assessment of the regulatory systems in this chapter, it seems the 
regulatory bodies and policies have evolved, or were created, to support this industry 
rather than protect the environment.  
 
 
IV. Resistance & Demands for Effective Environmental Regulation  
Concern for the environmental impacts of oil developments in NL’s offshore have long 
been peripheral in the debate on this industry. At the start of the industry in the 1970s, 
the noted environmental concerns were limited to risks posed by icebergs, tanker 
collisions with the shore and blowouts.  
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Impediments to the fishing industry—that oil developments might impede 
dragging on the Grand Banks (coincidentally a practice representing its own 
environmental crisis)—were also initially taken seriously. But once fisheries groups 
were successful in lobbying for the smallest possible no-fishing buffer zone around the 
facilities, “the environmental issue went away.” And now, still not recovered from the 
near-total demise of the industry in the early 1990s due to over fishing, fisheries groups 
are not in a position to fight a global oil industry. The more “subtle” point of routine 
discharges, cumulative effects, emissions and so forth have seldom been considered 
(interview with former senior provincial energy policy maker in 2008).  
The earliest legislation on NL oil development, the 1977 Act Respecting Petroleum 
and Natural Gas that made no mention of the environment, reflected this state of the 
debate. And today, this trend continues with the emphasis in public debate on local 
benefits but with limited attention to the significant and wide-ranging environmental 
costs. In government, academic and media circles, discussion is narrowly focused on 
the socio-economic impacts of oil development (such as capturing employment, 
royalties, spin-offs and so forth)—environmental (and safety) issues have been “tertiary 
at best” in the debates (interview with former senior provincial energy policy maker in 
2008). 
We would expect to find evidence of opposition to or questioning of oil 
developments in NL to come from the common sources of environmental policy or 
environmental science expertise: environmental non-government organizations 
(ENGOs) and other NGOs, university researchers, and scientists and analysts within 
government departments. But there are significant gaps or constraints that impede the 
development of coherent criticism at every site. Where we typically find the strongest 
resistance to oil development in other cases, we find multiple weaknesses in the NL 
case. Of course, the geographic location of NL’s oil development makes the work of 
opposition more challenging because the extraction sites are hundreds of kilometers 
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offshore and environmental impacts are seldom directly observed by local people. This 
is a very different case from AB’s tar sands, for example, where citizens can drive on 
public roads through tailings ponds and witness the environmental impacts first-hand. 
 ENGOs such as the NHS and Alder Institute have been consistently involved in 
the consultation processes, attending public meetings and submitting interventions, 
since the first project in the 1980s. However ENGOs in NL suffer from, first, a lack of 
funding and staff even worse than in other provinces (Fusco 2007, 101-03). This point 
was also stressed in an interview with Sierra Club researcher (3) in 2008. This situation 
translates into low capacity to intervene in complex debates on oil.  
Second, and more important, is the caution with which ENGOs proceed in 
dealing with an industry that is hailed as the economic, social and cultural savior of the 
province. The classic jobs-versus-environment framing has not been debunked in this 
province and this stifles ENGOs’ ability to challenge developments on environmental 
grounds (Fusco 2007, 79). In fact, the environmental community it itself acutely aware 
of the widespread economic benefits of the oil industry (although, as noted by other 
groups discussed below, there is concern about the future of the province, post-oil 
(Fusco 2007, 82, 84). ENGOs are very careful to avoid the “anti-development” label—
they are well aware of the vitriolic response received by seal hunt protestors. This 
political memory constrains what ENGOs can do and say in a real way (this point was 
noted in several interviews, for example with a graduate student researching oil and 
environmental issues in January 2007 and with a Sierra Club researcher (2) in February 
2008). Third, when groups do engage in consultation processes, they note that their 
participation seems to be merely window dressing on a pre-determined pro-oil 
development process. Fusco describes this as a “shared perception of powerlessness” 
(114). Due to this, some withdraw from the process (interview with Natural History 
Society scientist and researcher in 2008). Hence the ENGO activity around oil in NL is 
paltry compared to the other cases, even those with similar population bases such as 
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Alaska and Wyoming. Only the NHS and, more recently, the Sierra Club work on this 
portfolio. 
 Researchers at MUN have also been involved in these processes as well as 
researchers from other institutions and I have referred to their work throughout this 
chapter. However critical research and commentary to challenge the pro-oil status quo is 
not easy forthcoming from the local university. There is a degree of either constraint on 
independent researchers within government and academic institutions, or an element of 
self-censorship at work. Multiple interviewees noted that researchers within MUN are 
reluctant or afraid to comment on environmental impacts of the oil industry in the 
province because of funding ties to the oil industry or reprimands that other scientists 
have received from the university administration.  
One interviewee, a university environmental science professor (2) in 2007, 
explained that s/he was threatened by her/his academic unit for making information 
about environmental issues offshore publicly accessible. S/he felt pressure to shift the 
focus of research to another jurisdiction. Another interviewee, Sierra Club researcher (2) 
interviewed in 2008, knowledge about politics at MUN, referred to “oil’s long reach” 
into the university given the close and growing funding links between the oil industry 
and the institution. 
An additional problem is the lack of funding available for research to track 
environmental risks in a long-term, scientifically defendable way (Burke et al. 2005, 608; 
Montevecchi and Burke 2005, 29). Several also noted the “consultation fatigue” felt after 
participating in governmental processes but never having an impact on them, and that 
they had stopped commenting on the local oil and environment issue (interviews with 
Natural History Society scientist and researcher in 2008 and with a university 
environmental sciences professor (2) in 2007). 
 Scientists or analysts within the provincial and federal government could also be 
a source of critical questions on oil development in the province. Unfortunately, there is 
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an obvious lack of public policy training in the province (hence the development of the 
new Master of Arts in Environmental Policy program to launch in fall 2011 at Grenfell 
Campus, MUN). In addition, the policy sections of provincial government departments 
were gutted in the mid-1990s budget cuts and are only now beginning to recover. Policy 
capacity is, therefore, more so found at the federal level.  
 However, interviewees from the federal government (DFO, TC, CCG and EC) 
noted similar constraints as on MUN researchers: researchers and analysts in these 
departments are not free to voice concerns about environmental impacts from oil 
developments, and certainly not to the public (interviews with Natural History Society 
scientist and researcher in 2008 and long time employee with key federal departments 
(2) in 2007). Rather than promote strong environmental action, interviewees suggest 
that, for example, EC attempts to hide or cover up information inconvenient to oil 
companies (such as after the TN spill). One method in this is to control employees’ 
comments in the media or to encourage “naysayers” to “move on”—a long time 
employee with key federal departments (2) interviewed in 2007 describes federal offices 
as having been “gutted” of critical voices. A university professor in environmental 
science (2) interviewed in 2007 also refers to government science at EC and its CWS as 
being “cooked up,” non-refereed “pseudo-science” to support government 
development policy. Employee censorship is noted at TC as well. An example is the 
reprimand received by an employee, interviewed for this study, after he was quoted as 
questioning the efficacy of the environmental assessment process in the offshore in a 
prominent national newspaper. For these comments his manager demanded he to sign 
an apology to the operator for publication in the paper (which he refused to do). 
 There are, however, two growing opportunities for a more open debate on 
environmental impacts. Breaking out of the false jobs-versus-environment debate, local 
labor organizations such as the NL Federation of Labour (NLFL) have expressed 
concern about the environmental impacts of oil developments and claimed in an early 
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text to have a new approach to development: not “jobs at any price” but “sustainable 
prosperity” and better enforcement of government regulations to make sure it happens.  
 
Newfoundlanders and Labradorians suffer from high unemployment and social 
problems created by the employment situation make us a prime candidate for 
environmental distress. People need jobs, and to some, this means at whatever cost. 
We have become vulnerable to enterprises and investment. […] Job blackmail at the 
expense of our environment will no longer be tolerated by workers (Newfoundland 
and Labrador Federation of Labour 1990).  
 
More recently, the NLFL has developed a “green jobs” discussion document that is 
beginning to put these early statements in to practice.  
One very specific opportunity that can be seized by the labor community to raise 
key questions about the oil industry has recently presented itself. In response to the 
2009 crash of a helicopter servicing the offshore that killed seventeen workers, the 
provincial government commissioned a study of offshore safely regulation. The 
resultant report called for the establishment of a separate safety authority given the 
deep-rooted problems of the Board. Discussions are now ongoing to restructure the 
Board in this way. A similar suggestion was made in relation to environmental 
regulation, for the creation of an independent, expert, transparent environmental 
authority (Carter and Fraser 2011). This is particularly relevant in light of the 2010 BP 
Deepwater Horizon disaster in the GOM. 
Another opening for demands for change in the regulation of offshore oil in NL 
is the growing recognition of the industrialization in Placentia Bay. Formerly a rich 
fishing area, the region is now becoming a center for multiple major oil support projects 
such as the transshipment terminal and an oil refinery as well as proposed 
infrastructure such as a liquefied natural gas facility and a second refinery. Community 
opposition to this re-designation of the bay is becoming more pronounced, especially 
due to the oil spill risks. 
 Note, however, there is also growing criticism of the oil industry in NL on 
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economic grounds. The current economic prosperity thanks to oil is worrisome to those 
within government who take a longer view. Even before revenues from oil started 
accruing to the province in a remarkable way, there were warnings about one-
commodity dependence. For example, in the 2003 Royal Commission report on NL’s 
place in Canada, Norris reviewed the province’s fiscal situation and warned the 
“revenue bump” due to oil revenues would have a “relatively short-lived” peak and the 
decline would be “steep” as early as 2011 if there were no new developments; he also 
warned about the province's “major sensitivity to oil prices” (2003, 282, 85). The 
province’s auditor general has been even more adamant: he describes the province’s 
“dependence” on offshore oil as dependence on “revenues that are volatile” and finite, 
hence the province’s inaccurate revenue predictions—since 2008, there have been 
“significant variations […] between budgeted and actual offshore royalty revenues” 
due to oil price volatility (Noseworthy 2009, 82, 85).  
House’s early analysis takes on new weight in light of these comments. 
“Paradoxically,” he wrote in 1985, “the more successful its petroleum sector becomes, 
the more difficult it will be to provide for a balanced economy and society in the long 
run when the oil runs out” (137). This problem is beginning to be acknowledged within 
the provincial government at the highest levels. 
Other commentators have argued that while the benefits from oil are extensive, 
they are not fairly shared and the province could be getting a great deal more from its 
oil, rather than developing yet another economy where the lion’s share of the benefits 
are exported, along with the raw resource—Stanford describes NL as “Canada’s 3rd 
World ‘Helicopter’ Economy” due to its focus on resources exports which sees “much of 
the proceeds of growth flow immediately out of the province” (2003). House agrees: 
while NL has secured more local jobs and business through negotiations on oil 
development, “ownership and control, profit-taking and most forward and backward 
linkages still accrue outside the province.” The province remains, in many ways, a place 
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where “economic surplus is appropriated from the region” (House 2005, 475).81 The 
destination of the appropriated resource is clear: every barrel NL exports 
internationally goes to the U.S.—and as much as 70% of NL’s oil is directly exported 
(more on this in chapter 4). At the same time, to fuel its refinery and meet domestic fuel 
needs, NL imports oil from Iraq, Russia and Venezuela.82 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
NL has been desperately attempting to develop a modern economy for decades and this 
longstanding circumstance, as a former director of the CCG’s Prevention of Oiled 
Wildlife Project, observes, has “probably has driven us to make radical and uninformed 
decisions” (Harvey is quoted in DePalma 1999). Thirteen years since first oil from 
Hibernia, and with the province now approximately half way through total oil reserves, 
we have a clearer understanding of the environmental impacts of the headlong rush 
into an oil-based economy. A globally significant marine ecosystem is now at risk due 
to seismic testing, flaring, the oil infrastructure itself, spills, routine discharges and 
carbon emissions. But the regulatory system managing these impacts is not able to 
prevent them due to multiple serious inadequacies. This chapter has discussed many 
these ranging from problems with the broader environmental assessment processes to 
monitoring and enforcement processes.  
How did we get here? I have attempted to provide an answer to this question by 
considering NL’s “petro-politics.” This system is marked by great government 
                                                
81 Analysis by the provincial government indicates a minimal amount of wealth being 
captured by the province. For example, on the Hibernia project (which had a total net revenue 
of $14.8 billion up to 2006), it is suggested NL received only $1.2 billion while oil companies 
received $8.8 billion and the federal government got $4.8 billion (Department of Natural 
Resources 2007, 20). 
82 Data on NL’s oil imports, based on Industry Canada’s Trade Data Online, were 
provided to me by the Economics and Statistics Branch (Newfoundland and Labrador Statistics 
Agency), Department of Finance, in December 2010 via e-mail. 
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dependence on oil revenue and, therefore, significant government support for the 
industry in the form of financial subsidies, the honing of provincial R&D and E&T 
around oil, and an institutional structure supportive of this industry. At the same time, 
oil companies have invested greatly in—and drawn great profits from—offshore 
resources and so they work with the public and government to ensure they have 
continued access. This chapter discussed the public relations, lobbying efforts and legal 
strategies used by companies to maintain access without undue environmental 
regulatory constraints. The general trend in this case seems to be that regulators have 
become attuned to the great local fiscal dependence on oil and made acutely aware of 
industry interests. The regulatory system is, therefore, framed around what is possible 
or convenient for industry, hence the continuation of or continued risk to significant 
environmental impacts in NL’s offshore. 
 Cadigan’s warning, which closes his new history of NL, is relevant here:  
 
The offshore oil industry may be the economic saviour of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, but that depends on whether the province may use the wealth generated 
by the industry to invest in people and communities in ways that sustain both them 
and the ecologies in which their fortunes are inextricably bound (2009, 297, emphasis 
added).  
 
Based on my analysis of the environmental regulatory regime surrounding offshore oil 
development in NL, I argue the province is not yet protecting this ecological base 
through effective environmental regulation. The policy system managing the 
environmental impacts of NL’s oil industry needs to be significantly rethought and 
redeveloped. I provide suggestions to do this in the final chapter. But first, in the next 
chapter I compare this case to the circumstances in AB and then situate the cases 
together in the broad context of the global oil economy in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4: CASE SYNTHESIS IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT 
 
Individual case studies are of value as stand-alone pieces, particularly to people 
grappling with the impact of oil dependence in those regions. However, my aim in this 
work has been to draw out trends across cases to offer a broader comparative analysis. 
This chapter is focused on that task.  
Section I elaborates on the broad national situation of economic reliance on 
natural resources, particularly oil. From here, I focus on AB and NL to explore the 
comparative applicability of resource curse theory to these cases. I first provide details 
on the cases’ comparative levels of oil dependence. Do these cases meet standard 
resource curse thresholds? Based on data measuring the impact of oil on total 
government revenue, GDP and exports, the answer is unequivocally positive (although 
the situation is more recent for NL given its late oil production start). 
Next I assess whether these obviously highly oil dependent cases actually exhibit 
the expected political and economic negative repercussions of this oil dependence as 
elaborated in the resource curse literature. I discuss how the evidence is mixed—there 
are not (yet) unequivocal economic and political resource curse impacts at work in these 
cases. Yet there are indications of many relevant trends at work. 
What is very clear, however, are the shared unfortunate impacts on 
environmental policy due to the high dependence on the oil sector, the focus of this 
study. In section II I look across the cases to note the comparative environmental 
impacts of frontier oil extraction and the similar problematic environmental regulatory 
trends at work.  
Finally, in section III, following the multi-scalar, cases-in-global-context approach 
and reconstructive commitments of political ecology, the chapter situates the cases 
within a Canadian and global petro-political context. In so doing, Canada and 
particularly these cases are understood as obsequious oil providers to a powerful 
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southern neighbor. 
Resource curse and political ecology theory provide guideposts for analyzing 
trends in environmental political economy in these cases and their environmental policy 
reverberations. This amounts to Robbins’ “hatchet” of political ecology, or the criticism 
of what is—the first half of “doing” political ecology. Then the next and final chapter 
attempts to provide the second half, the “seed” of political ecology—imagining what 
could be and how to get there. 
To begin the cross-case synthesis of this chapter, I demonstrate the applicability 
of extending the resource curse theory into the “first world” and subnational cases of 
AB and NL by assessing their comparative resource “cursedness.” But I start at the 
national level where we see high dependence on natural resource extraction and 
export—and the subsequent worrisome resource curse impacts, notably the decline of 
manufacturing. This national circumstance is driven in great part by the petro-
provinces.  
 
 
I. Resource Curse Compared 
Canada is undoubtedly highly dependent on natural resources, and oil in particular. 
Data from NRCan show a stark trend (depicted in figure 15 below): in recent years, 
natural resource exports account for approximately 50% of total exports, with energy 
exports accounting for nearly half of those. 
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Figure 15: Canadian Exports: Total Natural Resources and Energy Sector  
(in billions of current Canadian dollars) 
 
Source: Data are from Natural Resources Canada, “Important Facts on Canada’s Natural 
Resources,” available at www.nrcan-rncan.gc.ca/stat/stat-eng.php. 
 
Energy is now Canada’s most valuable export. In 2008, oil and natural gas sales were 
valued at $95 billion and represented about 21% of total merchandise exports, “the 
highest value recorded in the previous two decades” (Plourde 2010a, 9). Similarly, 
business investment is dominated by natural resource industries, in particular the 
energy sector, which is, in turn, primarily “driven by the oilsands.” Furthermore, the 
value of traded energy and metal shares account for approximately 50% of the total 
shares traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (Cross 2008, 3.1-3.5). 
Canada has become an energy state, more specifically an oil state. This is so 
much so that over the 2003-2007 period, oil prices and the Canadian dollar (as well as 
the exchange rate with the U.S. dollar) were closely correlated (Cross 2008, 3.4-3.5)—
hence the “petro-loonie” neologism. 
However Canada’s natural resource extraction and export proclivity is not a 
shared trait across the country. Provinces and territories have very diverse resources 
and economies. And given Canada’s uniquely highly decentralized federal structure, 
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the subnational levels of government, particularly the provinces, have extensive 
authority over the development of these resources. While amalgamated under the 
Canadian nation state, these provinces can be understood as distinct political and 
economic entities. Drilling down from the broad national trends to the provincial level, 
it is obvious that national trends are in fact being driven by provinces with extensive 
natural resources, particularly the petro-provinces, and primarily AB. Figures 2 and 3 in 
Chapter 1 demonstrate this reality well, as they indicate how oil production is 
concentrated on three provinces, AB, NL, and SK. 
To what extent do AB and NL fit the characterization of standard “resource 
cursed” cases (where oil represents one-third of total revenue, GDP and exports)? And 
do the predicted negative economic and political outcomes follow? 
In AB, non-renewable energy resource revenues—predominantly oil and gas—
have accounted for a major portion of total provincial revenue, as much as $14.8 billion 
in revenue out of a total of $35.5 billion in total revenue in 2005 (see figure 16 below83). 
  
                                                
83 Note that lacking comprehensive disaggregated data for each individual fuel—the 
data available do not allow me to assess the impact of tar sands fuel on its own—in figure 16 
and 17 I follow standards used by Alberta Energy and calculate “non-renewable revenues” 
which include revenues from natural gas and byproducts, conventional crude oil, synthetic 
crude oil and bitumen, coal, bonuses from sale of Crown leases, rentals and fees, and minus 
Alberta Royalty Tax Credit (ARTC) and "Special Royalty Features." 
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Figure 16: AB Government Total Revenue and Non-Renewable Energy Resource 
Revenues (in millions of Canadian dollars; in current dollars) 
 
Source: Data on total provincial revenue are from the Department of Finance Canada, Fiscal 
Reference Tables October 2010, Table 25 AB. Non-renewable energy resource revenues are from 
Energy Alberta Annual Reports 1998-1999, 2001-2002, 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 available from 
www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Org/Publications (accessed March 9, 2011).  
 
Between 1994 and 2009, oil revenues have, on average, contributed 29% of total 
provincial revenue since 1994, rising to over 40% in 2000 and 2005 (figure 17). 
 
 
Figure 17: AB Government Revenues from Non-Renewable Energy Resources 
(% of total) 
 
Source: Data on total provincial revenue are from the Department of Finance Canada, Fiscal 
Reference Tables October 2010, Table 25 AB. Non-renewable energy resource revenues are from 
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Energy Alberta Annual Reports 1998-1999, 2001-2002, 2006-2007 and 2009-2010 available from 
www.energy.gov.ab.ca/Org/Publications (accessed March 9, 2011).  
 
 
In NL, the impact of the oil sector on government revenue has been delayed 
compared to AB, given the much later start of oil production in this province. But oil 
revenues have quickly ramped up over the last five years as projects have matured and 
hit “pay out,” shifting the applicable royalty regime to provide for a much greater share 
to the provincial government (figure 18).  
 
 
Figure 18: NL Government Total Revenue and Oil Revenue  
(in millions of Canadian dollars, in current dollars) 
 Source: Total provincial revenue data are from the Department of Finance Canada, Fiscal 
Reference Tables October 2010, Table 17 NL. NL oil revenue data for 1997-2005 are from “Public 
Accounts of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997 to 2005 Volume III” and, for 2006-07 to 2009-10 
data, the “Report on the Program Expenditures and Revenues of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund.” These revenues are primarily from royalties with a small contribution from corporate 
income taxes (CIT) and, smaller again, from the Offshore Revenue Fund. (The latter fund 
includes forfeitures, registration and issuance fees, penalties and other amounts payable 
(excluding royalties) from offshore exploration.) But note that the CIT noted here refers only to 
taxes on offshore extraction. It does not include taxes on onshore business associated with the 
offshore, such as office costs; it does not include taxes on indirect or induced business. Therefore, 
these numbers reflect only the direct offshore revenues from oil development. Royalties data 
used are those on a cash, rather than accrual, basis. 
 
The trend is made evident by considering the high percentage of total provincial 
revenue now coming from oil—this sector now accounts for over 30% of total provincial 
revenue (figure 19) and this is expected only to increase. 
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Figure 19: NL Government Revenues from Oil (% of total) 
 Source: Total provincial revenue data are from the Department of Finance Canada, Fiscal 
Reference Tables October 2010, Table 17 NL. NL oil revenue data for 1997-2005 are from “Public 
Accounts of Newfoundland and Labrador 1997 to 2005 Volume III” and, for 2006-07 to 2009-10 
data, the “Report on the Program Expenditures and Revenues of the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund.” These revenues are primarily from royalties with a small contribution from corporate 
income taxes (CIT) and, smaller again, from the Offshore Revenue Fund. (The latter fund 
includes forfeitures, registration and issuance fees, penalties and other amounts payable 
(excluding royalties) from offshore exploration.) But note that the CIT noted here refers only to 
taxes on offshore extraction. It does not include taxes on onshore business associated with the 
offshore, such as office costs; it does not include taxes on indirect or induced business. Therefore, 
these numbers reflect only the direct offshore revenues from oil development. Data are in current 
Canadian dollars. Royalties data used are those on a cash, rather than accrual, basis. 
 
In addition to a high proportion of total revenues coming from non-renewable 
energy (in great part from oil), AB also sees its GDP correlated with the impact of the oil 
and gas sector, as shown in figure 20.   
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Figure 20: Oil and Gas Sector's Contribution to Total GDP in AB (in millions of 
Canadian dollars, in current dollars) 
 
 
Source: Data on total GDP for 2000-2009 are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 384-0002 
“Gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure-based, provincial economic accounts.” Data for 
1997-1999 are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 381-0015 "Gross Domestic Product by 
Industry - Provincial and Territorial." On the total impact of the oil and gas sector, data are from 
Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 379-0025 "Gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and province." Data selected to 
calculate the total impact include those on oil and gas extraction, support activities for mining 
and oil and gas extraction, oil and gas engineering construction, petroleum and coal products 
manufacturing, basic chemical manufacturing, and pipeline transportation. The selection of data 
to include in this calculation was based on advice from Bruce Cooke, Industry Accounts Division, 
Statistics Canada. 
 
In terms of dollar value, the data show that in 2007 (the last year of available data on 
this province), the oil sector accounted for $87.5 billion of the total $255.8 billion 
provincial GDP. Data presented in figure 15 below show the oil and gas sector as 
accounting for as much as 37.5% of the total GDP, averaging 33% since the post-2000 
boom. Over the longer 1997 to 2007 period of available data, rates were still high at an 
average of 30%. 
  
  172 
Figure 21: Percentage of Total GDP from Oil and Gas Sector in AB 
 Source: Data on total GDP for 2000-2009 are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 384-0002 
“Gross domestic product (GDP), expenditure-based, provincial economic accounts.” Data for 
1997-1999 are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 381-0015 "Gross Domestic Product by 
Industry - Provincial and Territorial." On the total impact of the oil and gas sector, data are from 
Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 379-0025 "Gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and province." Data selected to 
calculate the total impact include those on oil and gas extraction, support activities for mining 
and oil and gas extraction, oil and gas engineering construction, petroleum and coal products 
manufacturing, basic chemical manufacturing, and pipeline transportation. The selection of data 
to include in this calculation was based on advice from Bruce Cooke, Industry Accounts Division, 
Statistics Canada. 
 
However, even these numbers may under-rate the full GDP impact of oil on the 
provincial economies as they have difficulty capturing the complete “multiplier effects” 
of the sectors’ spin-offs, such as workers’ spending. These data are therefore potential 
underestimations of oil impacts on the economy.  
In recent years, NL finds itself in a remarkably similar situation to AB with 
regard to GDP. The Government of NL now acknowledges that “over half” of NL’s 
rapid GDP growth is “attributed directly” to the oil sector (Department of Finance 2010, 
9), as demonstrated in figure 22.  
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Figure 22: Oil Sector's Contribution to Total GDP in NL  
(in millions of Canadian dollars, in current dollars) 
 Source: Data on NL’s total GDP shown for 1997-2007 are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 
381-0015 "Gross Domestic Product by Industry - Provincial and Territorial (Annual)." Data for 
2008 is an estimate provided by the Government of NL (Department of Finance 2009). Data for 
2009 and 2010 are estimates from The Government of NL (Department of Finance 2010, 6). To 
ascertain oil’s contribution to total GDP, I could not use data from Statistics Canada as oil and gas 
extraction data are confidential given the low numbers of operators. Therefore, I am using the 
calculations of oil’s GDP impact from Mark Shrimpton’s most recent report (Stantec 2009). 
 
The GDP boom in NL is definitely an oil boom. Just prior to the recession, in 2008 
the oil sector contributed $11.7 billion of NL’s $29.6 billion dollar economy. Graphing 
the impact of oil on total GDP in terms of a percentage clearly emphasizes how oil 
dominates GDP growth in this province. Figure 23 demonstrates that the oil sector 
accounted for 39.6% of total GDP just prior to the recession, averaging 29.4% over 1999-
2009, or 33.7% from 2002-2009. 
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Figure 23: Percentage of Total GDP from Oil and Gas Sector in NL 
 
Source: Data on NL’s total GDP for 1997-2007 are from Statistics Canada, CANSIM Table 381-
0015 "Gross Domestic Product by Industry - Provincial and Territorial (Annual)." Data for 2008 is 
an estimate provided by the Government of NL (Department of Finance 2009). Data for 2009 and 
2010 are estimates from The Government of NL (Department of Finance 2010, 6). To ascertain 
oil’s contribution to total GDP, I could not use data from Statistics Canada as oil and gas 
extraction data are confidential given the low numbers of operators. Therefore, I am using the 
calculations of oil’s GDP impact from Mark Shrimpton’s most recent report (Stantec 2009). 
 
Even more striking than the oil sector’s impact on provincial revenue and GDP 
for both cases is how the oil sector accounts for the lion’s share of total exports. Data on 
AB is depicted in figure 24 which shows that at peak revenue in 2008, total exports in 
AB were valued at $109 billion and the oil and gas sector (including tar sands bitumen, 
of course), accounted for $80.1 billion. 
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Figure 24: Oil and Gas Exports & Total Exports in AB (in millions of Canadian 
dollars, in current dollars) 
 Source: Data on total and oil and gas sector exports for 1998-2007 are from Statistics Canada 
National Economic Accounts, CANSIM Table 386-0002, "Interprovincial and international trade 
flows at producer prices, annual," referring to international exports and including lines 9, 28 and 
29 as oil sector exports. 2009 and 2008 data are from the Government of AB (International and 
Intergovernmental Relations 2009). 2008 data on total exports (a missing piece not included in the 
2009 report above) are from another Government of AB publication (International and 
Intergovernmental Relations 2008). 
 
On average across the 1998-2009 period of available data, percentages of total export 
value coming from this sector are very high at 62% on average. Since 2005, this has 
intensified to an average of 70% (figure 25). 
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Figure 25: Percentage of Total exports from Oil and Gas Sector in AB 
 Source: Data on total and oil sector exports for 1998-2007 are from Statistics Canada National 
Economic Accounts, CANSIM Table 386-0002, "Interprovincial and international trade flows at 
producer prices, annual," referring to international exports and including lines 9, 28 and 29 as oil 
sector exports. 2009 and 2008 data are from the Government of AB (International and 
Intergovernmental Relations 2009). 2008 data on total exports (a missing piece not included in the 
2009 report above) are from another Government of AB publication (International and 
Intergovernmental Relations 2008). 
 
NL’s export dependence on oil is equally pronounced. As shown in figure 26, 
NL’s export revenues follow oil export revenue.  
 
Figure 26: Oil Exports & Total Exports in NL (in millions of Canadian dollars, in 
current dollars) 
 
Source: Industry Canada Trade Data Online, Canadian Industry Trade By Industry (NAICS 
codes), available via strategis.ic.gc.ca. 
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At the peak in 2008, the province had $15.1 billion in exports, with $11.1 billion from oil 
alone. Oil sector exports in NL averaged 57% of total exports over the 1998-2010 with a 
marked intensification to an average of 70% since 2004 (figure 27). 
 
 
Figure 27: Percentage of Total Exports from Oil Sector in NL 
 Source: Industry Canada Trade Data Online, Canadian Industry Trade By Industry 
(NAICS codes), available via strategis.ic.gc.ca. 
 
NL and AB meet the threshold of high resource dependence as established by the 
literature across every major indicator (oil’s impact on government revenue, GDP and 
exports). As shown above, AB’s oil exports have met the threshold throughout the 
decade of this study and the same is true of oil’s impact on revenue and GDP impact 
since 2000. NL, with its oil coming on much later, meets the “oil dependent” threshold 
for revenue only since 2008, but passed the one-third mark for exports in 1999 and for 
GDP in 2003. Both provinces are significantly focused on oil as the primary economic 
driver, almost to the exclusion of other sectors. Economic diversification is not an 
obvious trait of these cases. 
Now the more complicated question is if these cases experience the economic 
and political impacts associated with this high dependence. While these impacts are not 
the focus of this project, below I briefly outline the major economic and political 
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consequences of the boom. Then I discuss in more detail what is the focus of this study, 
the environmental regulatory impacts of the oil dependence established above. 
 
Economic Impacts 
At first glance, both cases contradict the resource curse theory in terms of economic 
impacts. For rather than experiencing slowed economic growth, both provinces are 
leading the country in GDP growth. This has long been true for AB but in NL the 
growth is even more striking: in recent years, oil has permitted a complete economic 
about-turn, converting it from a “have not” province dependent on equalization 
payments from the federal government, to a “have” province that now fights to protect 
its oil revenue from federal “clawbacks” in the federal formula. This is a major 
transformation for a province that has found itself in last place on most economic 
indicators since confederation with Canada over the last sixty years. 
The resource curse theory has us expecting slowed economic growth in cases with 
severe dependence on oil. But in AB and NL, we see only strong GDP growth. That 
said, we could argue here at least in the NL case that not enough time has passed to 
assess the long-term economic impacts. 
However, beyond GDP, there is perhaps a less-acknowledged economic element 
of the resource curse that is at work in these provinces: the tendency for oil-rich regions 
to become more unequal due the concentration of wealth in these economies. Ross’ 
work provides insight into the relationship between high dependence on natural 
resources and inequality. The causal relationship he observes is that intense dependence 
on mineral resource, on oil in particular, can heighten “vertical” and “horizontal” in 
equality (between, respectively, the classes of the rich and poor, and across geography) 
as oil dependence tends to favor particular kinds of workers and particular regions over 
others (Ross 2001b, 2007). Ross has also extended this idea to note the differential 
impact of oil-based economies on men and women, with men having more access to 
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high-income oil jobs versus women who experience income losses as their employment 
opportunities decline in sectors struggling to compete with the oil sector, such as 
manufacturing (Ross 2006). 
The Parkland Institute has been the leading institution tracking these oil-induced 
inequalities in AB. Research from the Institute shows that the oil boom has not been felt 
equally; rather, oil benefits have “trickled up” to the top ten percent income earners in 
AB and to (mostly foreign) companies. Where wage increases have been noted in 
middle-incomes, this is due to Albertans working more rather than them gaining more 
from the oil boom. As Gibson notes, “middle income Albertans are no better off due to 
the boom while low income Albertans are worse off” (Gibson 2007).  
As a specific example, contrary to benefiting from the oil boom, steep rises in 
housing costs that are putting a major financial stress on middle and low-income 
people. Housing shortages particularly in the extraction region around Fort McMurray 
are described as “extreme” (Gosselin et al. 2010) due to the influx of workers into the 
area. But the impacts extend in many other cities in AB. Across AB, vacancy rates 
declined alongside rapid increases in housing and rent prices. This has led to a “crisis in 
homelessness” in the province (Gibson 2007, iii). 
Another economic resource curse impact of note in AB relates to the way the 
provincial government uses oil revenue to lower taxes. As noted in the first chapter, the 
resource curse literature understands personal income taxes as creating a strong tie 
between governments and citizens: governments dependent on taxes are more apt to be 
accountable to citizens; taxed citizens are more apt to demand good governance, better 
services, and so forth. But in a petro-state, governments are freed from depending on 
public taxes thanks to resource rents. This weakens the line of accountability between 
governments and citizens and instead builds a stronger bond between governments 
and the providers of oil money, the oil industry (Shaxson 2007; Stevens and Dietsche 
2008). This approach may function in the short term but when oil production or oil 
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prices decline, governments in this situation have limited resources on which to draw to 
maintain services (see also Karl 1997).  
AB exhibits this kind of situation. The Government of AB frequently boasts that 
the province has the lowest taxation rates and lowest rates of tax collection in the 
country. Comparative tax take shows AB as having the lowest tax share, and far below 
that of the next-lowest taxing province. AB’s new taxation regime, a “flat tax” system 
has further reduced the government’s intake of tax revenue by as much as $5.5 billion 
(Parkland Institute 2009). And as anticipated by the literature, the undermining of the 
tax base means that during recession periods such as the present one, the province faces 
deficit budgets and, therefore, must cut social program cuts (Gibson and Acuña 2011). 
The natural resource revenue of the boom is not being saved or productively invested in 
ways that would weather an oil bust (Warrack and Keddie 2002; Thompson 2008). 
In NL, research on the economic underbelly of the oil boom is even scarcer than 
in AB. But in the (albeit limited) literature that exists, it seems the understated economic 
problems of the oil boom are very similar to the AB case. As oil revenue began to 
impact the province, Stanford (2003) pointed to the inequalities of the boom and 
questioned the long-term viability of NL’s oil economy. He showed strong GDP growth 
from oil in the province but also that local benefits did not necessarily follow. Income 
growth predominantly concentrated on corporate profits (which have “quintupled”) 
while labor income saw only 29% growth. Corporate profits in NL have far outpaced 
even AB. Since 1997, half of GDP growth was “captured in corporate profits”—many of 
them foreign. A Petroleum Research Atlantic Canada publication recognized this issue 
as well, noting that “much of the business income earned in the petroleum industry 
accrues to non-resident companies” (Community Resource Services Ltd. 2003, 13). 
Stanford’s concerns are now being extended in Cadigan’s new work. Cadigan’s 
(forthcoming) analysis of economic trends indicates that the boom benefits have not 
been felt by the working class in NL. He shows how the oil sector is more capital 
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intensive than it is labor intensive—jobs are not a major benefit of the oil boom84 and 
many new jobs that are created by oil sector spin-offs are not good jobs (they are mostly 
in the low-wage services sectors). Women and workers outside the Avalon region, 
where the economic impacts of the boom have been concentrated, have been 
particularly excluded from oil benefits. Outmigration from the province continues due 
to this employment problem. Who benefits from the oil boom in NL? Cadigan 
demonstrates how corporations (again, mostly foreign) take the largest share of the 
benefits.  
Similar to AB, one of the Government of NL’s methods of sharing the spoils of 
the boom is through lowering personal tax rates (as opposed to implementing natural 
resource savings programs). The government has proudly noted that since 2007, it has 
“delivered the biggest personal income tax reductions ever in Newfoundland and 
Labrador” with a recent press release announcing more across-the-board tax reductions 
to come. But while the title of the recent press release announcing the tax cuts indicated 
that these new economic initiatives would “Provide Assistance to People Who Need it 
Most,” the highest tax reduction (by 4.7%) went to those in the highest income bracket 
(Department of Finance 2011). 
To summarize, on the surface there is evident economic growth in both cases as 
measured by our blunt instruments of GDP growth, revenue and exports. This growth 
appears to be contrary to the standard resource curse theory. But what these upward 
trends miss, however, are the problems of inequality across regions and economic 
classes, another problem of relevance in the resource curse literature. There is economic 
growth in these provinces from the oil boom, just not for everyone. 
There is also the problem of the ever-deepening concentration of these economies 
on the oil industry (and a simultaneous weakening of the tax system) rather than a 
                                                
84 Shrimpton similarly notes the limited impact the oil economy on resolving the long-
standing problem of high unemployment rates in the province (Stantec 2009, 10). 
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commitment to diversification that will be more sustainable when the oil runs out. And 
in the meantime, as these cases remain focused on oil, they are vulnerable to the 
volatility of oil price booms and busts (see figure 28 below for a depiction of oil price 
volatility since 1970) which have a direct, tangible impact on government budgets and, 
therefore, the delivery of public services.  
 
Figure 28: Crude Oil Spot Prices (in U.S. dollars per barrel, nominal prices) 
 
Source: Oil price data for 1970 to 2008 are from the 2010 OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, 
Environmental and Social Statistics. 2009 and 2010 data are from Dow Jones & Company, 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/OILPRICE/downloaddata?cid=98. 
 
Neither case is following the Norwegian example to shelter economies and public 
coffers from oil’s finitude and volatility. NL lacks a natural resource fund; AB gutted its 
Heritage Fund. Both have engaged in pro-cyclical spending (spending during the boom 
rather than saving to be able to stimulate an economy in recession). Both governments 
have tied their own fiscal hands by eroding the tax base in the good times via reducing 
personal and corporate taxes. In the future, citizens in both cases will come to the 
conclusion that the real beneficiaries of the oil industry are American companies, buyers 
and shareholders, but not the owners of the resource. 
Above I have focused on the economic resource curse impacts in AB and NL. 
However the extent and significance of these petro-provinces (primarily in AB) is such 
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that their impacts are felt nationally as well. One impact in line with the resource curse 
is particularly evident. Contrary to the assumption that Canada is blessed by natural 
resources, recent literature on Canadian political-economics is now arguing that the 
country is indeed experiencing the “Dutch Disease”—notable particularly in the decline 
of the manufacturing sector—due to the “petro-loonie.”  
A 2006 Library of Parliament publication noted the applicability of the Dutch 
Disease to Canada by acknowledging that energy has become the “single largest export 
sector” in the country since 2005 and that manufacturing jobs have been in decline since 
2003. It noted how provinces dependent on manufacturing (Ontario and Quebec) 
experience lower growth, while oil-rich AB and NL experience excellent economic 
growth. There is growing recognition that rather than diversifying its economy, Canada 
remains in many ways a staples-based economy, now centered on oil: the Canadian 
dollar is now considered a “petro-dollar” (Bergevin 2006). As noted in The Economist, 
“Foreign-exchange dealers now treat the Canadian dollar as a petrocurrency” (Of Forest 
and Mine; Canada's Economy 2005). Similarly, Stanford (2008), shows how Canada is 
increasingly heading “back to the future,” returning to its heritage as a “hewer of wood 
and drawer of water,” an extractor of natural resources for (often) raw export. The 
impact of high-value natural resource exports concentrated in key provinces has 
resulted in a rapid descent of manufacturing in other regions. 
 
Political Impacts 
What of the negative political outcomes associated with the resource curse in these 
cases? Obviously there is no evidence of the civil wars exacerbated by oil wealth in 
many of the countries studied in the resource curse literature. What of 
authoritarianism? Here again, there is little evidence of this as it is understood in the 
developing state cases typically emphasized in the literature.  
However, one obvious impact of oil development that is present in these cases as 
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elaborated in the resource curse literature is the political conservatism effect. The 
democratic implications of this trend are worrisome. As shown by Goldberg et al. (2005) 
in their study of American states, dependence on natural resource wealth has a 
“conservative” effect on politics. Concerned with the effect of resource abundance on 
political regimes, Goldberg et al. studied American states over seventy-three years and 
found natural resource wealth “serves to preserve underlying political dynamics at the 
time natural resources began to contribute to state finances.” State actors in power at the 
time that resource wealth floods the state gain the resources to maintain a strong and 
lengthy hold on their polities. They do so, of course, by using oil rents to maintain 
public consent. This trend is obvious in AB and NL.  
The problem is most evident in AB, the more long-standing oil province of the 
two, which has seen its political landscape become increasingly uncompetitive. The 
Progressive Conservative Party has held power for four decades, since 1971. The party 
took a particularly striking turn to the ideological right as well as to heavy-handed 
government during Premier Ralph Klein’s 1992 to 2006 leadership period. Klein’s 
governance of AB’s oil boom was marked by growing “democratic deficits” such as the 
party’s active avoidance of oppositional party and legislative budget reviews (Parkland 
Institute 2006) as well as tight control on public relations. AB’s “post-democratic” 
government and the reign of “King” Klein are elaborated in detail by, for example, 
Brownsey (2005), Dabbs (2006), and Soron (2005). Wasteful spending by the PC 
government to maintain political legitimacy continues under the new premier, 
Stelmach. For example, the $25 million dollar 2008 public relations campaign to 
“rebrand” AB and the tar sands (Sampert 2005). 
The province does exhibit democratic deterioration noted in resource curse 
theory. For example, government policy on oil development runs directly counter to 
public opinion in AB in key respects. Public polling has indicated that over 70% of 
Albertans surveyed want the provincial government to “suspend new oil sands project 
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approvals until environmental and infrastructure issues have been resolved.” More 
than 80% want “increased government investment in environmental protection in the 
oil sands” and over 90% want requirements for GHG reductions from oil sands plants 
(with 70% of those surveyed wanting absolute reductions in GHG emissions as opposed 
to the per-barrel intensity based target approach of the government). Concern is also 
widespread about the pace of development and there is great demand for more 
government control of and involvement in development pacing (Pembina Institute 
2007a). Yet rather than responding to these concerns, the AB Government instead 
launched public relations campaigns to “re-brand” the province and “greenwash” the 
tar sands. Rather than duly considering citizens concerns about the tar sands, provincial 
leaders have been adamant tar sands expansion will continue, a point made obvious in 
Premier Stelmach’s often-repeated statement that the province will not be “touching the 
brake” on tar sands development (see, for example, Government of Alberta 2007; 
McLean 2006). 
Democratic problems are noted at the highest levels of Albertan public debate. 
As observed by the Royalty Review Panel, “There is an absence of accountability from 
the government to the owners of the resource. Even with substantial effort, Albertans 
cannot determine whether their interests are being well served” (Hunter et al. 2007, 5). 
Citizen engagement has waned in this political context, a point that was particularly 
apparent in the 2008 provincial election which had a 41% voter turnout, the lowest in 
the last half-century of Canadian provincial elections (Low voter turnout in Alberta 
election being questioned 2008). 
Then in NL, an increasingly more controlling, publicly inaccessible form of 
governance often discussed in public debates but not well documented in scholarly 
work. As in AB, NL saw the rise of the Progressive Conservative government just as oil 
revenues began to have a clear impact on the economy. The PCs and Premier Williams 
were elected to office in 2003 and Williams had approval ratings over his tenure until 
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2010 as high as 80%. Elections have been landslides in favor of the PCs given the public 
misconception that the PCs caused the province’s transition to “have” status (as 
opposed to the simple fact of oil export at a time of high oil prices). 
What is problematic in NL is the near-complete erosion of the opposition and the 
virtual elimination of opposition parties. Oppositional positions on the future of NL’s 
economic development are nearly non-existent. Public debate on the province’s 
economic future is exceedingly narrowly focused on oil. Alongside the lack of 
alternatives is the defensive and opaque PC government, a trend to be documented in a 
forthcoming volume on the Williams’ administration (Marland and Kerby 
forthcoming). Williams’ aggressive, concentrated leadership role is observed to have 
inhibited public debate. 
Certainly in AB and perhaps to a lesser degree in NL, we see broader risks to 
participatory democracy with increasingly concentrated, exclusive parties with 
declining accountability to citizens. This trend is paired with the undermining of the 
provincial governments’ ability to govern for the long term due to the over-emphasis on 
oil alone as an economic strategy and the erosion of the tax base.  
In addition to this political fallout at the provincial level, these impacts are so 
great that they spill over into the national level as well. I noted at the start of section I 
above that there is evidence of the “Dutch Disease” at work in Canada due to the 
pressures of the petro-provinces. This is causing great economic problems but also 
political tension within the Canadian federation. The oil producing provinces are now 
clearly pitted against the oil-poor and often manufacture-based provinces. As the 
former benefit from rising oil prices, the latter face a burden of equal proportion. 
Regions of the country experience the same economic changes (such as the rise of the 
Canadian dollar) in diametrically opposed ways that make governing at the federal 
level contentious (Cross 2008). Further, more work is also needed on how AB in 
particular is assuming greater political power federally. Stanford, for example, alludes 
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to the “daunting political influence of Canadian resource elites (especially over 
Canada’s Albertan-led Conservative federal government)” (2008, 7). 
The cases clearly qualify as highly oil dependent and they do exhibit many of the 
economic and political problems associated with this kind of natural resource 
dependence. I note in particular the economic problems of growing inequality, wealth 
concentration away from the extraction sites, the erosion of tax systems, and the 
experience of revenue volatility, alongside the political problems of the “conservative” 
effect on political power and the rise of democratic deficits relating to government-
public accountability and public debate.     
But what of the specific focus of this research, the environmental effects of 
intensive frontier oil extraction and the related environmental policy regimes? As 
explained in the introduction, resource curse literature is void of environmental 
impacts, yet this is surprising given that the long-term negative economic and political 
effects of environmental degradation on oil-dependent societies. While some mention of 
the adverse environmental impacts of petro-states is made at the margins of the 
literature, this body of work provides only limited guidance on this kind of analysis. 
For this reason I joined resource curse theory with political ecology to be able to focus 
on human-environment interactions and environmental impacts. Thus the next section 
extends the resource curse literature to include the environmental impacts of the 
petrocracy. In so doing, I emphasize policy dynamics, an under-studied area of political 
ecology. 
 
 
II. Environmental Policy in the Petro-Provinces 
Oil extraction in NL and AB results in extremely different but similarly significant and 
worrisome environmental impacts. There are generalized notable risks in NL to a 
globally significant and unique marine environment. Worst-case blowout scenarios 
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estimate impacts spanning hundreds of square kilometers of ocean. In contrast, in AB 
there are widespread risks to the northern boreal forest system extending from the 
northern part of the province to as far as the Arctic Ocean. 
Scientists observing the NL case note multiple specific disruptions to ecosystems 
and species due to seismic exploration, the chronic noise of operations, gas flaring, the 
presence of human structures, and species’ contact with toxic materials. Major species 
mortality is estimated due to routine discharges as well as larger blowouts or spills. In 
addition, there are air pollutants, including GHG emissions, that far exceed government 
targets. Yet the direct impact on humans of these environmental problems is less 
evident given the extraction sites’ distance from human settlement and ocean and wind 
patterns. To date, there has been only infrequent direct human experience of the 
environmental impacts of NL’s oil extraction. 
In AB, research has documented disruptions to ecosystems and habitat due to 
massive consumption and pollution of fresh water, the challenging legacy of toxic 
tailings ponds (now over hundreds of square kilometers in size and leaching into other 
water systems), air pollution, and enormous GHG emissions that undermine national 
efforts to meet emission reduction targets. But here the direct human impact is more 
obvious: potentially widespread health issues relating to air and water pollution are 
gradually being documented, particularly in downstream aboriginal communities. The 
loss of access to traditional lands used for subsistence living is also notable. 
Political ecology analysis begins from these local, tangible environmental 
impacts to ask what accounts for these impacts. I have provided an answer to this 
question by examining the broader provincial and federal political-economy context 
that informs the surrounding environmental regulatory systems and shift to even 
broader continental and global levels of analysis in section III.  
As elaborated in the section above, NL and AB have a significant and deepening 
economic dependence on oil and this is the critical element of the respective political-
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economy contexts. Government support for this initially promising and now 
exceedingly lucrative industry has been multifaceted and long term in both provinces. 
Current tar sands and offshore oil projects were both very heavily government-
sponsored industries that would not have developed without significant, longstanding 
government financial support. And these subsidies continue today. A primary example 
is the way both provinces and the federal government have honed their educational 
systems to address the challenges of frontier oil (such as CCS in AB and ultra-deep 
water and Arctic drilling in NL).  
Both provincial governments have also implemented low royalty regimes to 
attract investment. These royalty regimes were meant to stimulate investment in oil 
development but they are now embarrassing losses of public revenue while the public 
picks up the tab for the associated environmental costs. The royalty systems leave a 
great deal of revenue from these public resources on the table for corporations who 
could not find a similar deal internationally. A false tale has been told and retold about 
how these frontier regions need to be made more attractive for capital investment when 
in reality there are few places left for private oil companies to go to access comparable 
reserves. 
These financial subsidies to the oil industry are complemented by public 
relations efforts. Provincial and federal governments promote and defend the industry 
at home and abroad. Both levels of government stress the critical economic importance 
of continuing to develop these oil resources, even though the environmental risks are 
high. Government financial and rhetorical commitment to the frontier oil industry in 
these cases is then reinforced by the oil industry. This industry has made enormous 
investments in these developments and, therefore, has high profit expectations from 
them. The oil industry protects these interests through various forms of government 
lobbying, often led by the CAPP. Messaging to government includes emphasizing the 
value of the industry, stressing the costs of environmental regulations, and subtlety 
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threatening capital flight. Companies have also used public relations campaigns in the 
media and “community engagement” projects to build legitimacy locally, particularly 
via educational investments that ultimately help the companies to get the workers they 
need. More aggressive court challenges have also been used in NL. 
In both cases there is a symbiotic government-industry relationship based on 
what House identified as a “mutuality of interests.” Governments are dependent on the 
expansion of oil extraction that is driven by private corporations. These corporations 
have their own interests (profit-maximization) in oil development. So industry feeds 
back into government oil interests to protect its access to resources and profits. The 
outcome has been the development of two petro-provincial economies focused, almost 
to exclusion, on the oil industry.  
What does this mean for the ecosystems where oil extraction occurs? They are 
vulnerable to the worst impacts of resource capitalism. This is manifested in the 
environmental regulatory system in each case, systems that are at best very weak 
matches to the government and industry pressures for oil development. I have 
discussed the main regulatory problems in detail in each case and below I provide a 
synthesis of the major trends across both. 
Taken together, the cases highlight the federal government’s reluctance to use its 
regulatory authority. This is obvious in EC’s withdrawal in monitoring seabirds in NL 
and the Department of Fisheries and Ocean’s reluctance to become involved in fish 
habitat issues in both cases. A typical explanation of this is the anti-federal sentiment in 
both provinces—both places have been battlegrounds for provincial rights against the 
federal government. But given the broader political trends across Canada over the last 
decades, federal reluctance to intervene might actually be another sign of devolution to 
the provinces, a cost-saving mechanism for the Canadian government. 
Within this regulatory system devolved to the provinces, industry has a 
preeminent role, to the point that oil companies even initiate oil exploration and 
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production. Parcels released for auction at the earliest stages of oil development are 
based on industry requests rather than public land use planning processes (with a 
severe lack of planning especially evident in NL). 
From this stage, there is a notably weak or poorly timed consideration of 
environmental impacts. This is obvious in the absence of formal, stringent reviews of 
environmental impacts particularly at the land leasing stages in each case as well as in 
the way that more substantive environmental reviews are taken as non-binding 
informational exercises that cannot impede environmentally problematic projects. Both 
cases show the repeated dominance of economic interests over environmental concerns 
within the government bureaucracy. 
These review processes are intended to include public consultation however this 
is also problematic in both cases. Public consultation is very limited or non-existent at 
the rights issuance stage. There is also a concern that the threshold of those who are 
“directly affected,” particularly in the AB case, is too limited and that, therefore, no one 
has the legitimacy to voice concerns over “unoccupied” land. When the public is 
engaged at the point of environmental assessments in both cases, participants often 
protest that their concerns go unheard or that the results of public consultation 
processes are non-binding and therefore only project “window-dressing.” There are 
also the problems of how the public can be effectively involved given the constraints of 
time and expertise, especially compared to the massive corporate resources to 
intervene. Major problems with transparency are also obvious in the NL case where 
access to basic data is limited by corporate confidentiality. 
As projects unfold, other regulatory trends become apparent in AB and NL that 
are unique to the specific environment in each case. For example, in NL regulations on 
waste disposal are questionable given the exemptions and the nature of the regulations 
that do exist (they are guidelines rather than hard limits and often the limits are overly 
permissive, for example with regard to drill cuttings and produced water). Spill 
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response is also of concern. In AB, water withdrawals are a pressing matter because the 
regulations are not in sync with ecosystem limits. Water has been over-allocated to 
companies and multi-stakeholder or cross-departmental initiatives have failed to 
resolve this problem. Both cases also share specific regulatory absences. For example, 
both lack the capacity to independently monitor environmental impacts. Both have 
compliance mechanisms that are infrequently used or do not provide incentives for 
industry to change behavior.  
There are also many shared specific regulatory gaps in these provinces. 
Regulations on GHG emissions are at the forefront. There are few restrictions on carbon 
emission in NL’s offshore—the province continues to await regulatory standards from 
the federal government. In AB, regulations do exist but they have long been criticized as 
resulting in increased emissions because they are intensity-based rather than based on 
absolute caps. Both cases also struggle with how to remediate ecosystems after projects 
terminate. Reclamation in both sites is undefined or ambiguous—or potentially 
technologically impossible. Success rates to date in AB have been shockingly low. As a 
third example of common regulatory gaps, there are clear institutional difficulties in 
both cases in coming to grips with cumulative impacts. This is due to the lack of 
baseline data (particularly in NL) as well as the complexity of multi-stakeholder, cross-
department initiatives in reaching consensus (in AB).  
These environmental policy trends mirror in many ways the common 
problematic environmental policy trends in the neoliberal capitalist system as identified 
by Heynen et al. (2007, 6) which include privatizing environmental regulation and 
commodifying more of the environment, reducing corporate regulations (or abstaining 
from regulating corporations), the gutting of government environmental programs, 
dovoling regulatory responsibility to lower levels of government that are poorly 
resourced, and using market-based regulations as opposed to government-directed 
standards. AB and NL fit this characterization well. Both cases exhibit neoliberal 
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regulatory tendencies that prize corporate convenience and benefit over environmental 
and public protection. 
What we find overall, therefore, is that the government/industry mutuality of 
interests to forward frontier oil development in these cases has been conveniently 
paired with an environmental regulatory regime that is similarly weakened or 
underutilized. I note also that this analysis may be delineating a particular 
environmental regulatory regime in these petro-provinces that can be extended to other 
similar cases. The research I had initially conducted for this project on Alaska and 
Wyoming, as well as new research on SK (seventy-five additional interviews combined 
with reviews of scholarly, “grey,” and publicly-oriented literature), certainly confirms 
these regulatory trends. I hope to extend the analysis to include these cases in future 
writing. 
Understanding these regulatory trends within the context of the (predominantly) 
provincial political-economic context is no doubt essential to understanding the 
environmental impacts of frontier oil extraction in NL and AB. But to see the 
fundamental motivation for this system, I place the domestic circumstances within a 
continental and global context. 
 
 
III. America’s Oil Colony in the Global Petro-Capitalist Context 
As emphasized in political ecology methodology, a rich and complex understanding of 
the human-ecological interface is an essential place to start analysis. But we need a 
globally contextualized perspective that understands individual cases as impacted by, 
and impacting, sites and trends more distant from them. Oil extraction from the cases 
studied here only makes sense from the wider perspective of the continental and global 
petro-capitalist system. The basic driving forces of the issues analyzed over the last 
chapters emanate from these broader sites. Taking a more distant view of these cases 
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from the global and continental perspective allows us to situate AB and NL as key parts 
of North American petro-capitalism. Therefore, below I re-embed the cases in a larger 
political economy of oil. 
World oil consumption has nearly doubled since 1971. In terms of actual 
volumes, global oil demand was at 87.8 million barrels per day in 2010 (International 
Energy Agency 2011), driven in great part by the need for transportation fuels in OECD 
countries where two-thirds of global oil is consumed. Within the OECD, the U.S. clearly 
dominates oil demand. Consuming over 20% of total global oil, the U.S. is the largest oil 
consumer in the world. However, recent new growth in oil demand is coming from non-
OECD countries, and nearly half of this new demand is from China (International 
Energy Agency 2010a, 33, 2010b, 4). 
While demand ramps up, increases in supply are less certain. The “all-time peak” 
of global conventional oil production was in 2005 at 70 million barrels a day, nearly 20 
million barrels a day less than 2010 global consumption. Several strategies are used to 
make up the shortfall between conventional supply and demand. Oil producers attempt 
to expand production by exploring for secondary fields at the margins of major 
“mature” fields. Or they attempt to squeeze the last drops out of mature fields using 
new enhanced oil recovery technology. But the real hope for enhanced supply is in 
seeking new supplies in frontier regions or unconventional production fuels. To date, 
unconventional oil and natural gas liquids are making up for declining conventional 
production (International Energy Agency 2010b, 4). 
The remaining proven oil reserves are concentrated in Saudi Arabia, Canada, 
Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. Approximately 70% of these remaining oil reserves are in OPEC 
countries (International Energy Agency 2010a, 114), leaving Canada as the leading 
major non-OPEC supplier. Yet Canada’s oil reserves are almost entirely tar sands 
deposits in AB and SK (Howard et al. 2009, 47). As Rubin notes, although expansions in 
offshore deep-water extraction will make a dent in demand growth, from now on most 
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new non-OPEC oil production will primarily come from unconventional sources such 
as the tar sands (Rubin is cited in Rowell 2007). 
That Canada has the world’s largest oil non-OPEC supply has caught the 
attention of American oil security analysts, particularly since energy security fears have 
intensified in recent years. There has been a growing public and political recognition of 
the U.S.’s need for oil and the growing dependence on foreign oil since the 1970s and 
the events of September 11, 2001, further drove home this point. The Bush 
administration’s response to the heightened energy anxiety was the National Energy 
Policy released in May 2001, developed by the National Energy Policy Development 
Group led by Vice-President Cheney. The policy stressed the importance of securing 
geographically closer oil reserves from more politically stable supplies in North 
America. Canada’s tar sands were specifically identified as part of the solution to 
American energy security (McCullum 2005, 19). The problem of oil insecurity and the 
solution of diversifying oil by finding reserves closer to home, primarily by drawing on 
Canadian resources, has become a frequent theme in American political discourse. 
The American need for closer, more politically stable oil reserves has produced a 
very close relationship between the two countries. Gattinger (2005) describes the 
Canada-U.S. energy relationship as “mutual interdependence” but what kind of 
interdependence is it? This characterization by no means signals a relationship of 
equality.  
Both Canada and the U.S. share the problem of extremely high per capita oil 
consumption rates. But absolute consumption and available reserves to maintain this 
consumption are vastly different. The U.S., the largest global oil consumer, uses 18.7 
million barrels of oil per day, 22% of global consumption. In contrast, Canada consumes 
of 2.2 million barrels per day, representing 2.6% of global consumption (2009 estimates). 
Comparative supply capacity is also very different. The U.S. can draw on domestic 
proven oil reserves estimated at only 19.1 billion barrels. Therefore, the U.S. must rely 
  196 
on foreign oil imports. Indeed, the U.S. is the also the largest global oil importer, 
importing 11.3 million barrels per day in 2008 (calculations based on data from Central 
Intelligence Agency 2011). In contrast, Canada has 175.2 billion barrels of oil in reserve. 
Predictions for total Canadian oil production are optimistic given the high hopes placed 
on expanded tar sands production. The CAPP anticipates total Canadian daily per 
barrel production to increase by 63% between 2009 and 2025—from 2.7 million barrels 
per day to 4.3. Growth will come solely from Western Canada’s tar sands deposits in 
both AB and SK (Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers 2010a, i, 2). The 
forecasted oil production trend is illustrated below. 
 
Figure 29: Actual and Forecasted Growth in Canadian Oil Production, By Fuel Type 
(in thousands of barrels per day) 
 
Source: CAPP’s 2010 report “Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets & Pipelines,” i. 
  
Apparently possessing oil in excess, Canada has proven eager to accommodate 
American energy needs. Canadian and provincial officials frequently and explicitly 
underline the secure, reliable and close oil resources available to the U.S. just north of 
the border. And this “open door” rhetoric—combined with U.S. need—has had a real 
trade impact. U.S. oil imports from Canada have grown substantially, from 242 million 
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barrels per year in 1990 to 658 million barrels in 2007 (Hughes 2010, 2697). Most recent 
available data indicates Canada exported 682 million barrels of oil to the U.S. in 2009—
73% of Canadian production is directly exported to the U.S., while the remaining 27% 
predominantly goes to refineries, many of which, in turn, export to the U.S.85 
 The U.S. has begun to shift from importing from OPEC countries to importing 
from Canadian sources. Canada took over Saudi Arabia’s role as the number one 
foreign supplier of oil to the U.S. in spring 2004 (McCullum 2005, 5). Canada, the new 
top supplier of American oil imports, provides approximately 15% to 20% the U.S.’s 
total oil imports (U.S. Energy Information Administration 2009a). 
Exporting to the U.S. is, of course, the goal in the major provincial oil producers 
studied here. AB is reported to have exported over 1.37 million barrels of oil per day to 
U.S. markets in 2008. This is 76% of the province’s total production.86 Furthermore, of 
the oil that remains in AB for refining, much of this is also eventually exported to the 
U.S. Therefore nearly the entirety of Albertan oil is exported to the U.S., specifically to 
American Midwest states (to Petroleum Administration for Defense District (PADD) II) 
or to Rocky Mountain states (PADD IV) (U.S. Energy Information Administration 
2009b). A depiction of the PADD system, provided by the CAPP (2010a, 11), is below. 
  
                                                
85 Data are from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM Table 126-0001.  
86 This percentage is based on AB production volumes of 0.5 million barrels per day for 
conventional crude (International and Intergovernmental Relations 2008) and 1.31 million 
barrels per day for tar sands (Alberta Energy 2009a), for a total production of 1.81 million 
barrels per day. 
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Figure 30: U.S. Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts 
 Source: CAPP’s 2010 report “Crude Oil: Forecast, Markets & Pipelines,” 11. 
 
NL oil production is similarly destined for U.S. markets. According to Hughes’ 
analysis of 2007 data, 73% of oil produced in Eastern Canada (96% of which is produced 
by NL) is exported directly to the U.S. eastern seaboard, to PADD I. The remaining 34% 
goes to Atlantic Canadian refineries which in turn export two-thirds of their product to 
the U.S. (2010, 2692-95). In 2009, every barrel of oil that NL exported directly 
internationally went to the U.S.87 
This export-orientation of the Canadian oil industry represents an important 
change in the national approach to oil regulation. Following the 1973 and 1979 oil price 
shocks (see figure 22 above), the Canadian government, led by Prime Minister Trudeau, 
initiated the National Energy Program to ensure Canadian oil security. The policy 
restrained oil exports, created national oil companies, commenced price controls and 
encouraged far more domestic exploration in federal lands (Plourde 2010a, 4-6). The oil 
                                                
87 Data are from Industry Canada’s Trade Data Online. 
  199 
policy tide changed, however, with the 1984 election of Prime Minister Mulroney and 
the Progressive Conservative party which was ideologically close to U.S. President 
Reagan and U.K. Prime Minister Thatcher. Supported by western Canadian groups that 
felt slighted by Trudeau’s nationalistic policies, the new government dismantled the 
NEP and swung the pendulum of energy policy in the opposite direction, toward 
privatization and deregulation to enhance production and exports. Government policy 
disengagement and the turn to reliance on market mechanisms was solidified in great 
part by the 1989 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement and 1994 NAFTA (Plourde 2010a, 6-
7). Canada’s oil sector is now tuned to fulfilling U.S. oil demand, with a major role for 
U.S. companies. Transportation systems bear this out: the densely woven pipeline 
system clearly depicts the orientation of the Canadian industry toward U.S. markets.88 
Indeed, in 2009, 99.3% of Canada’s oil exports went to the U.S. 89 
Canada’s ardent oil export orientation has had major impacts on the country’s 
economy, as discussed at the outset of section I. Most evidently, the Canadian dollar has 
been an oil currency particularly since 1993, when Canada’s role as an energy exporter 
(80% being oil and gas) became more pronounced and earlier policies of energy 
deregulation and North American energy market integration (entrenched in free market 
agreements), began to take effect. The impact of Canada’s “more accommodating 
attitude towards foreign investment” also became noticeable at this time, with the 
inflows of foreign capital becoming significant (Issa et al. 2008, 739-40, 56). 
Even more worrisome is the fact that Canada’s rush to export product to the U.S. 
has helped recreate in Canada the very problem that drove the U.S. to seek foreign oil 
supplies: Canada’s conventional oil reserves are now in decline. As noted in the 
proceeding case chapters, NL’s oil reserves have, or soon will, peak—hence the 
                                                
88 See, for example, CAPP’s pipeline and refinery map available at 
www.capp.ca/GetDoc.aspx?DocID=137798. 
89 Data are from Statistics Canada’s CANSIM Table 126-0001.  
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scramble for increased exploration to discover new fields in ever-deeper waters. AB’s 
conventional production has long been in decline, hence the province’s transition to tar 
sands. Fortunately for these petro-provinces, as global oil prices (and fears of energy 
security) mount, tapping into these previously economically unviable reserves has 
become viable—indeed highly profitable. Suddenly what Nikiforuk describes as the 
“ugly, difficult and tough stuff at the bottom of the barrel” (2010)—extraction with high 
risks, including great environmental risks—has become feasible. At high oil prices it 
becomes economically rational to invest previously unthinkable amounts of capital, 
energy and resources into projects such as the tar sands and ultra-deep offshore wells. 
Canada’s plans for Arctic oil develop follow in this trend (as does the pressure to 
develop ANWR in the U.S.). In fact, at the time of this writing in March 2011, an 
emergency meeting organized by the international Inuit Circumpolar Council is 
ongoing in Ottawa to debate conflicts between oil development and the potential 
environmental and social fallout.  
The link between prices and pressures to develop oil is clear. But is there a 
discernable relationship between oil prices and stronger or weaker environmental 
policy? I see two potential pathways. Strengthening environmental policy is perceived 
by industry as increasing costs. (Although I would argue this is not necessarily the 
case— “greener” operations may be more efficient and therefore have lower costs.) 
Assuming this perception, the oil industry would be most adverse to costly 
environmental regulations in times of low oil prices when profit margins are already 
compressed. Therefore, at a time of higher oil prices, governments would have a better 
chance at implementing stronger environmental policies with less industry backlash. 
However, as oil prices increase, industry also has access to more resources to engage in 
political lobbying with governments and communities to oppose changes to 
environmental regulation. And industry actors would be acutely aware that 
strengthened regulatory systems would persist into times of oil price declines or 
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declining production, meaning increased costs in the future when profits are lower. 
Industry, therefore, even at times of high prices, would resist strengthened 
environmental policy. That said, industry actors could also perceive an advantage in 
implementing tougher standards if they would be more difficult for new entrants to 
implement. In this way, meeting environmental standards could act as a barrier to 
competition over access to the resources. 
In an effort to keep up oil production at a moment of declining conventional 
reserves, Canada heavily subsidizes frontier oil development (which is, of course, 
blatantly contrary to the Conservative Party’s commitment to receding government 
intervention in the market). The annual value of federal subsidy to the fossil fuel sector 
is estimated at $1.38 billion, with major oil provinces (AB, NL and SK) matching and 
slightly exceeding that amount to bring the total Canadian subsidy to the sector to $2.8 
billion per year (EnviroEconomics Inc. et al. 2010, 15). Further, Canada’s financial 
community is also heavily committed to supporting this sector. A recent report 
detailing the extensive financial commitments made by all major Canadian banks (RBC, 
TD Bank, Scotiabank, BMO Financial and CIBC) to fossil fuel production showed these 
institutions financing approximately $155 billion in fossil fuel investments in 2007 alone 
(Financing Global Warming: Canadian Banks and Fossil Fuels 2009). 
Yet while assuming the costs of subsidizing the industry, Canada simultaneously 
experiences a revenue penalty from frontier oil development sites. Tar sands and 
offshore oil royalty rates are typically low until these enormously expensive projects hit 
“payout” (Plourde 2010a, 15)—this means governments can wait a long time to tap into 
rents from these sites comparable to conventional reserves. Therefore, governments are 
interested in companies producing greater volumes of product. There is a built-in 
motivation to extract high volumes of oil quickly. 
One major irony, therefore, of Canada’s role in North American petro-capitalism 
is that in an effort to satisfy American demand, Canadian conventional reserves have 
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declined and the petro-provinces now must search for new reserves. These 
unconventional and far offshore fields are economically costly (in terms of subsidies 
and the environmental legacy of these developments) with less economic benefits in the 
short term given the lower royalty rates for these projects. 
Further, in becoming a key oil reserve for the energy insecure U.S., Canada is 
now vulnerable to that same problem. (And perhaps the problem is even more severe 
given that, unlike most other developed industrial states, including the U.S., Canada 
lacks strategic petroleum reserves (Laxer 2008, 1).) Albertan oil is destined for U.S. 
markets leaving eastern Canadian provinces reliant on importing as much as 1.2 million 
barrels per day of oil from foreign sources. As Hughes observes, “to meet demand for 
Canadian crude in the United States […] Canada is importing crude to meet its own 
needs” (2010, 2697). Eastern Canada imports as much as 90% of its oil (Laxer 2008, 1) 
primarily from Algeria, Norway, the UK, Angola, Saudi Arabia and Iraq in recent years. 
(OPEC countries provide almost fifty percent of Canada’s total oil imports) (Laxer 2008, 
4). Of course, each of these countries faces domestic security risks, political stability 
risks or peak oil (declining production) risks, or a combination of all three (Hughes 
2010, 2696-97).  
Instead of having its own strategic oil reserves, Canada is the strategic oil reserve 
for the U.S. This is the relationship of “mutual interdependence” between Canada and 
the U.S.: American oil needs gradually drain Canadian supply. This leaves Canada’s oil 
security at risk, while it is burdened with the environmental costs of oil extraction and 
the financial burden of subsidizing this sector. 
This problematic Canada-U.S. energy relationship is a stable one given that it is 
virtually locked into place by trade agreements. The FTA in 1988 and the NAFTA in 
1994 altered Canadian west-to-east oil flows from AB to Quebec and Ontario to a north-
to-south orientation, from AB to the U.S. (Hughes 2010, 2692). These geographic shifts 
in oil flows were cemented by NAFTA’s “proportionality” clause, article 605, which 
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requires Canada to supply oil continuously to the U.S. proportional to its own use. 
Canada can only reduce its oil exports to the U.S. if there is an equal reduction in 
Canadian domestic supply (Hughes 2010, 2697; Laxer and Dillon 2008, 7-8; Laxer 2008, 
6).  
One potential way to gain more control of Canadian exports is by diversifying 
the destination of exports. China, which surpassed the U.S. in 2009 as the world’s 
largest consumer of energy, is a primary contender and one of great concern to the U.S. 
(International Energy Agency 2010a, 87; U.S. Department of Energy 2006). China is 
assertively seeking energy supply and its presence grows in Canada. China invested $8 
billion in Canadian oil companies in 2009 alone (Brearton 2010). Instead of securing 
outright full ownership of projects, China is gradually buying into more and more 
operating oil and gas projects as a project partner.  
China has shown particular interest in the AB tar sands since 2005. 2010 marked 
the first time a Chinese company purchased a direct stake in an operating tar sands 
company, with Sinopec’s $4.7 billion purchase of a 9% stake in Syncrude Canada Ltd. 
(McCarthy 2010). Chinese companies have also recently expressed strong interest in tar 
sands projects in SK and invested $5.4 billion in a B.C. natural gas deal with Encana. 
Transportation lines are obviously a key interest of Chinese investors as well, hence 
Sinopec’s stake in Enbridge’s Northern Gateway Pipeline which will bring tar sands 
fuel to Kitimat, B.C., then on to Asian markets. 
These larger political-economy forces incite Canadian frontier oil extraction, 
particularly the country’s relationship with the U.S. Global oil demand continuously 
intensifies while accessing easy oil supply becomes more difficult. The U.S. is 
particularly at risk, given its enormous appetite for oil and resultant dependence on 
foreign imports. Fortunately for the U.S., it northern neighbor has become an 
accommodating energy reserve.  
To summarize, Canada has become an energy state restructured to deliver 
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product to the U.S. Further, Canada’s obliging relationship to the U.S. has been 
formalized through international trade agreements. In this way, Canada’s oil provinces 
have become stable oil suppliers for U.S. oil demand. But in supplying the U.S. with oil, 
Canada faces similar oil reserve limitations and so needs to extend exploration to 
frontier sites to keep the oil flowing—while it imports oil to meet demand in the east. 
However Canada’s recent steps toward diversifying export destinations to trade with 
China and other Asian countries may upset this stability. 
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
If we look up from the individual cases of AB and NL and attempt to see patterns across 
them, we observe two major Canadian petro-provinces that meet or vastly exceed every 
standard threshold of high oil dependence as established by the resource curse 
literature. Government revenues, GDP and exports are dominated by the oil sector. And 
the economic and political fallout from this dependence is suggestive of typical resource 
curses. Although economic growth appears to be strong for the moment, the petro-
provinces are setting themselves up for a hard economic fall should oil reserves decline 
(which is the eventual reality for both cases). Tax bases have been eroded while oil 
revenues have not been saved or wisely invested in economic diversification. These 
amount to structural constraints to dealing with the volatility of oil. Further, even now 
in the midst of this period of apparent economic advantage, there is the notable 
problem of economic inequality across regions and classes. The rising tide of the boom 
is not lifting all boats, and certainly not equally. Then in terms of politics, while there 
are no civil wars over oil in these cases, there are obvious growing tensions between the 
oil “have” and “have not” provinces that are straining national governance. Inside the 
provinces, political power is increasingly concentrated, stable and insulated from public 
accountability; democratic participation is strained or waning.  
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The impacts of oil dependence are also reflected in the environmental policy 
regime that I have emphasized in this study. Government dependence on oil revenue 
from private oil companies’ continued production, combined with acute pressure from 
these companies that are driven to maximize profit, results in a permissive 
environmental regulatory system. This system is marked by important problematic 
trends such as the withdrawal of the federal government from environmental 
regulation, the ascent of corporate power, delayed and inconsequential consideration of 
environmental impacts, limited and disregarded public consultation, as well as obvious 
regulatory gaps. These petro-provinces have tied their fates ever more closely to oil. The 
environmental risks of this, especially considering the weakened environmental 
regulatory regime managing oil development, are substantial. 
Of course, AB and NL are not just stand-alone cases marked by similar political 
economy and environmental policy trends. They are bound together by a much larger 
context as the expansion of frontier oil extraction in these provinces is driven by a 
broader petro-capitalist system. Herein, Canada is situated as an obliging supplier of oil 
to the globe’s greatest oil consumer, the energy-insecure U.S. These provinces are, in 
this light, willing reserves of oil for American consumption. 
The cross-case trends and global petro-capitalist context framing these cases flesh 
out the critical comparative analysis. But what is to be done from here? Alternatives to 
the current environmental political economy are presented in the next and final chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE WAY FORWARD 
 
Given political ecology’s commitment to what I have called “normative reconstruction,” 
simply critically analyzing the economic, political and environmental trends of oil-
dependent cases (the task of the last chapter) is insufficient. There is a need for both 
critical comparative analysis and then improving on or rebuilding destructive human-
environment interactions revealed through that analysis. What is needed to redress the 
problems raised in these cases? Or, going farther, what convincing, potentially utopian 
“counter-narratives” (Walker 2006, 384) can we imagine for more democratic, 
environmentally sustainable futures? This chapter provides at least preliminary 
answers by offering recommendations to improve the current human-ecological 
interaction on the Canadian oil frontier.  
I proposed two directions forward. The first is to attempt to correct or fine-tune 
the petro-state to avoid the resource curse and the worst environmental impacts of oil 
extraction while not fundamentally challenging oil development as it currently unfolds. 
I propose specific policies and institutions for better fund management and 
environmental policy. This approach aims to “tweak” the petro-state without 
challenging it outright. The second way forward is to rethink the political-economic 
system of oil dependence and extraction in more far-reaching ways. Here I follow 
political ecology’s inclination to pose a more fundamental challenge to petrocratic 
political-economies. This move also raises the troublesome relationship between 
democracy, policy and environmental outcomes.  
Rather than seeing these recommendations as paths in two different directions, I 
think of them as complementary. I would propose attention to the first—the lower 
hanging fruit; the easier policy changes—as we then redress the larger systematic 
issues. The “tweaking” path could be a first step toward more fundamental system 
restructuring. 
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The chapter closes with an overview of the most promising current sources or 
opportunities for change in the system but I also note the backlash to them. Given these, 
I end by proposing three specific future interventions for beneficial environmental 
policy (and also democratic) outcomes. 
 
 
I. Averting “Curses” and Redressing Environmental Regulation 
In the “system tweaking” approach, there is a clear consensus developing on what is 
needed in terms of institutions and policy to avoid the resource curse (this is the focus 
of new publications like Humphreys et al. (2007)), and to improve environmental 
regulation. To do this, several policy changes are required related to managing revenue 
and spending, and enhancing several key aspects of the environmental regulatory 
regime. 
Within the resource curse literature in recent years there has been a turn toward 
offering pragmatic solutions to the long-term negative economic and political 
consequences of oil dependence. There are four typically recommended ways in which 
the management of revenue and spending can be improved in highly oil dependent 
states. Oil states must adopt natural accounting systems that document oil as capital, 
not income. This is the point well made in Warnock’s (2006) study of SK: exploitation of 
oil and gas resources is, ultimately, the dwindling of a stock of non-renewable capital 
assets. Basing an economy on oil extraction is likened to a household becoming 
financially dependent on selling the family silver. In both instances, economic security 
is built on using up a finite asset rather than generating more sustainable income. And 
this approach is bound to fail in the long term. 
To avoid this problem, or at least become aware of its depth, states need to 
maintain clear accounts of how quickly they are exhausting the natural resource or 
natural “capital,” and with what environmental and economic impact. Methods already 
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in use include the System of Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA) (Auty 
2007). These accounting tools remind citizens and political leaders of the difference 
between revenue from one-time natural resource extraction (capital) and revenue from, 
for example, taxation (income). 
Once accounting is broadened to include environmental value and distinguish 
between one-time versus enduring resources, oil dependent governments need to 
differentiate oil rents from general revenues, keeping oil rents separate from other types 
of income. This prevents the temptation of governments in power to waste oil rents on 
patronage projects of only short-term value, or to succumb to the demands of a 
“grabbing” industry lobby. Norway’s example, where resource rents are “depoliticized 
and taken out of the hands of incumbents” (Robinson et al. 2006, 23), is frequently 
noted. The idea of giving oil revenue to citizens directly, to force the state to develop 
broad-based taxation, is sometimes suggested (Shaxson 2007, 1135) as a creative (but 
also problematic) way to avoid this common problem. 
These separate oil rents should then be spent productively in ways that avoid 
Dutch-Disease effects. Long-term investment plans are required, particularly those that 
facilitate the transition to a more sustainable energy economy. The resource curse 
literature recommends states to develop institutions that encourage spending of oil rent 
in areas of long-term value, particularly education and economic diversification—that 
is, to use revenue from natural resource capital to develop other forms of capital or 
strengthen other sectors (manufacturing or agricultural) thus ensuring future 
generations can also benefit from the resource.  
To do this, Stevens and Dietsche (2008, 60) note the importance of developing 
and implementing longer-term development plans. This would require oversight by an 
independent, diverse group (what Auty calls a “public sector investment evaluation 
unit” (2007, 631)) that can take a longer-term view without intense, direct pressure from 
industry. 
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Perhaps more important than wise spending, however, is the judicious saving of 
oil rents, primarily through natural resource funds. Petro-states need to remove boom-
time rents from general revenues and to facilitate saving for the inevitable moment of a 
resource bust. This serves to “sterilize” oil rents from causing unwanted changes to the 
states’ exchange rate and inflation rate, and from challenging other sectors. A state’s 
level of savings has been demonstrated as key to averting the resource curse (Costantini 
and Monni 2008, 869; Auty 2007). These funds also encourage states to maintain a tax 
system that is not fully reliant on natural resources revenues (Jones Luong and 
Weinthal 2010, 3-4). 
Stated succinctly, applying this policy advice from the resource curse literature 
to these cases means several changes are in order. Oil revenue needs to be insulated 
from general revenue so that oil rents can be treated as capital rather than as income. 
And this special revenue must be saved for future generations as well as reinvested in 
diversifying and transforming the economy to one that is sustainable, based on 
renewable energy sources and “green jobs,” where we get employment, goods and 
services with less environmental fallout. Finally, rather than increasing economic 
dependence on oil rents, the governments of AB and NL need to return to focusing on 
maintaining and enhancing the personal and corporate tax system.  
However, as I stressed at the outset of this dissertation in the theoretical 
discussions, the resource curse is a limited framework primarily because it does not 
address the obvious paradox of the long-term environmental impacts of oil 
dependence. And these inevitably interact with—or even drive along—the economic 
and political circumstances at the heart of the resource curse theory. The resource curse 
literature offers an invaluable analysis of the initially counter-intuitive outcomes of 
great natural resource wealth. It provides essential insights into how this wealth 
translates into weak economic growth and stagnating democracy, in great part due to 
the weakening or inertia of institutions. But comments on environmental outcomes are 
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muted in this work. Turning the focus to the ecological impacts of frontier oil 
development requires, therefore, another theoretical lens; hence my turn to the theory 
and research approach of political ecology. This perspective, with its new emphasis on 
policy, guided a close analysis of the environmental regulatory problems in these cases. 
In so doing, I have a clearer sense of improvements in the environmental regulation 
system that need to be paired with the above fund management recommendations to 
ensure economic, political and environmental sustainability in these cases.  
As a first important step, the environmental regulator needs to be strengthened. 
Both cases have seen the capacity of the environmental regulator (the Board in NL and 
AENV in AB) as lacking in sufficient budget or expert staffing or as seeing these 
resources eroded while the pace of oil development expands. This constrains the 
regulators’ ability to conduct in-house analysis or to evaluate corporate analysis. 
The role of the environmental regulator in the decision-making process also 
needs to be given more prominence and authority. In AB and NL, environmental 
concerns must be documented and addressed earlier in the process, before leasing has 
occurred and rights to development are assumed. Environmental assessments need to 
have more weight in the decision-making process, rather than being treated as non-
binding advice that is easily overruled by economic interests. Once projects commence, 
there must also be expert, on-site, dedicated environmental regulators or monitors who 
are independent from industry influence and who have the authority to stop work if the 
environment is at risk. Likewise, impact predictions made in environmental 
assessments need to be verified and there must be consequences for impacts exceeding 
predictions made. The regulators must also overcome their reluctance to use their 
authority to prohibit or stop oil development. Compliance measures such as fines need 
to be used more frequently and bolstered to become effective incentives in this high-
profit industry. 
Once the environmental regulatory is placed on more equal ground with other 
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departments or agencies, key regulatory gaps need attention. Three areas are 
particularly problematic for both cases. First, AB and NL need regional, long-term land-
use planning that identifies significant “no-go” protected areas. Both need effective 
carbon emissions regulations as well that ensure emissions decline over time. Putting a 
price on carbon might be a primary incentive to emissions reductions. In addition, 
remediation practices need clarity in both cases. There needs to be a firm “no 
development without guaranteed remediation” policy. Finally, resource use (such as 
water withdrawals in AB) and waste disposal standards (routine discharges of 
produced water in NL) need to be within ecosystem limits as determined by 
“disinterested” science. A price on the use of environmental resources might be needed 
here to internalize these externalities. 
The environmental regulator at the provincial level then needs to be assisted by 
federal government counterparts that appear to have relinquished their responsibility in 
these cases. EC—facing its own political constraints—seems to have handed authority 
for environmental regulation over to the C-NLOPB in NL and to the AENV in AB. 
There is an obvious reluctance for the federal department to exert its regulatory 
authority and this creates a gap in national accountability while also leaving the 
provinces without federal expertise. Instead of a strong provincial and federal 
regulatory system, the cases are marked by a preference for privatized or corporate-
driven regulation, such as industry self-reporting. A basic return to more publicly 
oriented regulation process is required here. 
The role of the public in the environmental regulation processes needs 
strengthening as well. Public involvement in both cases is currently limited or occurs 
too late in the decision-making process—after the leasing of oil development areas has 
occurred and the wheels of oil development are already set in motion. Or where public 
consultation does occur, it appears to be co-optation or window-dressing as public 
concerns are rarely addressed in any substantive way. A more genuine, authentic public 
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engagement process on these projects is needed. 
I should emphasize that public consultation is an essential component of 
democratic practice in these mega-development cases (I enlarge on the discussion of 
democracy and policy later in this chapter as well). There is an obligation for project 
proponents to consult with the public according to federal and provincial legislation 
that applies in these oil development cases. The intent of the legislation, for example the 
CEA Act, is to allow for the sharing of information about the project and its impact as 
well as to provide an opportunity for those outside of government and industry offices 
to engage in dialogue on the risks and benefits of the project. Note that here “the 
public” does not refer (only) to special interest groups that, if heeded, could somehow 
thwart the public interest. While groups with targeted interests across the political 
spectrum do become involved, the aim of public consultation is to bring together a 
much wider range of “stakeholders,” particularly those directly impacted.  
Citizens can cast a vote in provincial and federal elections on the broader issues 
of political parties and platforms but I would argue that authentic democratic 
engagement requires more than sporadic voting. Engagement also needs to happen in 
the period between voting. Broad public involvement between elections, especially on 
major development projects, is essential to keep elected officials accountable and on 
track. Unfortunately, as I have noted in the case analyses, participants in these 
consultations and observers of them frequently interpret these processes not as genuine 
dialogue but as a box project proponents check to proceed with the project as originally 
planned.  
As a final point on improving the environmental regulation regime, there is a 
need in both cases for improved research to inform the regulatory process. Cumulative 
environmental impacts are seldom studied in AB and NL. Instead, strategic regional or 
grouped assessments might further erode the environmental assessment process. What 
is needed is expert, long-term, cumulative impact research that is independent from 
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industry control. At the same time, both cases need improved baseline data and 
scientifically valid studies in important areas such as water quantity and quality studies 
in AB or seabird impact analysis in NL. Funding is needed for the required long-term, 
independent, scientific studies. Post-secondary institutions in both provinces have 
emphasized technological research to increase oil finds and production but far more 
attention is needed on environmental studies and protection. 
What do these system-tweaking policy changes amount to, tangibly, with regard 
to the ongoing oil development processes in AB’s tar sands and NL’s offshore? I take a 
“Lougheed-ian” approach on this:90 current developments must be halted, or 
dramatically slowed, to allow time for the development of effective fund management 
and environmental regulatory systems to manage them. The oil is a non-wasting 
resource that is increasing in value. It is not a “use-it-or-lose-it” resource. If we want to 
spread out the benefits over time and to allow time for the development of the best 
possible environmental and fund management practices, we would be best to take the 
industry slowly.  
At a minimum, movement toward developments in new regions (such as new 
fields in AB, and into Labrador gas fields and Arctic oil development in NL) should be 
halted until we have effective systems in place to deal with the potential fallout and to 
capture maximum benefit from these new projects in a way that is fair to all resource 
owners, present and future. Note that there is a possibility, particularly with Arctic 
development, that it will be very difficult, or even impossible, to develop technology to 
deal with spills in these exceedingly harsh ice environments. And in this case, a 
                                                
90 Progressive Conservative Peter Lougheed was the premier of AB from 1971 until 1985. 
While his leadership of the AB Government commenced the long reign of the Conservative 
Party which continues to this day, his approach to developing the tar sands was dramatically 
different than current Conservative Party members. For example, similar to initiatives in 
Norway and Alaska, Lougheed created an oil revenue saving oil fund for the province, the 
Alberta Heritage Fund (which was subsequently gutted by succeeding administrations). In 
more recent years, he has been an outspoken critique of current development and an advocate 
for slowing the tar sands industry. 
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permanent moratorium on oil development may be in order. 
 
Which Ideal Case to Replicate? 
At the very center of this work are the perhaps mundane yet (I believe) vitally 
important details of the regulatory problems in these cases and how we might 
overcome them. Understood systematically, these distinct problems cumulatively 
signify a broken system, one that facilitates oil development in frontier sites. The fund 
and environmental management recommendations outlined above would go far in 
redressing or preventing resource curse and environmental degradation outcomes. But 
can we look to a real-world case that has applied this policy “package”? Is there a real 
or imagined model against which I am comparing these cases? There are obvious worst-
case scenarios, with Nigeria frequently cited. But what of “best practice” cases?  
No North American cases are notable; however, looking to Europe, one example 
is frequently suggested. Norway is often hailed as having an unparalleled record on 
environmental impacts related to oil development. This claim is usually supported in 
reference to the country’s “zero-discharge” policy (one that far exceeds standards in AB 
and NL), the early creation and implementation of regional plans that prohibit oil 
exploration and production in critical areas (currently missing in NL and only recently 
developed in AB), the suspension of exploration after scientific reports noted impacts 
on fish from the oil industry (Hasle et al. 2009) (while such evidence is often ignored in 
NL and AB), and the banning of ultra-deepwater drilling in response to the GOM 
disaster (unlike in NL where the provincial government asserted the ultra-deep drilling 
projects would continue regardless of the GOM experience). Overall, in comparative 
policy analysis, Norway seems to be using a stricter more “coercive” policy approach. 
The country employs stronger, direct “command and control” government regulations 
and economic instruments, such as taxes, to meet environmental goals in its oil sector 
(Wettestad 2004). 
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Yet for all it apparent environmental regulatory success, Norway faces the 
contradictions of “being a big petroleum producer with green vanguard ambitions” 
(Wettestad 2004, 780). Even our most promising example of environmental regulation of 
the oil industry is plagued by many of the same regulatory gaps and issues as the cases 
at hand.  
Since the mid-1990s, Norway has generally struggled to meet its sustainable 
development goals and has shown reluctance to implement policies developed during 
Brundtland’s period of national (and international) environmental policy leadership 
(Lafferty et al. 2007). For example, government officials claim Norway’s oil industry is 
much less carbon intensive than the sector in other countries (and that it is committed to 
green energy projects91), but given the massive size of the industry, the emissions are 
significant. In fact, from 1990 to 2004, Norway’s GHG emissions—driven by the oil 
sector—had already grown by 27% (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 2007, 6), with a 50% increased expected by 2012. This is far from Norway’s 
commitment to reduce emissions by 5% over the same period. And the public response 
to this failure has been described as apathetic due to the widespread recognition that 
the country’s impressive wealth and standard of living are a direct result of oil 
development (Norgaard 2006). Norway has also shown evidence of other regulatory 
problems common to my cases, such as delayed environmental assessment. For 
example, the environmental impact statement for the Norwegian Barents Sea came 
some eight years after exploration drilling commenced in 1980.  
The regulation of Norway’s oil industry is certainly not perfect at home. And its 
foreign activities might be a sight worse. Norway’s 67% nationally owned oil company, 
Statoil, has oil operations extending into Nigeria, Libya, Iraq and other countries with 
                                                
91 But note that the Norwegian oil industry is noted as flaunting its “green” reputation to 
discredit the development of alternative energy and to argue for increased oil production (Ihlen 
2009). 
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questionable human rights and environmental records. Since 2007 Statoil has also been 
active in AB’s tar sands (its first oil production there began in early in 2011), and in NL 
where it owns small shares in offshore operations.  
So rather than serving as an ideal-type of environmental regulation, Norway 
contends with many of the same problems as other industrialized oil states and exhibits 
many of the same problematic regulatory trends. Certainly, this case shows advances in 
important areas but it does not provide an ideal example on which to model regulation. 
My point here is that I have not raised solutions to the regulatory processes in 
AB and NL with a real-world ideal case as a point of comparison. One does not exist. 
What the interviewees identified early on in the research, and what was later confirmed 
in my reviews of public, government and scholarly literature, were the main 
impediments to better environmental outcomes in these particular cases. Rather than 
arguing for the replication of regulation elsewhere, I have drawn out the regulatory 
“sticking points”—the important areas in each case that, if improved, would have the 
greatest chance of improving or limiting environmental impacts.  
Comprehensive, ideal models for the environmental regulation of oil to correct 
these problems are seldom noted by those working on these issues or presented in the 
literature in any rigorous way. Instead, specific examples are drawn from a variety of 
cases. For example, experts on environmental policy in AB’s tar sands might stress the 
importance of a detailed cumulative analysis of the impact of oil and refer to the effort 
in Alaska to do this, as encapsulated in the report “Cumulative Environmental Effects 
of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaska's North Slope” (Committee on Cumulative 
Environmental Effects of Oil and Gas Activities on Alaska's North Slope 2003). Or 
experts on environmental policy in NL’s offshore might highlight the importance of 
suspending ultra-deepwater drilling and refer to the exploration bans used in the 
Norwegian case. But there is certainly no consensus that environmental policy in the oil 
fields of Norway, Alaska or some other case ought to be a complete model for 
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development in AB and NL. I have outlined the regulatory changes required but the 
great challenge is to implement them not in a piecemeal way but as a coherent 
framework alongside essential fund management policies. In the final section of this 
chapter, I propose a few key elements of this framework. 
 
 
II. Radically Rethinking Petrocracy  
The above discussion on policy recommendations for improved revenue management 
and environmental regulation represent what I take as the consensus in the literature 
and within policy communities involved in debates on oil development. This is what 
needs to be done in terms of policy to mend the system to avoid the resource curse and 
severe environmental degradation.  
 However this analysis is limited because it does not question the basic  
political-economic of the current system.92 Above I noted the first obvious steps toward 
the important regulatory improvements needed in these cases. But even more 
fundamental changes are required to the underlying political-economic assumptions at 
play in these cases. And this is where political ecology’s more radical edge is of great 
use. Political ecologists argue that to arrive at more socially and environmentally just oil 
development, deeper changes to the political economy system are needed.  
Promising systemic changes to challenge status quo economics involve an 
emphasis on “steady state,” “self-maintaining,” or “circular” economic models oriented 
around the original intent of sustainable development (as opposed to the current 
capitalist system based on increasing growth) (M'Gonigle 2000, 10, 1999, 19-20, 22). Such 
a system is based not on continuous profit growth through increasing demand 
(consumerism), supply and throughput of material and energy. Rather conservation, 
                                                
92 I thank Laurie Adkin for raising this point as she reviewed other work on the AB case 
(Carter forthcoming). 
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efficiency and demand reduction are its central features. The energy driving this system 
is, therefore, renewable and far more local. Environmental costs are no longer external 
to economic accounting; rather they are incorporated into the system. Also, recognizing 
that poverty and economic marginalization are the result of, but also the cause of, 
environmental degradation, economic security would also be a central feature of 
political ecology’s proposed alternative—otherwise there would always be pressure to 
accept development at any environmental cost (Alperovitz et al. 2000, 167-71).  
This kind of sustainable economic system is, of course, in direct opposition to the 
current approach of both cases. Applying these ideas to the cases, we would note that 
the dominant economic system needs to be re-conceptualized toward more localized 
“steady state,” efficient models that require less through-put of energy and natural 
resources and that “internalize” the current economic externalities. In terms of 
economic equity, we would then advocate for a frank assessment of the inequalities of 
oil development across geography, class and time—and then work for redistribution 
measures to ensure more equity. Likewise, more benefit of the resource needs to be 
captured by the resource owners (provincial and/or federal citizens, now and in the 
future)—and nationalizing the industry is the most promising route forward to attain 
this goal. In these oil dependent province cases, an obvious start to leveling the political 
playing field is a move to more public (provincial or national) ownership of oil reserves 
and development. This would include recasting the leasing processes from corporate-
driven to informed by long-term public social and environmental goals (more on this 
below). Increasing government involvement (for example via significant equity stakes), 
enhancing royalty regimes and eliminating subsidies would be a good start in the 
meantime.  
Political ecology then suggests that these economic reconfigurations need to be 
paired with political readjustments. Given the interaction between social relations and 
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ecological impacts,93 political ecology proposes less coercive, less exploitative, more 
democratic and fairer political organization. This is Adkin’s crucial point: she advocates 
building “the most inclusive solidarities possible” crossing class, gender, race and 
generation divides (2000, 68-73) and working toward “deepened and broadened 
participation by individuals and groups in decisions about the direction of society (vis-
à-vis states, élites, corporations and other institutional actors” (2000, 78). Simply put, 
this political critique is calling for the retrieval of democratic ideals and enacting them. 
An idealistic interpretation of democratic practices at work in these cases could 
be as follows: AB and NL are democratic governments where citizens freely elect 
representatives who devise and implement the environmental policies that citizens 
want. Government and the policies flowing from it are the will of the people. Therefore, 
whatever is (for example, a trade off of environmental integrity for industrial growth or 
weak environmental policy to facilitate oil development), is what voters democratically 
chose. And if voters want something different, they will vote differently. From this 
perspective, it would seem I am arguing for a technocratic elite to wrest decision-
making power from “the people” who elected to have things as they are. This sounds 
very undemocratic indeed. 
However, I would argue the depiction of government as the will of the people is 
a highly simplistic and naïve view of how democratic institutions actually work in these 
cases. Further, proposals I would suggest for the creation of bodies at “arm’s-length” 
from government for better environmental protection and fund management (discussed 
in the final section) are not measures to thwart the will of citizens. Rather they are 
urgently required temporary solutions to improve the current system, which has many 
                                                
93 As Watts notes, the “pressure of production on resources is transmitted through social 
relations which impose excessive demands on the environment” (Watts 2000, 262, original 
italics). Disparity in power so very often the problem—ecological problems see as rooted in 
inequity (cf. Bookchin), therefore solutions to ecological problems must include more equitable 
politics. 
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undemocratic tendencies, while we undertake the longer and more difficult work of 
fixing democratic institutions, or developing them to move closer to democratic ideals.  
The criticisms of the democratic system as it now stands in Canada are well 
known. Most importantly, the first-past-the-post, winner-take-all electoral system (as 
opposed to a proportional representation system) means that some parties in Canada 
and the provinces can win the majority of seats and govern based on very low 
percentages of the public vote. For example, Conservative Stephen Harper became 
Prime Minister in 2008 with 36% of the popular vote, gaining 143 seats (46% of the total 
seats). Given low voter turnout—the lowest in Canadian history at 59%—this means 
only 22% of the total electorate cast a ballot in support of this party. In contrast, for 
example, the New Democratic Party won 18% of the popular vote, but took only 37 of 
the seats in the House of Commons (only 12% of the seats). Similar patterns repeated in 
the recent 2011 federal election where the Conservative Party won 54% of the seats 
(finally giving majority government status to Prime Minister Harper) with 40% of the 
popular vote. Votes do not equally translate into seats and, therefore, political power.  
A similar pattern is obvious in AB as well. In the 2008 provincial election, 
Conservatives won 52% of the popular vote and got 86% of the total seats. Given the 
very low voter turnout—here the lowest in Albertan history at 41%—only 22% of the 
total electorate voted for this party. In NL, the difference between votes and seats was 
less pronounced but still noticeable. In the 2007 provincial election, the Conservatives 
won 70% of the popular vote to take 92% of the seats. Here a slide in voter turnout to 
62% was also noted; thus 42% of the total electorate cast a ballot in support of Williams.  
Given the potential to govern with minority support, candidates can win 
elections by catering to smaller groups of constituents using targeted policies rather 
than attempting to appeal to a broader public with more wide-spread or universal 
policies. The winner who takes all (or most) can represent a minority and forward 
minority policy interests. (Note also the additional complication of the divergence 
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between party platforms and party policy in practice. For example, the Liberal Party of 
Canada is often satirized as campaigning from the left and governing from the right. 
For what voters vote is not necessarily what they get.) 
So there is a problem of the preferences of those who vote not translating into 
governance leadership. But another perhaps more worrisome problem is the proportion 
of citizens who have withdrawn from voting. As in many industrialized countries, voter 
turnout is sliding in Canada and the provinces, as noted above. Of course, a common 
explanation for low voter turnout is frustration with the problems of representation also 
noted above. There is also the issue of whether voters feel there is a party on offer that 
represents their views. In Canada federally and in AB and NL, the two parties that have 
a realistic chance of forming government hover at the center and center-right with little 
to distinguish them (particularly in NL). Low turnout may be related to this as well. 
Other issues of note include the impact of negative advertising that can have the effect 
of making voters tune out rather than turn out, as well as the pressures of increasing 
work hours and the dearth of widespread civic education. 
Citizens choose not to vote in growing numbers. But the opposite problem to this 
is that interests which ought to be represented are not easily given voice. Who votes for 
coming generations or for people outside provincial or federal borders who are 
impacted by decisions taken within these jurisdictions? An electoral system focused on 
the present electoral cycle of a few years as it relates to issues within the narrow 
boundaries of provinces or the federal government has difficulty representing the 
concerns of intergenerational or global justice. The same is true of the environment 
itself—no traditional party is taking a position to preserve ecological integrity in its own 
right, rather environmental considerations are at best weakly incorporated into 
discussions of economic-environmental “balance” or poorly accounted for in rough-cut 
cost-benefit analysis where the environment is reduced to the dollar value of specific 
goods and services. 
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The result of these electoral issues means that voters do not get the governments 
they want, much less the policies they would choose. The chasm between public 
opinion polls and actual policy demonstrates this well. For example, polls repeatedly 
show Canadians highly value the environment and environmental protection (as well 
as universal health care and other social programs). Yet the last decades have delivered 
an ever-deepening progression of cuts to the very agencies responsible for 
environmental protection which has ended in the loosening of environmental 
regulation. Citizens resoundingly state that they want one thing (sustainable economies, 
health care, environmental protection) and yet they get quite another (tax breaks for the 
wealthy, and cuts to healthcare and the environmental protection). Political leadership 
and the environmental policies that follow from it do not represent what voters want. 
Instead we find striking correlations between campaign spending and election success. 
Political will is not simplistically driving along elections and policy. 
But beyond these electoral problems, I would add that democracy is about far 
more than free and open elections. Voting is of course the most obvious marker of 
democracy but democracy needs more than voting. On other important aspects of 
democracy, Canada and the case provinces fall short, particularly with regard to the 
lack of government transparency, unequal access to the political process, and surging 
inequality. 
Beyond the boundaries of the resource curse literature, guided instead by the 
critique of political ecology, we come to a critique of the larger political system in which 
the policies of fund management and environmental regulation are embedded. What is 
needed to move toward more politically just and economically and environmentally 
sustainable oil development? A more authentic democratic system is centrally 
important to this.  
Democratic practices in these cases need to be rethought by implementing 
proportional representation that ensures political power better reflects voters’ 
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preferences. Work is also needed on the tricky issues of party accountability, campaign 
financing and voter turnout. Perhaps even more difficult to attain, we also need traction 
on our international responsibilities and our responsibilities to future generations given 
the global intergenerational “commons” of our shared climate and oil reserves. Of 
course note that many of these policy recommendations for better revenue and 
environmental impact management as well as the recommendations for broader 
political-economic changes apply not just to petro-states. They might be basic aspects of 
good governance for states regardless of the major revenue source. 
And we could take this discussion to an even higher level of analysis to rethink 
oil reserves, a critical global commodity undergirding our carbon age, as part of a global 
commons—a global intergenerational commons. How could we democratize global 
hydrocarbon reserves, ensuring fairer access to energy? International debates on climate 
change sometimes suggest an equal rationing of GHG emissions as the only fair way to 
proceed. A similar equal rationing of oil resources comes to mind here as well. (Yet this 
outcome is highly unlikely. It is exceedingly implausible the U.S. would consent to 
having its access to oil rationed. These notions are theoretically just, but politically 
impossible.) 
Taken together, these ambitious economic and political changes provide a 
“radically transformed model of development” (Adkin 2003, 393), one reoriented 
around the limits of our environmental reality. Significant changes are needed, 
potentially Neumann’s “major, if not revolutionary, redistributions of power and 
wealth” (2008, 729). But how do we get to fairer political organization with more citizen 
participation in decisions that have major social, economic and environmental impacts? 
Or, at the very least, how do we simply tweak the system to get improved 
environmental outcomes? 
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III. Potential for Change and Petrocracy Resurgent 
The system of “petrocracy” that I have described is resilient to the kinds of system 
“tweaking” and fundamental systemic changes proposed above given the weakened 
state capacity and institutional inertia effects that come with entrenched oil interests. 
This, I think, is the key conundrum of the resource curse literature. Institutional 
improvement might prevent negative economic, political and, I would add, 
environmental outcomes. But this literature also shows that institutions are eroded and 
compromised by oil dependence. This is an elementary paradox. 
Still, there are prospects for change from several directions now evident the cases 
from civil society opposition, international pressures, random crises, and price impacts. 
I summarize these below. Yet, I also note that, to date, these combined oppositional 
forces have had only limited impact on actual development practices and 
environmental outcomes. In fact, recent crises, particularly the nuclear disaster in Japan, 
and price shifts may be working against effective environmental regulation. I briefly 
discuss these issues then turn to a discussion of three specific critical interventions in 
the regulatory regimes that hold promise. 
 A broad range of civil society actors demand change in these oil dependent cases. 
In AB in particular we see an enormous span of civil society actors working in tandem 
to oppose tar sands developments and demand environmental policy change. 
Environmental, social justice, labor, religious, aboriginal community, local community 
and health organizations work with non-partisan research institutes that are 
independent of industry funding, prominent individuals such as doctors, actors and 
filmmakers, as well as academics and scientists who have entered the public debate to 
communicate their research to the wider public. Coalitions cut across levels from very 
local settings to provincial, national and international sites. They work “inside” the 
political system, commissioning research to better understand the issues, participating 
in government hearings and consultations, and using the courts to ensure policy is 
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applied. They also work “outside” the political system, using direct action methods to 
take over work sites and interrupt campaign suppers to shame provincial politicians, 
coordinate cross-border campaigns to raise awareness of American policymakers, lobby 
banks and international European shareholders of those institutions providing the 
investment dollars, and target fuel users (such as airlines). These are sometimes massive 
international campaigns using new and traditional media. Through these interactions a 
consensus has developed that tar sands projects must be slowed or stopped outright 
until the social and environmental impacts are well known and can be dealt with 
through effective environmental regulation. This opposition has succeeded in drawing 
attention to Albertan and Canadian environmental policy problems surrounding oil 
development.  
But the view from NL is markedly different. Perhaps the explanation for the far 
more constrained public debate in NL is the poorer and more long standing economic 
circumstances faced by the province and its much narrower economic base since the 
collapse of the cod fishery in 1992. Perhaps it is also the remote location of the 
extraction, approximately 350 kilometers offshore. Unlike in AB, there is no “upgrader 
ally” on clear public display from major cities and people cannot easily directly 
experience the tailings ponds—the pollution is more or less diluted in the North 
Atlantic, flowing east away from coastlines. Perhaps the limited opposition is also due 
to the memory of the Greenpeace sealing fiasco in the 1980s that, to this day, makes 
“environmentalist” a highly negatively-charged word in the province. Or perhaps it is 
due to the obvious dearth of independent public policy analysis in the province. 
The muted debate due to this combination of factors in NL compared to that in 
AB could give the false impression of consensus in NL, that the environmental policy 
regime in the province is unproblematic. Yet this would miss the early and vigorous 
objections of fisheries groups in the 1980s as well as the longstanding efforts of a small 
group of scientists, government scientists, academics and ENGOs who have raised 
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environmental and social concerns about the province’s whole-hearted commitment to 
developing an oil economy over at least the last twenty years. Union organizations have 
also participated, for example in lobbying for an economic shift to green jobs. Many of 
these organizations and individuals, particularly the ENGOs who are very small and 
woefully underfunded and staffed, have grown frustrated of two decades of repeating 
the same concerns through the traditional channels of public consultations with no 
uptake by government. However this frustration has not yet been transformed into 
more direct actions outside normal politics.  
Alongside the pressure from civil society groups, change in environmental policy 
comes from other political factors. For example, great hope was placed in Obama 
during his campaign due to his criticisms of tar sands oil that had Prime Minister 
Harper and Albertan Premier Stelmach scrambling to defend the fuel and secure clean 
energy agreements with the new American president. This, combined with policies in 
California and big city mayors that aimed to restrict imports or use of the “dirty” fuel, 
suggest AB’s tar sands might not be as warmly welcomed as conventional exports in the 
U.S. 
Another potential source of environmental policy change is from public outcry 
following oil-induced environmental crises. After the Exxon Valdez spill in 1989 off 
Alaska, space was opened in the political debate across the U.S. and Canada to question 
oil development and to tighten environmental regulation. Worsening climate change 
impacts might provide a similar opportunity. But more dramatic events might be more 
effective. The most obvious example is, of course, the April 2010 blowout of the BP 
Deepwater Horizon rig in the GOM that caused a continuous, uncontrolled spill for 
nearly five months and wrecked havoc in ecosystems and the communities dependent 
on them across the region. The disaster provided an opportunity to galvanize North 
Americans to demand better regulation of oil development. 
And in NL, just prior to the blowout, there was another crisis with great local 
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impact that has also opened a space for rethinking oil dependence and environmental 
regulation. The crash of the Sikorsky S‐92A helicopter servicing the offshore oil sector in 
March 2009 which killed seventeen workers focused public attention on the need for 
improved regulation of workers’ safety in NL’s offshore while also raising questions 
about the adequacy of the regulatory regime surrounding environmental impacts. In 
the inquiry following the crash, the report commissioner noted that protecting workers 
and protecting the environment are, from a regulatory standpoint, closely intertwined 
(Wells 2010).  
Change could also be market driven if oil prices were to drop, as lower prices 
mean these extremely expensive frontier oil projects would be priced out of the market. 
This is also the issue of declining reserves, as a long-term solution to the problems in 
these cases. In approximately eighty years in AB and twenty in NL, at current rates of 
extraction, there will be little oil left to extract from these sites and, therefore, no need 
for a debate on environmental policy regime change in this sector (at least not here). 
These pressures from civil society, international shifts, environmental crises, and 
price change are political openings for policy change. Yet to date, taking a clear-eyed 
view, in reality very limited progress has been made on environmental regulation or on 
rethinking oil dependence and development more fundamentally in these cases. Rather, 
the dominant petrocratic order is reasserted against the challenges posed by civil 
society, shifting politics and environmental crises. 
In response to civil society resistance to status quo oil development, particularly 
in the case of tar sands development in AB, there has been a government-led backlash 
and re-legitimation of the projects. The provincial and federal governments, alongside 
or pressured by industry, work to undermine the opposition, downplay or spin crises, 
and sooth international concerns (or, in the end, some of the international pressures 
have lost their force). 
Given the strong opposition to tar sands in AB, the backlash was most evident 
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there. As soon as media outlets’ coverage of the negative impacts began in the late 
1990s, companies and the lobby association enhanced “communications” efforts to 
dispel what they referred to as the “myths” of the opposition. They attempted to 
discredit the opposition—and subtly threaten job loss and economic decline—across the 
traditional and new media spectrum. The provincial governments and the federal 
government stepped up efforts as well. Albertan officials have also been extremely 
active in countering messages casting the tar sands in a negative light. The Alberta 
Entreprise Group has gone as far as lobbying investors via “missions” to Europe. In my 
second case, recent years have seen NL’s former Premier Williams travelling widely 
particularly through the American northeast to tout NL’s “green” energy economy, 
focusing on the province’s hydro-power developments while underplaying the actual 
oil economy of the province. 
And while it seemed Obama could make implement emissions regulations 
during his campaign, the reality of stalled American progress on this issue is now clear. 
Prime Minister Harper has explicitly stated Canada will follow the lead of the U.S. on 
climate change and, to date, there is little leadership to follow. As the vulnerability of 
the American economy becomes more obvious, it is increasingly doubtful emissions 
“externalities” will be accounted for in American production processes. North 
American-wide emissions regulations are far off. While awaiting Obama’s leadership 
on emissions, as of 2009 Harper began loosening environmental assessment, apparently 
so that environmental regulations would not impede projects intended for stimulus 
growth. 
The backlash against change in these oil cases was most obvious in the recent 
federal and provincial response to the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout. Many hoped the 
disaster would provide a lesson for other frontier oil developers; instead, the incident is 
being spun to serve the frontier oil development industry and deepen status quo oil 
dependence and development in frontier Canadian cases. 
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Since the disaster, numerous assessments of environmental policy have been 
undertaken provincially and federally dealing primarily with offshore oil development 
but extending to onshore projects as well. The list includes the Government of NL’s 
“Review of Offshore Oil Spill Prevention and Remediation” (commenced May 2010)—
which followed on the long-awaited release of the NL south coast oil spill risk study 
(Transport Canada 2007), the House of Commons Standing Committee on Natural 
Resources hearings on energy security and oil development impacts (commenced in the 
summer of 2010), and the NEB’s “Arctic Offshore Drilling Review” (commenced 
September 2010). Most recently, the Federal Environment and Sustainable Development 
Commissioner released the “2010 Fall Report of the Commissioner of the Environment 
and Sustainable Development” which described Canada was unprepared for a major oil 
spill (Vaughan 2010). These are indications of an opportunity for change to the 
environmental regulation of offshore and onshore oil developments across Canada. But 
will the multiple reviews have real policy impact, or simply result in changes at the 
margins? 
The latter result is most likely, as is evident by the immediate reaction of NL 
officials after the spill. After the explosion, as preventative measures such as relief wells 
were discussed, Premier Williams warned that requiring these measures in NL’s 
offshore would slow or stop the industry—and the billions of dollars of revenues the 
province receives from it. Not even two months after the blowout, as oil was still 
gushing into the GOM, NL Minister of Natural Resources Dunderdale assured the NL 
Oil and Gas Industries Association that “We are wide open for business” (Sibonney 
2010). Meanwhile the head of the Board, CEO Max Ruelokke, expressed confidence that 
a comparable disaster would not occur in offshore NL (Antle 2010), even though NL’s 
new Orphan Basin drill sites are six times farther out to sea and nearly twice as deep as 
the disastrous BP well. 
Note also the biased leadership of the NL review of oil spill prevention meant to 
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identify any outlining problems with NL’s regulatory system to prevent disasters 
offshore. The Government of NL selected Captain Mark Turner to lead this project, 
former CEO of North Atlantic Pipeline Partners and Newfoundland LNG Ltd. who had 
proposed a liquefied natural gas transshipment and storage terminal for Grassy Point, 
Placentia Bay in the mid-2000s. We cannot expect a former proponent of an oil and gas 
project to have a neutral perspective on the risks of oil development.  
Nor has the GOM disaster disrupted development in AB’s tar sands. On the 
contrary, the NEB recently approved the Mackenzie Gas Project in December 2010 
(National Energy Board 2010), a pipeline project to deliver natural gas nearly 1200 
kilometers from the Northwest Territories to fuel AB’s tar sands projects. This highly 
contentious project was stalled since the early 1970s due to the extensive social and 
environmental impacts identified in the well-known assessment by Justice Thomas 
Berger.94 That it should be approved now, only four months after the BP hole was 
finally plugged, is a clear indication that Canadian oil development regulators have not 
become reluctant to commence major new oil projects. 
On the contrary, AB’s tar sands are increasingly officially glorified in light of the 
disaster. During the summer of 2010, media commentators began asking if the GOM 
disaster justifies expansions in the tar sands, given that they are less environmentally 
dangerous than offshore oil. Soon after, Levant published Ethical Oil (2010) which 
presented AB’s tar sands as a morally superior oil than reserves benefiting corrupt 
and/or authoritarian governments that use oil to fund terrorism and other unsavory 
activities and that have even worse environmental records. The book is now used 
widely as a justification for the tar sands by Albertan officials as well as Prime Minister 
Harper and the new Environment Minister Peter Kent (Egan 2011). It provides the 
                                                
94 Justice Berger was appointed the chairperson of the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry 
over the 1973 to 1978 period. His exhaustive, creative approach to working with people in the 
Arctic is considered an example of genuine engagement with communities—in stark contrast to 
most current attempts at public consultation. 
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illusion of oil producing provinces’ moral authority, as if their oil development was a 
kind of altruistic international aid. Rather than the GOM spill drawing attention to the 
problem of oil dependence and oil extraction broadly, in AB it allows the tar sands to be 
recast as a less risky alternative to offshore extraction. Meanwhile, in NL it is has come 
to stand for an unlikely risk, a potential cost of doing a very lucrative business on which 
the province depends. 
Another more recent and poignant example of environmental crises working 
against effective policy change is, of course, the recent Fukushima nuclear disaster. 
Recent events in Japan plainly exposed our energy conundrum yet they do not 
necessarily point to palatable alternatives. As Nikiforuk wisely notes, “Japan reflects 
both our petroleum pasts and our energy futures. […] In many ways Japan’s fate is our 
collective fate” (2011).  
The incident underscored our awkward predicament. The most powerful energy 
source we have tapped to date, the one on which we have built the global economy, is 
oil. But along the way, oil has wrought global climate change and its terrible 
consequences. Now oil-addicted states try to cope with declining conventional oil 
production (the cheap and easily accessible resources are gone) and, therefore, rising oil 
prices amidst global efforts to bring down carbon emissions. How can we achieve the 
dual aims of replacing oil energy while emitting less?  
Improving energy efficiency—finding ways to use less fossil energy—is one 
appealing solution. But the reality is that the efforts of some to consume less oil will be 
overtaken by the growing global demand for energy from old and new oil addicts. 
Worse, following the Jevons Paradox, gains in energy efficiency might result in greater 
energy use (hence the growing demand for energy in industrialized societies). The more 
realistic solution to the energy conundrum is to find new sources of energy that are not 
based on fossil fuels and do not result in high emissions. In this vein, Simpson et al. 
(2007) have proposed several “wedges” that, if used in tandem, will bring emissions 
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down (they focus on the Canadian case but the proposal applies globally). CCS and 
“fuel switching” take the largest share, with the latter implying a transition from fossil 
fuels to renewables or nuclear energy. 
Renewable, low-emissions energy (such as wind, solar, geothermal and wave 
energy) is the ideal contender to fossil energy. But each of the renewable energies comes 
with challenges that go beyond the well known problem that many of these are new 
technologies needing more development. Unpredictable supply, energy storage 
difficulties, the need to expand the grid, and NIMBY local resistance to the 
infrastructure are all problems impeding the rapid expansion on renewables’ share of 
energy generation. Given this, renewables are not expected to account for much of the 
total energy supply for decades to come. 
The great non-carbon, non-oil hope, therefore (for all its own environmental 
controversy95), is nuclear energy. But the disaster at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant due to the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami throws this energy source 
again into contention. The “Fukushima Effect” has been to undermine efforts to 
transition to nuclear as a viable replacement to conventional oil. And what will be the 
impact of this? Ideally, we would see the expansion of renewables—a re-doubly of 
efforts to get environmentally sound energy on line. However, the reality is that 
countries formally committed to nuclear are now rolling back plans for nuclear energy 
facilities and returning to fossil fuels development, particularly coal. But coal (the fuel of 
choice for many countries going off nuclear), comes with a heavy burden of 
environmental/climate and labor/human health risks, ones arguably comparable to 
those posed by nuclear energy (Monbiot 2011a). Even in countries like Germany, which 
has publicly committed to replacing nuclear plants with renewable energy, the probable 
                                                
95 On this controversy, see the notable exchanges between George Monbiot (climate 
change solutions author, environmental activist and now nuclear proponent) and Helen 
Caldicott (medical doctor and longstanding anti-nuclear activist) in The Guardian newspaper 
over March and April 2011. 
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result, as noted by Monbiot in a recent discussion in The Guardian newspaper online 
(2011b), is that it will face energy shortages and need to import more coal-fired 
electricity from the Czech Republic. Japan, for its part, will burn more coal, liquid 
natural gas and other fossil fuels to make up the energy shortfall from reduced nuclear 
power.  
It seems that, post-Fukushima, a disheartening realization is becoming clear: 
renewables cannot replace both fossil fuels and nuclear energy. And with nuclear at 
least momentarily off the table, this means an expansion of fossil fuels. Given the 
decline in conventional oil, this means the expansions of fuels like coal and 
unconventional carbons (tar sands, heavy oils, shale gases and so forth). The nuclear 
disaster could result in a great push toward renewable energy. But given the state of 
renewables, the more likely end result might be a renewed dependence on fossil fuels of 
the worst kind. All this is to say that combined environmental and energy crises like the 
most recent one in Japan might serve to reinforce a global reliance on oil. Post-oil 
societies might now look farther out of reach than ever after the Fukushima disaster.  
Environmental crises might not permit the kind of policy changes needed in 
these cases. Nor is waiting on oil prices to drop far enough to impede these very 
expensive frontier projects viable. Such declines are highly improbable, at least in the 
short- to medium-term. Prices will stay high given the slim chance of a major discovery 
of more easily accessed supplies, the slow progress on developing alternative energy 
sources (due to the technological barriers, reluctance to act in many jurisdictions, and 
the subsidies to the oil sector), and the slow progress on international systems to price 
carbon.  
Instead, we are more likely to see dramatic price increases rather than decreases 
that end frontier oil extraction—most likely we are moving instead toward Rubin’s 
(2009) predicted “$200 oil.” And as prices rise, this makes previously economically 
unthinkable oil projects feasible, including transporting natural gas from Alaska to fuel 
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AB’s tar sands projects, transporting bitumen from AB across the Rocky Mountains to 
new mega-ports with tankers headed to China, and extracting oil in NL’s offshore from 
wells twice as deep as the BP Deepwater well and much farther out from land. These 
extraordinary feats of technology requiring mind-boggling investment commitments 
are already possible now with the price of oil hovering around triple digits. Further 
price increases will motivate oil “entrepreneurship” in directions we might now find 
hard to imagine—full development of Arctic oil reserves among them. Prices are not 
going to drive the kind of positive policy change needed in these cases. 
For these reasons, the potential for significant, effective environmental policy 
change in AB and NL does not seem great, even after years of well-organized civil 
interventions and promising environmental crises or price circumstances that in theory 
provide openings for change. Given the many points of backlash against the several 
promising pressures for policy changes in these cases, admittedly there is not much 
hope that we will see the kind of needed improvements for environmental and other 
kinds of management in these cases. What, then, is to be done?  
 
 
IV. Critical Interventions 
I propose focusing growing civil society opposition on implementing three very specific 
and strategic policy interventions that might be effective in improving environmental 
outcomes and that might also have positive, self-sustaining political culture and 
democratic impacts. If pressed for at the right time, as the environmental crises of our 
energy paradox intensify—and they undoubtedly will, as scientific evidence 
documenting the health impacts of the tar sands developments in AB is building and 
more spills or accidents in NL’s offshore are unfortunately inevitable—new frameworks 
might stand a chance of being implemented. 
 Figures 10 to 13 in chapters two and three provided basic flowcharts of the major 
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regulatory stages and environmental assessment process. Combining these in broad 
stokes, case nuances aside, we have the process outlined below, moving from initial 
disposition of rights to the project’s end. 
 
Figure 31: Basic Regulatory and Environmental Assessment Process 
 
Leasing of rights to land/resources  
 
Proponent applies to government agency for project approval;  
Environmental assessment process is required 
 
Result of assessment is transmitted to final decision maker  
(federal or provincial minister) 
 
Project Approval 
 
Project Monitoring 
 
Project Closure / Remediation 
 
In this system, I would argue that the most promising changes to be made, for both 
environmental and democratic outcomes, are threefold. 
First, we need to open up the “black box” of decision-making activity that occurs 
before the first step above, the leasing of rights to land or resources. This is the critical 
point at which decisions are made to list lands for auction for leasing. Companies that 
purchase these leases interpret them as property rights they now own and as such the 
leases are difficult to revoke once issued. And once issued, there is an expectation, and 
not an unreasonable one, that companies will develop these areas for oil production. All 
the regulatory issues that follow in these systems are set in motion at the point of 
leasing. Yet, in both cases, there is limited information on how decisions on 
environmental impacts are made and limited public access to or involvement in this 
process. What is clear is that the process for releasing lands for oil development is more 
often than not driven by corporate requests for particular parcels rather than 
scientifically based notions of environmental integrity or public good. I am 
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recommending, therefore, that pressure be exerted to open this process to public 
scrutiny at which point broader debates can be had on regional land use planning for 
the long term. 
 Second, to guide the decision making from the point of land leasing forward, an 
environmental board needs to be established that is independent from the profit 
pressures of industry and from the revenue pressures of government. It is this board 
that would guide the environmental assessment and monitoring processes featuring in 
the figure above. The board would be mandated to ensure environmental protection 
and the long-term public good and have sufficient capacity to do this work. It would 
also be guided by independent scientific expertise. Further, to be effective, it would 
have the authority to reject projects. In both provincial cases, past experience indicates 
that proposed projects are seldom rejected; rather they are revised until satisfactory to 
regulators who, as I have shown, often do not have the capacity to monitor the actual 
environmental outcomes. An institutional change is needed that permits a change of 
tenor in the environmental assessment process from “how” to “if”—from focusing on 
how the project might best be developed to reduce environmental impact to evaluating 
if the project should proceed at all. Such an independent environmental agency has 
already been proposed in NL (Carter and Fraser 2011). In addition to this change, 
following the Norwegian model, I would also suggest the creation of an oil revenue 
authority. As a pair, these bodies would insulate the protection of the environment as 
well as the collection, spending and saving of oil revenues, from short-term partisan 
and industry interests.  
Third, throughout the new approach to leasing and the activity of the 
independent environmental and fund management agencies, simple but powerful 
procedures of transparency are needed. They would bring to light basic but essential 
environmental and economic information that are currently difficult to access, 
particularly the following: (1) the dollar value of the resource (both in the ground at 
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current and projected prices, as well as in terms of the value of sales), (2) what revenues 
governments and corporations are capturing, (3) the level of provincial and national 
dependence on oil-related revenues and exports, (4) the costs incurred (costs of 
development, environmental costs, and the subsidies and other government 
investments), (5) how much of the resource has been extracted to date and how much 
remains. There are currently effective ways to do this, for example by participating in 
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  
Making data on oil revenue, spending and environmental impacts available on 
the regulators’ websites is an easy but fundamentally transformative practice. Better 
public transparency is essential to better government accountability to citizens. It incites 
citizens to stay informed about the benefits and costs of the industry and to demand a 
fair share of resource rents as well as industry practices that are more environmentally 
sustainable. These demands are often the impetus for governments to initiate policy to 
avert the resource curse (Stevens and Dietsche 2008, 63) and protect the environment. 
Transparency may be a necessary condition for citizens demanding and governments 
enacting the needed policy changes.  
 Environmentally, these three specific changes would provide for invigorated 
ecologically-based decision-making, environmental assessment, and monitoring. 
Politically, these changes enhance the practice of democracy in these cases. They would 
give more access to fundamental early decisions, provide structures for more balanced 
decision-making, access to more information and, therefore, increased awareness about 
the real state of the environment (and economy dependent on it). And once 
established—once the leasing process becomes accessible, the independent 
environmental agency is in place, and basic information is transparent—these 
institutions may even open space for discussions on moving toward more “radical” 
political-economic system shifts.  
The question, then, is how to initiate these three small but powerful institutional 
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changes, even given the inertia and under-capacity of these cases and the backlash 
against them. Changing the institutions of a petro-province is indeed a daunting task. 
But progress can be made toward the critical, self-sustaining, democratically re-
invigorating interventions described above if there is a new kind of public debate on 
several basic but essential points. First, widespread public awareness is needed on the 
powerful fact that these oil resources are public resources. Companies assisting the 
public in extracting revenue from these resources deserve a fair profit return, but few 
would agree they deserve the windfall. What is a fair rate of return for people, 
governments, and corporations? This is, I think, an often evaded but powerful line of 
questioning. Second, debate on the issue of intergenerational justice would be valuable 
as well. This would be a conversation highlighting that the public resource owners are 
not just people here and now—the one-time, finite resource belongs to future 
generations as well. The option of leaving the non-wasting resource in the ground for 
future extraction would also mean even more could be gained from the resource in the 
future as prices rise and extraction technology improves. Discussion is also needed, as a 
third point, on the fact that these are increasingly rare high-value resources, given that 
independent multinational companies have few other places available to them and 
these Canadian jurisdictions are politically stable. These cases are do not need to pander 
to or feel held captive by corporate interests—quite the opposite. Fourth, information 
on the reality of declining finite oil reserves in these cases is needed, as well as 
information on similar oil-dependent jurisdictions (such as Alaska) that have had great 
difficulty managing public services as oil supplies have declined. Lessons of fallen oil-
rich cases will indicate where these cases are potentially headed. Finally, public 
conversations on the environmental costs of oil development as well as the enormous 
subsidies to the industry are crucial. There needs to be a public weighing of oil versus 
other kinds of economic growth, particularly growth from developing sustainable 
energy economies which bring local, long term employment and easily build on current 
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local skilled trades. Public discussions on points such as these would help in rethinking 
status quo petro-political-economics. 
From where could these conversations come? The origin of the new debates will 
necessarily come from outside industry and government—these two entities are too 
intertwined with status quo oil development. In AB, independent research institutes 
such as the Pembina Institute and Parkland Institute are already making inroads on 
developing these debates. Researchers there are joined with journalists associated with 
media outlets (traditional and new) who are freer from corporate influence and with 
progressive academics focusing on energy and equity issues. In NL, which lacks 
comparable public policy research institutes with a critical edge, the onus is on 
journalists and academics, but the pool is much smaller in this province compared to 
AB. That said, conversations are already underway across the provinces and territories 
to share the bitter lessons of oil dependence and find solutions. New research programs 
are joining universities and public policy research institutes. A new institutional 
framework for re-designing oil development in Canada’s frontier, such as I have 
proposed above, is anticipated to come from this work. 
But these efforts are now confronted by a major political setback due to the May 
2011 Canadian federal election. Given this, Canada is farther than ever from the goal of 
implementing effective environmental policy in the oil frontier—and this is regardless 
of the significant gains made by an environmentally and socially progressive party.  
The rise of the New Democratic Party to the official opposition party for the first 
time in Canadian federal politics might seem to hold some promise for the possible 
implementation of policies I have recommended here, given the NDP’s commitment to 
environmental sustainability, social justice and energy diversification. Garnering more 
than two million votes across the country (due to the implosion of the Liberal Party and 
the collapse of Bloc Québécois support), the NDP opposition signals a strengthened 
progressive voice in the House of Commons crossing the English-French divide. The 
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election also gave Canada its first Green Party Member of Parliament. 
Yet while the election saw the strengthening of the Canada’s social democratic 
party, the party among the most likely to embrace effective environmental policy 
change in the frontier oil patch, and the arrival of the Green Party in the House, it also 
resulted in the election of a majority Conservative government. With just 40% of the 
popular vote, thanks to the deficiencies of the first-past-the-post electoral system, Prime 
Minister Harper is now moving forward on the presumption that he has a clear 
mandate from Canadians to implement his party platform. This includes a commitment 
to “streamlining” environmental regulation as well as to expanding oil and gas 
development, particularly in the tar sands and in the Arctic, to solidify further Canada’s 
role as a global energy superpower. 
The Harper government is already internationally recognized as a climate 
change laggard due to its blatant defiance of attempts to set global targets on emissions 
reductions. On the national stage, the June 2011 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act plan 
shows Canada as comfortable increasing carbon emissions while other federal policy 
documents demonstrate a clear reluctance to isolate and deal with major emitters. For 
example, EC’s spring 2011 National Inventory Report on emissions as part of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change conspicuously omits precise data on tar 
sands emissions.  
Instead of taking effective measures to deal with emissions from the oil sector, 
the federal government is increasing lobbying efforts in Europe to thwart fuel quality 
directives that would prevent imports of fuel from the tar sands on the grounds of high 
emissions. The Harper government is also restructuring the CEA Act to facilitate federal 
environmental assessments of oil pipelines and tar sands projects and quietly 
underfunding effective environmental programs to the point of incapacitating them, or 
simply not renewing programs as they expire (the precarious future of ecoEnergy for 
Renewables program being a case in point). The erosion of environmental policy begun 
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in previous terms of Conservative Party minority governance will now be expanded 
and deepened from the government’s majority position. And this will occur alongside 
the continuation of subsidies to oil and gas developments.  
So while policy solutions to the resource curse and anemic environmental 
regulatory systems are obvious and potentially easy to implement, and while the 
structural changes for more social equity and environmental/economic sustainability 
are equally evident, implementing these changes will undoubtedly be challenging 
within the new Canadian political context. Conversations to galvanize public debate 
toward the regulatory and political-economy changes are growing out of civil society 
demands, particularly in AB and particularly in response to the experience of 
environmental crises. Yet the obstacles to change are formidable, given the powerful 
government/industry backlash against resistance to status quo oil regulation. Oil 
dependent governments rush to defend and re-legitimate their oil economies, to the 
point that even environmental disasters caused by oil extraction are used to justify 
apparently “safer” oil extraction in other sites or by other methods that have equally 
problematic impacts. Even more daunting are the realities of the over-arching oil-
dependent global petro-capitalist system that continues to press for more and more oil.  
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APPENDIX I: FORMAL INTERVIEWEE LIST 
 
AB Case 
 
 
1. Alberta Employment, Industry, and Immigration policy maker, April 27, 2007. 
Edmonton. 
2. Alberta Energy policy maker, Policy, Planning and External Relations (1), April 27, 
2007. Calgary. 
3. Alberta Energy policy maker, Policy, Planning, and External Relations (2), October 
18, 2008. Edmonton. 
4. Alberta Environment policy maker, Environmental Policy Branch (1), April 23, 2007. 
Edmonton. 
5. Alberta Environment policy maker, Environmental Policy Branch (2), October 16, 
2008. Edmonton. 
6. Alberta Environment policy maker, Oil and Gas Policy Sector and Electricity / 
Minerals Sector (1 & 2), April 23, 2007. Edmonton. 
7. Alberta Environment policy makers, Oil and Gas Policy Sector and Electricity / 
Minerals Sector (3), April 23, 2007. Edmonton. 
8. Alberta Environment policy maker, Strategic Policy and Innovation, October 23, 
2008. Phone interview; call to Edmonton. 
9. Alberta Federation of Labour researcher, April 30, 2007. Edmonton. 
10. Arusha Centre activist. April 14, 2007. Edmonton. 
11. Canadian Institute of Resource Law lawyer (1), University of Calgary, April 11, 2007. 
Calgary. 
12. Canadian Institute of Resource Law lawyer (2), University of Calgary, April 11, 2007. 
Calgary. 
13. Council of Canadians researcher, April 3, 2007. Edmonton. 
14. Edmonton Social Planning Council researcher, April 2, 2007. Edmonton. 
15. Energy and Utilities Board policy maker (Business Operations and Development), 
April 24, 2007. Phone interview; call to Calgary. 
16. Energy Resources and Conservation Board policy maker, Fort McMurray Office, 
October 20, 2008. Fort McMurray. 
17. Environmental Law Centre lawyer, April 23, 2007. Edmonton. 
18. Fort Mckay community leader, April 17, 2007. Fort MacKay. 
19. New Democratic Party representative, April 26, 2007. Edmonton. 
20. Oil Sands Development Group researcher, October 20, 2008. Fort McMurray. 
21. Parkland Institute researcher (1), April 4, 2007. Edmonton. 
22. Parkland Institute researcher (2), April 23, 2007. Edmonton. 
23. Pembina Institute researchers (1 & 2), April 11, 2007. Calgary 
24. Pembina Institute researcher (3), April 12, 2007. Canmore. 
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25. Polaris Institute researcher, April 16, 2007. Fort McMurray. 
26. Professor of Political Science (1), University of Alberta, April 8, 2007. Edmonton. 
27. Professor of Political Science (2), University of Alberta, October 16, 2008. Edmonton. 
28. Public Citizen researcher, April 16, 2007. Fort McMurray. 
29. Public Interest Alberta researcher, April 27, 2007. Edmonton. 
30. Quality of Life Commission researcher, April 14, 2007. Edmonton. 
31. Regional Aquatics Monitoring Program member, October 22, 2008. Fort McMurray. 
32. Sierra Club researcher, April 14, 2007. Edmonton. 
33. Wood Buffalo Alliance Ltd. representative, April 17, 2007. Fort McMurray. 
34. Wood Buffalo Environmental Association researcher, October 23, 2008. Fort 
McMurray. 
 
 
 
NL Case 
 
 
1. C-NLOPB Environmental Affairs researcher, February 14, 2008. St. John’s.  
2. Department of Finance researcher, Fiscal Policy, ongoing since March 2007. St. 
John’s. 
3. Department of Human Resources and Labour Relations policy maker, Poverty 
Reduction Strategy, February 26, 2007 and March 16, 2007. St. John’s. 
4. Department of Natural Resources policy maker, Energy Branch, Petroleum Projects 
Monitoring (1), March 7, 2007. St. John’s. 
5. Department of Natural Resources policy maker, Energy Branch, Petroleum Projects 
Monitoring (2), March 7, 2007. St. John’s. 
6. Department of Natural Resources policy maker, Energy Branch, March 7, 2007. St. 
John’s. 
7. Department of Natural Resources policy maker, Energy Policy, Planning and 
Coordination, March 21, 2007. St. John’s. 
8. East Coast Response Corporation (ECRC) - Atlantic Region representative, February 
4, 2008. Mount Pearl. 
9. Environment Canada policy maker, Newfoundland Provincial Office (1), February 
11, 2008. Mount Pearl.  
10. Environment Canada policy maker, Newfoundland Provincial Office (2), March 13, 
2007. Mount Pearl.  
11. Environmental consultant, February 27, 2007. St. John’s. 
12. Fisheries and Oceans Canada policy maker, Environmental Response, March 26, 
2008. Mount Pearl. 
13. Former senior provincial energy policy maker, July 18, 2008. St. John’s. 
14. Long time employee with key federal departments (1), March 6, 2007 and March 27, 
2008. Mount Pearl. 
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15. Long time employee with key federal departments (2), March 6, 2007. Mount Pearl. 
16. Natural History Society scientist and researcher, February 12, 2008. St. John’s. 
17. New Democratic Party (NDP) representative, March 5, 2007. St. John’s. 
18. Newfoundland and Labrador Environmental Association (NLEA) representative, 
January 22 and 28, 2008. Mount Pearl. 
19. Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour (NLFL) researcher, March 1, 
2007. St. John’s. 
20. Sierra Club researcher (1), January 29, 2008. St. John’s. 
21. Sierra Club researcher (2), February 12, 2008. St. John’s. 
22. Sierra Club researcher (3), February 14, 2008. St. John’s. 
23. Tekoil (onshore oil development company) representative, March 5, 2008. Corner 
Brook. 
24. Transport Canada (TC) policy maker, March 28, 2008. Mount Pearl. 
25. University environmental sciences professor (1), December 20, 2006. Phone 
conversation. 
26. University environmental sciences professor (2), August 17, 2007. St. John’s. 
27. Graduate student researching oil and environmental issues, January 23, 2007. St. 
John’s. 
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